



21st CENTURY

«NORAVANK» FOUNDATION

1(7)

YEREVAN

2010

21st CENTURY

Information and analytical journal

1 (7), 2010

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COLLAPSE OF THE “SYSTEM”: SOME CAUSES AND EFFECTS

*Gagik Harutyunyan**

More than 20 years have passed since the day (November 9, 1989) when the East German patrols guarding the symbol of the Cold War – the Berlin Wall, left their duty stations and Germany unified de-facto. The fragments of the fallen “wall” became hot selling souvenirs and thus, in a way they remained symbols but this time around, symbols of the new era. Two years later the USSR and the “socialist bloc” ceased to exist.

What happened was described as the “end of the Cold War”, “victory of democracy”, although characterizations like “geopolitical tragedy” or “civilizational collapse” are suggested as well. Nonetheless, the fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in a new era, which essentially differs from the previous one and used to be called “post-modernity”. It is not for nothing that the international community pompously celebrated the 20th anniversary of this event, with official events organized and wide discussions held in mass media and political scientists circles. Meanwhile, there have not been too many references to this topic in our information space.

Armenian realities. 20 years ago the “Berlin Wall” of ours ran across Lachin, and the unification and relative restoration of territorial integrity as a result of the war took place only in 1994, when an armistice was concluded. Ideas with mainly national and historical roots dominated the Armenian society. This added a certain peculiarity to the social and political developments ongoing then, which even so were in line with the logic of “socialist system” destruction and creation of the new world order. However, this period and the subsequent ones have not been fully studied so far, although there were some attempts made. To some extent, this was because of the transformation of Armenian SSR into the Third Republic, the country dropped out of the imperial scientific, educational and cultural space, which

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had to lead inevitably to its isolation and significant narrowing of the society's horizons in general. Consequently, today we do not always adequately assess and sometimes do not even comprehend at all the phenomena that are out of our local perceptions.

In particular, the system changes occurred in the 90s of the last century are somewhat naively designated as just "gaining independence" and some researchers even suppose that Armenia was a colony of the USSR. Such a dubious approach is the legacy of the unpretentious Soviet social science concepts based on the methodology of permanent criticism of the British colonialism (and later on the criticism of the so-called neo-colonialism) by the Soviet propaganda.

The successor of the Russian Empire – the Soviet Union, with all its disadvantages and advantages, was a unique phenomenon and in fact, it was an immense geo-ideological project. In the context of these realities, the comparisons with other imperial structures are not always appropriate, and this concerns not only the Eurasian/continental nature of the Soviet empire. The status, real rights and obligations of all the peoples of USSR (including Russians) and their administrative formations practically did not differ from each other. The same concerns the "socialist bloc" countries that formally were not part of the "parent state." Moreover, as far as freedoms are concerned, things were much better in those so-called "vassal" countries. Furthermore, as a result of such system some nations (especially those in the Asian part of the USSR) acquired writing systems, literature and modern culture; universities, branches of the Academy of Sciences, operas and philharmonic orchestras were established in the autonomous republics and regions, and this played a key role in their development.

As for Armenia, it should be mentioned that despite the severe ordeals it had go through along with the other nations of USSR (repressions, ignoring and falsifying national and historical issues, etc.), the Soviet years had also been an important phase for us from the standpoint of scientific and technological, and spiritual and cultural development.

The list of the misconceptions about the Soviet past may go on and on, but let us mention that they are not always the legacy of the Soviet past, where the officious stereotypes prevailed in the field of humanities. Today, one may clearly observe the tendencies of manipulating the national memory that point to application of the modern technologies for informational and ontological warfare and nation building.

Consequently, the mass media depict the Soviet period mainly in “tragic” or “ironical” tones, and call for getting out of “clutches of the past”. The form, spirit and “black-and-white” approaches seen in these materials conspicuously “made for export” interestingly resemble the much-criticized Bolshevik “agitprop”.

At the same time, attempts are currently made to analyze our recent history in a more complex manner: some interesting research works and memoirs are published. However, because of the small print run volumes of such a literature, the absence of appropriate *PR* (which is a necessary condition today) and the partial loss of the “books culture” and reading in general, these studies hardly scratch the surface of the informational space and make no imprints in the consciousness of the society, particularly, the youth.

The considerations brought herein do not imply at all creation of a Stalin-style *“History of the All-Union Communist Party: Short Course”*, where the definite assessment of the recent past would be given. The approaches may differ and even be mutually exclusive, but their existence would help forming elaborate conceptions in the society with regards to the pathway we walked through with a dignity. This is important not only from the cognitive standpoint; it is known that comprehending the continuity of one’s own history is one of the cornerstones for the national and informational security and national ideology. However, let us get back to the “Berlin Wall”.

The fall of the “Wall” is presented in many versions by mass media and expert literature over the last 20 years. Most of them are quite curious, but what they allow is just once again stating the fact that such a global phenomenon as the collapse of the “socialist bloc” was, could not have happened due to only one or even several factors.

“External factor”. The main “external” cause for the “system” collapse was, of course, the coordinated and consistent military and political (the creation of the “black holes” consuming the resources of the Soviets in Latin America, Africa, Afghanistan and other “hot spots”), economic (like the exhausting “armaments race” and “star wars”, manipulations with the oil prices), informational and psychological (particularly, in the form of radio broadcastings that rather skillfully portrayed an irreproachable “image” for the West and the gloomy reality of the “socialist bloc”, through dissemination of “dissident” literature, etc.) struggle of the USA and its allies in the Cold War against the USSR and “socialist bloc”, which ended with the defeat of the latter. At the same time, some historiographic circles often interpret the col-

lapse of the system exclusively as a result of the activities of western intelligence services during Perestroika and political and economic “agents of influence” enlisted by them. It has to be mentioned that many reprehensible actions in the post-Soviet period are also attributed to those “agents of influence.”

These observations, often confirmed by documents, suggest that the intelligence services indeed played an important role in the “collapse”. There are evidences that not only ordinary citizens but also some high-ranking Soviet leaders acted against the USSR and in the interests of the US. Particularly, the so-called “Gold-laden donkey”¹ technology was efficiently used, which implies bribing and orienting the political figures in the needed direction. One may assume that the aforementioned methods of the external influence were then, of course to a much smaller scale, used in “Armenian developments”, and it cannot be precluded that such techniques are used today as well.

In the context of aforementioned, the public statements by the western officials to the effect that the processes of those years were a “surprise” to them sound unconvincing: at the meetings where no mass media are present, they express quite different views. For example, in 1995 the US president Bill Clinton stated at a closed meeting of the chiefs of staff that: “the policy carried out over the recent decade against the USSR pursuing the destruction of one of the strongest world powers had proved right ... Taking advantage of the Soviet diplomacy mistakes, unwarranted self-confidence of Gorbachev and his circle, including those who had *taken a visibly pro-American stance*, we achieved what the US president Truman wanted to do using the atomic bomb [1].

At the same time it should be recognized that the US and its allies acted in their national interests and accusations against the West might be understandable from the emotional point of view, but they are not compelling at all: the “hypothetical enemy” acted in a spirit of the Cold War and used the methods accepted in that war. It is also very important that these actions resonated with the Soviet society. Part of the so-called “agents of influence” acted in a way, out of “ideological considerations” and sincerely believed that the existing system had to be changed by any means, because it would be for the good of the country. However, the notions of “motherland” and “undesirable political system” were evened in the

¹ This expression is credited to Philip of Macedon who once said that for capturing cities few armies were as powerful as a single donkey laden with bags of gold. Such technology called “Gold-laden donkey” in the expert and journalist circles, and which existed during the whole history of humankind, has been “legitimized” and essentially improved nowadays (particularly, considering the great number of “grant” programs and capabilities of the modern banking system). It plays an important and legitimate role in not only the concepts of the intelligence services, but also in military and political, diplomatic and information spheres of some world powers.

meanwhile, as it had happened with the Russian social democrats on the eve of the 1917 October revolution, with all the ensuing consequences. Thus, apparently there were also “internal” preconditions for the system collapse.

“Internal factor”. The Soviet system was established in a result of revolutionary violence, and the “terror” against own people based on different motives or without any had lasted for about 36 years (1917-1953), till the death of Stalin. According to the data from the Commission on Rehabilitation of the Political Repression Victims under the president of the Russian Federation, the number of these victims totals to about 32 million people, of which 13 million are the casualties of the Civil War, and part of the huge number of victims in the Great Patriotic War (30 million) can be attributed to the “peculiarities” of the totalitarian regime¹. Not only “human resource” or “human capital” fell victim of the terror; huge strata of the spiritual/intellectual and cultural values, as well as material ones created over the centuries in the multi-national Russian Empire were destroyed.

It is known that in the post-Stalin period the “system” just became somewhat softer and the “national” and “human” factors still had not been regarded of any particular value. The “Perestroika” allowed the entire Soviet society, as well as the population of the republics with national problems, to express their protests accumulated over decades. The policy of “Perestroika” carried out by the Communist party high-ranking functionaries, or at least by some of them, had also been a peculiar form of dissatisfaction with the system.

That very dissatisfaction and buildup of the critical mass of those who protested against the “system”, in interaction with the “external” influence in line with the Cold War recipes, destroyed the “socialist bloc”. Let us also mention that the collapse occurred when the information revolution began: under the new realities, it was impossible to imagine the existence of an isolated systems sized 1/6 of the planet, as the USSR was. In addition, it is not unconceivable that had the “system” survived till the Internet age, the collapse scenario might have followed a smoother pattern, since the “protesting masses” would have not had abstract perceptions about the surrounding world, but rather more realistic ones.

Society out side the system. It is known that even in the “not free” states the creative communities find their forms of self-expression. In our case, this was facilitated by the fact that the idea of creating a strong Soviet power and stressing

¹ See <http://www.lenta.ru/russia/2001/10/29/yakovlev/>. It has to be mentioned that the conclusions of the commission suggest that the number of the victims might be incomplete.

the ideological factor necessitated the communist leadership to create an integral, developed and large-scale military/industrial, scientific/educational and cultural complex. Consequently, the USSR (and later on its allies too¹) turned into a country with highly developed science, technologies and culture on the basis of which a new, Soviet intelligentsia bearing deep knowledge and spiritual values had come into being. Taking advantage of Khrushchev's "Thaw" and partial reforms, the said creative elite seemed to have assumed the role of Soviet people's spiritual leader to some extent.

For the considerable part of the society, the words of the reputable scientists and writers, successful books and films were much more important than the speeches of the communist party leaders or the theses of their party congresses. The "dissident"² and national movements gained some significance: in spite of the repressions, many people disseminated and read the so-called "*Samizdat*" (self-published books) or "*Tamizdat*" (foreign-published books). Remarkably, the formerly condemnable system of values and its bearer – the Soviet person (*Homo Sovieticus*), the hero of many jokes, unlike today's *Homo Economicus*, has a rather high rating today. For instance, both in Armenia and in Russia some clergymen presently consider that the citizens of the atheist USSR very often stood much closer to the true Christian values and ideas than those who live amid the current "freedom of conscience and religion" and follow the religious rites. In this context one may say that following the "Perestroika" slogan borrowed from A. Chekhov "to squeeze the slave's blood out of oneself", the post-Soviet society along with that "squeezed out" some rather precious qualities, too.

Nevertheless, the political perception of the "protesting" part of the Soviet society at the same time was more than naïve and guileless. The idealized "free world" seemed to be the only alternative to the communist regime and even the slightest sign of distrust towards the "West" was interpreted as a manifestation of the official propaganda or, at the very least, a delusion. The understanding, that the western

¹These realities reflect in the fact that some countries of the "socialist bloc" despite economically lagging behind their "developed capitalist" neighbours, outperformed them in social and health indices and by some other criteria.

²Interestingly, according to the Russian political scientists Sergei Kurginyan and Alexander Dugin the "dissident" movement in the USSR was managed by KGB, because the Committee was not satisfied by the "system" (Al. Dugin qualified KGB as an "Atlantic order" in the USSR). It is known that in the world practice the collaboration between special services and anti-state organizations is not an extraordinary phenomenon. Moreover, the intelligence services, as a rule, are much better aware of the situation in the country and from this point of view KGB should have forecast back in 1970s that the "system" is degenerating and losing to the West. This, as well as certain collaboration between the elite of the "dissident movement" and the higher echelons of KGB does not sound as something fantastic. On the other hand, it would be definitely an exaggeration to think that KGB managed the dissident movement and this was the main reason for the collapse of the USSR, as S. Kurginyan and Al. Dugin believe.

model is also a system of a sort with harshness of not a lesser degree, came later. It is characteristic that only very few Soviet “dissidents” openly admitted that: most probably for many of them such an acknowledgment implied revision and reconsideration of their own views, which perhaps, was hard from psychological standpoint¹.

Effects and possible prospects. The collapse of USSR and the “socialist bloc” took place in the classical revolution mode with all the ensuing negative consequences: ethnic conflicts, refugees and street children, crime rates increase, management system collapse, decline of economy and living standards (markedly, even up till now the GDPs of some post-Soviet republics have not reached their Soviet period levels), destruction of scientific, industrial and cultural infrastructure (specifically, in Armenia the science is currently financed 30 times as little as it was 20 years ago), impoverishment and, most importantly, demoralization of the society. In this context it is worth noting that in 1990-1995 the annual print run of magazines dropped about 17 times [2]. In Armenia, the decrease in the number of bookstores reflects the dwindling interest to literature: presently there are only a few bookstores in Yerevan, whereas at a time there were dozens of them. As for the political aspect, it turned out that the geopolitical confrontation was still going on and very soon after the First Cold War, the Second Cold War broke out, which was a more sophisticated (particularly, in the informational area) and dangerous one in many aspects [3].

It could be stated that the “Perestroika”, organized as a very much Soviet style event, was one of the gravest crimes committed by the communist high-ranking functionaries. Undoubtedly, the reforms could have been carried out in a more thoughtful manner as to prevent losing yet another time the “human capital”, the huge spiritual, intellectual and material values and the potential accumulated over the decades of the Soviet rule. It is known that Armenia did not avoid this either.

At the same time, the fall of the “socialism” had its certain negative effects on the victorious “free world”, too. It hard to argue with the Western researchers (including the renowned scholar Immanuel Wallerstein) who contend that the absence of the competition between the systems in the post-Soviet realities in some sense corrupted the West and led to the “post-modernist” permissiveness.

¹ Professor Alexander Zinovyev (1922-2006) holds a special place among them. He was banished from the USSR in 1978 for his book “The Yawning Heights.” Upon returning to the “new” Russia he publicly criticized the disadvantages of the “western system” and published fundamental scientific works devoted to this issue.

Remarkably, a new “dissident” movement is emerging in the modern, almost globally “democratic”, but at the same time not so “free” world. Very often, these modern dissidents are the representatives of intelligentsia who have rather high positions in the society (as A. Sakharov or Al. Zinovyev used to have), and sometimes are even state officials or political figures. Interestingly, in the political and ideological arena socialist postulates has been activated again, though in a new edition. What happens can be conditionally called “post-modern” style convergence¹ processes, when in the absence of the actual “socialist system” the interaction occurs at the ideological, or in a way, virtual level. All of this comes to prove that the “system collapse” phenomena can recur later, and this time this might reach a more global scale.

January, 2010

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¹ According to the convergence theory which appeared in the 1960s (John Galbraith, Pitirim Sorokin and others) a kind of conceptual convergence, counter motion took place between the socialist and liberal systems. As a result, in the USA the system of governmental planning developed, whereas in the USSR – the approach of gaining profit from economic activity.

THE PROSPECTS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN ARMENIA

*Sevak Sarukhanyan**

The general condition of energy sector

The energy security has always played a key role in the system of national security of Armenia. This was conditioned by the fact that the Armenian energy sector suffered the most from the collapse of USSR. The energy supplies through the territory of Azerbaijan were halted ensuing the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, and since early 1990s the only supply route remaining was the one through Georgia, which had been suffering a political crisis¹.

The energy sector of Armenia underwent some global changes at the end of the 1980s when the country was still under the Soviet rule; in 1989, the authorities of Soviet Armenia decided to shut down the two power-generating units of the Medzamor Nuclear Power Plant, primarily giving in to the public pressure². The plant built in the second half of the 1970s, with the two WWER-440 reactors then producing about 80% of electricity consumed by the economy and population of Armenia. The shutdown of such an important plant caused structural changes in the energy sector, and the major burden of power generation fell on the thermal power plants. The stable supply of the natural gas and black oil fuel from different parts of the USSR enabled the two large Armenian thermal power plants – Hrazdan

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¹ In the Soviet period 5 gas pipelines entered Armenia – two from Georgia and three from Azerbaijan. The latter provided for about 60% of the natural gas demand in the Armenian SSR. Since 1993 the Georgian route of gas imports had been the only one for Armenia till 2008.

² After the 1988 Spitak earthquake many intellectuals and leaders of the newly emerging independence movement started to actively persuade the public opinion that Medzamor NPP is an environmental hazard to the country and that its continued operation will bring Armenia to the brink of extinction. Interestingly, no expert or specialist assessment took place prior to shutting the NPP down, and the decision to terminate the operation of the two power-generating units was, above all, a political one.

and Yerevan – to assure the stability of the energy system in Armenia. However, later on the Armenian energy system appeared in a state collapse following the termination of the natural gas supply through the territory of Azerbaijan, destabilization of the gas pipeline operation passing through Georgia, and disruption of the railway connection of Georgia and Armenia with Russia through the territory of Abkhazia. This resulted in the energy crisis of 1992-1994 when the energy capacities produced only 10-15% of the electric power necessary for the Armenian economy and population.

Amid the energy crisis, rationalism and pragmatism that have ceased to play any significant role in the political processes in Armenia since the escalation of the struggle for independence (and as a result of which the nuclear power plant and a number of the chemical plants claimed to be hazardous for the environment were shut down), reemerged again as factors in the process of political decision making in independent Armenia. The fundamental changes in the structure of the Armenian economy began from the energy sector mostly due to the crisis occurred during the first two years of independence.

Some of the important components of these changes were:

1. The April 7, 1993 Republic of Armenia Government Resolution on Initiating Refurbishment Works of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant and Recommissioning of the Second Power Generating Unit”¹.
2. The Republic of Armenia Government Resolution of September 9, 1997 on Establishment of the Russian-Armenian ArmRusgasprom CJSC. The company was established to increase the gas supply volumes, construct local gas pipelines, produce power and transit the Russian gas. Nevertheless, the most important objectives of the company turned out to be the rehabilitation of the energy infrastructure in Armenia and NKR, and the import of natural gas using the only operational gas pipeline through the territory of Georgia.

The Armenian government’s decision to create the joint Armenian-Russian “Armrusgasprom” CJSC, where the share of the Russian Gazprom increased from 45 to 80 percent in the course of time, was an important event for the Armenian energy sector. In the past years, the company has managed to secure the Gazprom-subsidized low pricing, which allowed the Armenian economy to revive quickly in an off-market mode. The company has invested about \$1 billion in the restoration of the Armenian gas delivery network, construction of new local gas pipelines, as well

¹ The first power-generating unit was beyond repair mostly because over the 4 years after the Nuclear Power Plant shutdown most of the equipment of this unit had been dismantled for various purposes.

as the Armenian section of Iran-Armenia gas pipeline, which became an alternative to the Georgian route of gas import to Armenia.

Since the crisis of early 1990s, the issue of the energy system stability is at the forefront of the national security protection policy of the country, as manifested by the special position it takes in the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia¹. This document mentions Armenian-Russian relations as one of the factors ensuring the energy independence of Armenia, which in essence, reflects the strategic and long-term character of the Armenian-Russian cooperation in the sphere of energy.

Presently Armenia is the only electricity exporting country in the region, and a strategic significance is attached to the construction of new power generating capacities, as they will insure the stability of the system after shutting down the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant in 2016, and increase the electricity export volumes. Among these projects are [1]:

1. building a new power-generating unit at the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant with capacity of 1000 MW;
2. construction of the 5th power-generating unit at Hrazdan Thermal Power Plant with capacity of 440 MW²;
3. installation of a new gas turbine unit with capacity over 200 MW at Yerevan Thermal Power Plant³;
4. construction of new hydroelectric power plants;
5. building wind farms with an overall capacity of over 200 MW.

The construction of Iran-Armenia gas pipeline capable of providing Armenia with 2.3 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually, which covers roughly the entire yearly gas consumption in the country, has been a very important development for Armenia. Although with the currently stable operation of the gas pipeline going through the territory of Georgia Armenia needs no Iranian gas and the gas received by that pipeline will be used to produce electricity to be exported to Iran, in case of force majeure with the Russian gas supply this pipeline could provide for the stable functioning of the Armenian economy. Thus, the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline is not an alternative to the Russian gas as long as the latter is regularly supplied to Armenia.

¹ The Strategy of National Security of the Republic of Armenia has been adopted by the Security Council under the President of the Republic of Armenia on January 26, 2007 and signed by the President of the RA.

² To be completed in the middle of 2010.

³ To be completed at the end of 2010.

Even though the energy sector of Armenia has become stronger for recent years and mechanisms have been created to assure its stability, in the years to come it will have to reach a crucial strategic goal, that is, building a new power-generating unit at the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant.

***The importance of the nuclear energy and
the project of the new power-generating unit***

The recommissioning of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant's second power-generating unit in 1995 solved the problem of electricity supply to the population and economy. Later on, Armrusgasprom CJSC managed to ensure the stable gas supply to Armenia, which enhanced the energy security level of the country. However, despite the stable functioning of the Armenian thermal power plants and the largest Vorotan Hydropower Plant¹, the nuclear energy still remains the backbone of the Armenian energy sector, producing about 40% of the electric power in Armenia.

Since the very first day of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant recommissioning, many European countries, and subsequently also the EU have expressed concerns about its safety, as the nuclear reactor of the Medzamor power plant is evidently the only one which was re-commissioned after a full closedown. Since late 1990s, the issue of shutting down the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant for the second time has been a significant factor in Armenia-Europe relations. In 2003, the Government of Armenia contracted Inter RAO UES for trust management of the plant in an effort to ensure the steady supply of nuclear fuel and continuous expert attention to the equipment and plant safety. It has been already seven years since this sizable Russian company is in charge for the safety of the NPP, but EU never stopped insisting to shut it down out of safety considerations.

In 2007 Euratom initiated official talks with the Ministry of Energy of Armenia seeking prospects for closure of the plant, but the technical format of the talks could not address the main issue: what will Armenia get in return for the shutting down the plant. This is a matter of alternative thermal, hydro- and nuclear power capacities. Neither Euratom nor the EU made any tangible proposal to Armenia on financing the construction of alternative capacities. During the 6th meeting of the Armenia-EU Cooperation Council, Hugues Mingarelli, Director-General for the European Commission's external relations with Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia formulated the maximum assistance that Armenia could expect from Europe: "If the government of Armenia takes steps to shut down

¹ It provides about 8% of the electric power production in the country.

the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant as soon as possible, the European Union would hold an international conference of the donor countries to raise the necessary funds for that" [2]. As a matter of fact, this has to do solely with financing the safe shutdown of the plant.

Meanwhile, back in 2005 the Armenian president and prime minister declared that the only alternative to the shutdown of the functioning reactor would be the construction of a new one. The EU has criticized this position of Armenia, but since European structures were not ready to offer and finance other projects, the European stance on the issue of the new reactor had to change. At the end of 2006 the envoy of the European Commission in Georgia and Armenia Torben Holtze accepted that it is reasonable to strive for building a new reactor instead of the old one [3].

Perhaps, the European policy on the new power-generating unit was prompted by the fact that Armenia is able to create thermal power capacities equivalent to the nuclear ones. In 2010 the fifth power-generating unit of Hrazdan Thermal Power Plant will be put into operation, with a power generation capacity close to that of WWER-440 nuclear reactor to be shut down. In addition, a number of other projects that can compensate the shutdown of the Nuclear Power Plant are implemented in Armenia, including the construction of hydropower plants of various sizes, the largest of which with the design capacity of 400MW will be constructed by Armenia and Iran on the Araks River.

However, the presence of a nuclear reactor in Armenia is not an exclusively technical issue. It correlates with two main factors:

1. **Regional situation.** The energy crisis in Armenia after the collapse of the USSR came to prove that failure of the energy system might be caused not necessarily by the absence of the power generating capacities, but by the impossibility of the fuel imports. Natural gas, the second by significance input for energy after the nuclear fuel for Armenia, is imported to the country through the territory on unstable Georgia where the risks of new destabilization are very high, and from Iran, which may eventually become a new focal point of regional conflicts. The closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey effectively put Armenia in a full dependence on the situation in Georgia and Iran. Even if the relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey are normalized, one should not expect that after such a long conflict these two countries would become reliable energy partners for Armenia in short-term or even mid-term perspectives. If some day in future getting natural gas from the south or north turns impossible, then in absence of a nuclear power plant Armenia, may suffer the same

kind of energy crisis as it did in 1993-1995. Consequently, the construction of a new reactor, the fuel supply for which is not dependent on Georgia's or Iran's transit policies, is of vital importance for Armenia.

2. **Energy business.** Today the electric power generated in Armenia exceeds the internal demand. However small were Armenia's revenues from exporting electricity to Georgia over these 10 years, it still was an income, and to some extent this brings a stimulus to Georgia for maintaining good relations with Armenia. After opening the Armenian-Turkish border, Yerevan will have an opportunity to reach the energy market of Turkey, eastern provinces of which suffer from the deficit of electric power, with electrification of some regions there just now commencing. It is obvious that when a new reactor twice as powerful as the old one, is built in Armenia to replace the WWER-440, the export capacities will increase. In this view, the new reactor may become a good business project for the country and its partners who will invest in the construction of the new plant. Hence, from a strictly economic viewpoint, the new reactor would be oriented towards opening of the Armenian-Turkish border¹.

On the legal side, the issue of building a new Nuclear Power Plant was submitted for consideration to the Armenian parliament, which passed the bill "On Construction of a New Nuclear Power-generating Unit in Armenia" on October 27, 2009, in the third final reading, thereby allowing the construction of a new power-generating unit with a capacity of up to 1200MW.

Finding investors for building the new power-generating unit might have been the biggest problem for the Armenian party until recently. From the very beginning of the discussion on possible sources of financing, different countries and organizations were mentioned, including the USA, Russia, France, Asian Bank of Reconstruction and Development, etc. In this regard, the prime minister of Armenia has noted; "There is a serious interest in this project. Generally, the construction of nuclear power plants around the world has some constraints; the reactors are reserved 10 years ahead, including those in Russia. Everybody knows who builds what and where, and there are too many of those who would like to invest, especially today, as many investors have the money and do not know what projects to invest in."²

¹ Most likely, this was the underlying rationale for the Armenian Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan's invitation made in spring 2009 to the Turkish party to participate in the new power plant construction.

² "Arka" Information Agency, October 19, 2009.

Nonetheless, in reality no country but Russia showed any significant interest in the nuclear project of Armenia. Apparently, this is due to lack of any visible business interest in relation with the new power-generating unit, owing to the following circumstances. The issue of opening the Armenian-Turkish border has not been resolved yet; the Armenian party's actual share in the project financing, as well as its sources have not been clarified; and some other risks have to be yet specified. In addition to that, the Armenian party seeks both investors for construction and a company that will build the plant, actually providing only the project site, and so all of these play an important part in the scanty interest to the project. In this backdrop, there are only two ways to attract investors:

- to show that their investments will break even in a rather short period and will generate profits in a relatively near future;
- to exploit not so much the economic benefits, but the political significance of the project, leaving behind such categories as sure breakeven and large revenues.

It would be safe to say that the Armenian party succeeded in the latter, since there seem to be no convincing arguments for the former. The Russian-Armenian relations and Russia's strategic interest in strengthening its positions in the regional energy market definitely contributed to resolving the problem of financing for the construction of a new power-generating unit. The matter concerns not only Armenia, but also Turkey and Iran where the electricity produced at the new power-generating unit of the Armenian NPP can be exported in the future. Today Armenia is the only country in the region with a potential for such exports. The construction of a new power-generating unit may only increase this potential.

The issue of building a new power-generating unit for the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant was discussed at almost all the high-level Armenian-Russian negotiations. Finally, on December 3, 2009 the Government of Armenia approved the draft resolution to establish a closed joint-stock company (CJSC) to build a new power-generating unit for the Armenian (Medzamor) Nuclear Power Plant. The Russian company Atomstroyexport and the Armenian party represented by the Republic of Armenia Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources incorporated this CJSC with equal shares for each. As announced at the Government Cabinet session, the new power-generating unit with the capacity of 1,060 MW and operational lifetime of 60 years will be equipped with a Russian-made reactor. According to the Armenian Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan: "The political decision is made. We

endorse the establishment of a joint venture with our Russian partners in equal shares.”¹

The Armenian-Russian accord on construction of a new power-generating unit can be regarded one of the major achievements of the Armenian government in recent years, which became possible thanks to wisely drawing on the Russian interests in the region.

The construction project of the new power-generating unit, planned to start next year, will cost \$5 billion according to the preliminary estimates. It is supposed that Atomstroyexport company will provide half of the project financing, while Armenian party will most likely get a loan from the Russian Federation to cover the financing of the other half. Probably a WWER-1000 class reactor will be installed at the site.

Another important direction in the nuclear sphere is the Armenian-Russian project of the uranium ore exploration in Armenia. A joint venture was established in 2008 for geological prospecting, mining and processing of uranium on the territory of Armenia; the Armenian-Russian Mining Company, CJSC. The company commenced field works in Syunik province where supposedly uranium deposits exist. By different estimates, the uranium reserves in Armenia vary from 10 to 60 thousand tons. In 2008 Armenia officially joined the international centre for uranium enrichment in Angarsk, where the uranium to be mined in Armenia is planned to process. The Russian party has allocated \$3 million to Armenian-Russian Mining Company, CJSC for the uranium geological prospecting. The statutory capital of the joint venture consists of 300 common nominal shares with 150 shares for each party, totaling to an authorized nominal capital of about \$300 thousand [4].

One of the most sensitive problems related to this issue is the transportation of uranium from Armenia to Angarsk for further processing. The absence of railway communication between Armenia and the external world (other than Georgia) hampers any large-scale uranium exports. Theoretically, the Georgian seaports could be used, but the Russian-Georgian relations may negatively affect this option. In future, building a railway from Armenia to Iran may create another option for the export of uranium, but there have been no specific agreements signed for that so far. On the other hand, the export of radioactive materials suitable for military purposes through the territory of Iran is something that is hard to know when it will be acceptable for the international community.

¹ <http://www.regnum.ru/news/1231523.html>

Though the Armenian-Russian Mining Company operates rather intensively, it is too early to talk about the uranium mining in Armenia.

Conclusions

1. The matter of protecting Armenia's energy security is of central importance within the system of the national security. Owing to this, the country has made progress in stabilizing and securing the energy sector development of the country by creating new capacities and diversifying the routes for the supply of energy inputs.
2. However, despite the results achieved, Armenia remains politically and economically dependent on the nuclear energy, which presently is the "backbone" of the national energy system. Therefore, shutting down the functioning power-generation unit of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant in absence of an alternative capacity constitutes a menace to the energy security of Armenia.
3. Therefore, the decision to build a new nuclear power-generating unit meets the interests of Armenia and subsequently, it will ensure the energy security of the country and create opportunities for electricity exports. It is important to mention that covering the costs of the power plant construction is directly correlated to the Armenian-Turkish dialogue that may enable exporting the electricity produced by the new power-generating unit to the Republic of Turkey.

April, 2010

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ARMENOCIDE: THE HISTORICAL PRECEDENT OF THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS

*Levon Shirinyan**

“Armenia is a vanguard of Europe in Asia” formula, which has been offered long ago, correctly defines the place of the Armenians in our world. The historical mission of the Armenian nation, prompted by the whole course of its development, is to seek and find the synthesis of the East and West”.

Valeriy Brusov

In present days, it has become fashionable to speak about the dialogue of civilizations, but one should not forget about the incompatibility of the cultures and civilizations, which often causes conflicts with tragic consequences.

One of such facts is the Armenocide, among many causes of which the cultural factor was also present. In fact, it was a consequence of the long-standing ethnic conflict between Christian Armenians and Sunni Turks from the Balkans to Anatolia and Caucasus. Being unable to assimilate the alien culture, the Turkish nationalist elite adopted a strategic objective to uproot and annihilate it.

Thus, on April 24, 1915, in accordance with the decision of the country's government and by the will of the Turkish people events took place in Western Armenia, Armenian Cilicia and other regions of the Ottoman Empire aimed at the final solution of the Armenian Question, i.e. the total extermination of the disarmed and defenseless people. These events were characterized in the May 24, 1915 Declaration of the Allied Powers – Russia, Britain and France, as a crime “against humanity and civilization”.

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Turks premeditated and thoroughly planned their actions, and the goal was clear: “to fully exterminate the entire nation” once and for all, and to put an end to the very name of “Armenia”, to wipe out its civilization from the face of the earth, to turn Western Armenia into a logical absurdity – “Eastern Anatolia”, to appropriate its culture¹ [1], and to seize the enormous material wealth of the Armenians living in the Empire using the Turkish predisposition to pillage and violence².

The perverted Turkish mind had nurtured this evil deed for decades and began from the deliberate change of the place names in the country and the distortion of the demography. In 1862, a fundamental restructuring of the provinces was implemented. Consequently, the previously vast “Ermenistan eyalet” province was divided into Erzurum, Bitlis and Van provinces, and districts with Muslim population were added to each of them “with crooked, artificially drawn boundaries”, in order to change the demography. Later in 1880 new administrative and territorial divisions were made in Western Armenia to reduce the native population ratio. Furthermore, in 1880s the usage of word “Armenia” was banned. Carrying out such actions time to time targeted to assimilate the Armenians living on their native land to the alien environment consisting of a rabble of different tribes called “the Muslims”.

The pretext for this “adjustment” of the Turkish stance on the issue was the significant economic and civilizational upturn of Armenians, which had begun since the middle of the 19th century. An English clergyman, B. Barail mentioned that the adoption of the National Constitution for the Western Armenians (1860) “marked the revolution in the habits and customs of the East”. That is why, “very soon Armenians turned into a suspicious element both for Turkey and Russia, and since that day they have had no restful life anymore” [2, p. 15-16].

Indeed, the notorious Turkish bile played an exceptional role in preparing ethno-psychological grounds for the Armenocide³. However, the “main argument” was the uncontainable desire of the Turks to “appropriate” the motherland of the Armenians – Armenia, to take it away from its legitimate owners. The overall extermination of the Armenian population clearly showed that sultans and rulers, their political affiliation, gender, religion or nationality may change in Turkey, but their major goal of annihilating Armenia may not.

¹ Ernst Dietz, a German art historian considered that the Seljuk art was an extension of the Armenian one.

² The total value of the pillage by the Turks in the years of the Genocide was about \$5 billion in gold. A part of that wealth was pocketed by the robbers and the top authorities, while its “lion’s share” was used for the needs of the Kemalist movement, particularly, for the war against Eastern Armenia.

³ This term is credited to the Syrian Arab historian Moussa Prince, who first used it in 1967.

Furthermore, during the times of collaboration between Lenin and Ataturk the prospects of the final annihilation of Armenia and Armenians clearly appeared, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kemalist Turkey Ahmed Mukhtar “explained” to the commander of the Eastern front Kazim Karabekir (now they have turned their eyes to Eastern Armenia): “Armenia is situated on vast Muslim territories (can you imagine that?) and hence, *it must be eliminated both politically and physically*. It should be considered that the general political situation and our power favour the realization of this plan [3, c. 76-77]”.

It has to be noted that it was Abdul Hamid who formulated and started to implement the plan for extermination of Armenia. His associates and followers, up to Kemal, simply continued the things he initiated. Hamid “directed” the process of stabilization and unification of the Empire, that was giving in under the pressure of the European powers (the policy of the great powers, the national-liberating movements, etc.), to the East. His goal was to gain access to *Western Arabia, Muslim shrines* and Armenia [4, p. 29]. The Balkan wars made his intentions firmer. “I will not regret about losing the Balkans that suck our powers dry”, said Abdul Hamid. “*We want to stay in Anatolia and live separately*”, stated the “the bloody sultan” [5, pp. 812, 827].

Hamid’s concept/idea was welcomed by some in Europe. In this aspect the address of Baron Hans von Wangenheim to the central committee of “Ittihat” (on the eve of the 1914 war), the forerunners of German national-socialism, is rather conspicuous: “The alliance with Bulgaria is advantageous for you. It is necessary to gain access to the Berlin-Istanbul line, to arm the Straits, deprive Russia of the help from abroad and crush it with joint efforts. *By giving you the Caucasus we want to open for you an access to Turan. You will have to destroy the element getting in the way of Turkey’s unity (i.e. Armenians – L. Sh.), and then you shall conquer Persia...*” [6, p. 18].

Thus, in 1914 the German ambassador spoke about the things that the great Armenian poet Hovhannes Tumanyan had foreseen two years earlier (“... the Armenian Question is one of Turkey’s headaches and with the time it will get even worse as long as the Turks will have to retreat in these lands”). In the meantime, the European powers in mutual accord squeezed out from the Old World the element alien to them in civilizational terms – the Medieval Turkish janissary. They directed him to the East. And on that way Armenia lay. That was the reason why the help of the Christian Europe to the biblical country, the “cradle of civilization” (David Lang) – Armenia, was moderate.

Meanwhile, the Turk who was out for blood adopted appropriate tactics and carried it out in three stages:

1. **1876-1915** – the local, but tending to broaden and expand, policy of the deportation, forcible Islamization and massacres of the Armenians.
2. **1915-1918** – the comprehensive process of the final solution of the Armenian Question. The Turks did not fully succeed in part due to the resistance of the remaining Armenians (battle-hardened soldiers and officers of the voluntary regiments; almost eight-month-long fights of the Armenian detachments from Yerznka (Erzincan) to Sardarapat and Baku, the breakthrough of the Syrian-Palestine front by the Armenian Legion on September 19, 1918), and in part due to the international situation.
3. **1919-1923** – on one hand the Kemalist policy of annihilation of the Greeks, continuation of the uncompleted Armenocide in the Eastern Armenia and Transcaucasia and expansion to new lands, and on the other hand the denial of the guilt and responsibility of the Turkish state and nation.

Henceforth, according to the plan of the genocidal Turkish state, “the purpose was to try achieving the acceptance of the existing situation by the Armenians. They had to make Armenians abandon any territorial claims in exchange for the recognition of their diminutive state (i.e. the 1918 Republic of Armenia– L. Sh.). Thus, almost full debellation and annexation could have been actually presented as a cession – the voluntary concession of the territory, whereas the Genocide of the Armenian population of those regions, as regrettable events of the past” (Y. Barsegov) [7, p. 215].

Nevertheless, the Genocide brought about the issue of the responsibility of Turkey and Turks:

- criminal penalty of the individuals who masterminded and carried out this crime that shocked the world. They were punished only partly (operation “Nemesis”, Armenian Nurnberg, which was implemented under the active resistance of the Soviet government);
- political responsibility of the Turkish state and creation of Armenia in accordance with the arbitral decision by Woodrow Wilson;
- material responsibility in the form of restitution (restoration of the rights of the Armenians, return of the forcibly taken property, etc.) [8].

It is clear that the second and the third points will mostly condition the further struggle of the Armenians. This would beget the liquidation of the effects of the first Genocide in the world – Armenocide, and would avert once and for all the repetition of such crimes¹ [9, p. 216, 240].

The remarkable words by Woodrow Wilson sound like a precept: “Armenia should get what it is historically eligible for. It has more rights to live than Turkey... Sooner or later Turkey will face the tribunal and will be held accountable, and then it will be demanded to return to the real owner everything it had robbed” [10, c. 186-187].

April, 2010

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¹ Remarkably, not on the traces of the mass massacre the civilized world spoke about the Armenian Genocide and characterized it as a holocaust, “ghastly holocaust”.

THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMENIAN WRITING: ORIGINAL AND TRANSLATED LITERATURE AS AN ASPECT OF THE DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS¹

*Eduard L. Danielyan**

Writing is an important factor of inter-civilizational relations through translated, as well as original literature. Armenia's centuries-old written legacy in the treasury of world culture is very much conducive to the dialogue of civilizations which is a guarantee for the security of the world civilization.

In the history of humankind the origin and development of writing conditioned verbal preservation of spiritual values and passing them to the future generations in a written form. Written sources are of great importance in the study of history as the history of civilization, consequently "societies with writing have left far more behind them than those without" [1, pp. XIII-XV].

Since the 18th century the term *civilization* has been brought into scientific use at the junction of economic, spiritual-cultural and social concepts in the general system of philosophy with reference to the certain epochs of human history [2, 3, c. 369]. The study of the main components of civilization allows us to consider the dialogue of civilizations in the context of contemporary tendencies of geopolitical processes [4, p. 57-72].

In the concept of *civilization* a paramount significance is attributed to culture as an important sphere of human activity.

Oswald Spengler: "Every Culture has its own Civilization... The Civilization is the inevitable destiny of the Culture..." [5, pp. 31-32].

Will Durant: "Civilization is social order promoting cultural creation. Four elements constitute it: economic provision, political organization, moral traditions, and the pursuit of knowledge and arts. It begins where chaos and insecurity

¹ A paper read at the World Public Forum "Dialogue of Civilizations", Rhodes Forum, VII Annual Session, October 8-12, 2009, Rhodes (Greece).

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end” [6, p. 1].

Arnold Toynbee: “The cultural elements are the essence of a civilization” [7, p. 1, 57].

N. V. Klyagin: “The concept of civilization may be identified with the concept of culture” [8, c. 3].

Cultures, as main components of civilizations, are bridging them owing to immanent creative principle [9, pp. 298-303]. Meanwhile, according to some modern theories of civilizations, the increase of the conflict of cultures in the modern world has a tendency of turning into the clash of civilizations [10.]. But destructive forces are derived not from cultural factor, but, on the contrary, because of its lack.

In “The Declaration of the Rights of Culture” D. S. Likhachov, considering culture as the main source of human history’s humanization, writes: “Culture is a determining condition for realization of the creative potential of an individual and society, a form of affirmation of the people’s originality and a basis of the spiritual health of the nation, a humanistic guiding line and a criterion of the development of a human being and civilization. Out of the culture the present and future of the peoples, ethnicities and states make no sense.” (Article 2.).

According to S. N. Iconnikova, only humanistic culture is able to become a foundation of ethics and morality [11]. Jagdish Chandra Kapur sees the peaceful future of the peoples through the cultural creation and cooperation along with preservation of national originality [12, p. 23], thus, considering the “Human future” as a fundamental basis for a dialogue of civilizations [13, p. 26].

Article 6 of “The Declaration of the Rights of Culture” states: “The culture of each people has the right to participate in the humanistic development of the whole mankind. Cultural cooperation, dialogue and mutual understanding of the peoples of the world are a guarantee for justice and democracy, a condition preventing international and interethnic conflicts, violence and wars”. In *the cultural-historic heritage*, as “a form of reinforcing and transferring the cumulative spiritual experience of mankind” (Article 1a), writing has a crucial significance.

In the history of the development of the world’s written languages Armenian writing, being a means of creativity of the Armenian people and a guarantee of its national originality, has a certain contribution to the treasury of world culture and has been highly appreciated in Western European, as well as Russian literature and historiography.

Rev. P  re Dom Augustin Calmet (1672-1757) called Armenia “Berceau de la Civilisation” [14]. In 1816 *George Gordon Byron* visited the Armenian *Congregation* of Mekhitarists, on St. Lazarus *Island* in Venice and, being inspired by Armenian culture, in particular, by its literary heritage, began to learn the Armenian language.

Lord Byron writes about Armenians and Armenia: “Whatever may have been their destiny - and it has been bitter - whatever it may be in future, their country must ever be one of the most interesting on the globe; and perhaps their language only requires to be more studied... It is a rich language... If the Scriptures are rightly understood, it was in Armenia that Paradise was placed. . . It was in Armenia that the flood first abated, and the dove alighted” [15, pp. 8, 10-12].

S. N. Glinka (1776-1847) comprehended the history of Armenia in the spirit of touching the cradle of human civilization [16, p. 77]. He writes: “According to the Biblical and folk traditions the second cradle of mankind rested on the summits of the Armenian mountains” [17, p. III].

David Marshall Lang writes in the same spirit: “The ancient land of Armenia is situated in the high mountains... Although Mesopotamia with its ancient civilizations of Sumeria and Babylon is usually considered together with Egypt as the main source of civilized life in the modern sense, Armenia too has a claim to rank as one of the cradles of human culture. To begin with, Noah's Ark is stated in the Book of Genesis to have landed on the summit of Mount Ararat, in the very centre of Armenia.... Whether or not we attribute any importance to the Book of Genesis as a historical source, none can deny the symbolic importance of its account of Noah's Ark, which is cherished by both believers and unbelievers all over the world. Again, Armenia has a claim on our attention as one of the principal homes of ancient metallurgy, beginning at least five thousand years ago. Later on, Armenia became the first extensive kingdom to adopt Christianity as a state religion pioneering a style of Church architecture which anticipates our own Western Gothic” [18, p. 9].

The roots of the origin and development of the Armenian language (as a separate branch in the Indo-European family of languages)¹ and writing are millennia old².

The ancient authors (II-III centuries A.D.) have given certain information on Armenian letters. The Greek sophist and orator Lucius Flavius Philostratus (around 170-247) notes: “It is said that once a panther was caught in Pamphylie³; it had a golden collar on which had an inscription in Armenian letters: “King Arshak to

¹ The beginning of the dialect break-up of the general Indo-European language is supposed to have occurred in V-IV millennia B.C. [19, v. I, p. XLVIII, v. II, pp. 865, 898, 912-913; 20, pp. 31-32].

² It is testified by pictographic writing in petroglyphs, on the walls of necropolises and on the cult ceramics (V-IV millennia B.C.) [21, p. 262], hieroglyphs [22, p. 115; 23, pp. 55-148], lexicon and grammatical forms, preserved in cuneiform sources of the epoch of the Kingdom of Van (IX-VII centuries B.C.) [24, p. 124-129] and temple literature [22, p. 176].

³ It lies to the west of Cilicia.

Nysa's god" [25, p. 172, 324b 4-11]¹. The Roman theologian and writer Hippolytus (III c.) mentions Armenians among peoples (Greeks, Jews, Romans and others) having their own writing [30, p. 58].

After the Armenians' conversion to Christianity by St. Grigor Lusavoritch (the Illuminator) under the aegis of the King of Great Armenia Trdat III, Christianity was proclaimed the state religion in Armenia (301 A.D.) for the first time in the world. Schools were established where the Greek and Syriac languages were taught with a purpose to teach oral translation² into Armenian both from the Bible during the church service, and documents (in foreign languages) which entered the court office.

At the end of IV century the King of Great Armenia Vramshapuh, the Catholicos of the Armenian Apostolic Church³ Sahak Partev, Mesrop Mashtots (361-440 A.D.) and Armenian bishops, according to Movses Khorenatsi (V c.), summoned a council being "anxious about the invention of Armenian letters" [22, p. 325].

An attempt to reconstruct the letters by means of the Bishop Daniel's written characters found in Mesopotamia had been in vain, because while teaching them to pupils it turned out that "those letters were insufficient to form all the syllables of the Armenian language, especially since the letters essentially proved to have been buried under other letters..." [33, p. 278].

According to the Armenian historian of V century Lazar Parbetsi, Mashtots was sure that Armenian letters existed [34, p. 30]. In the course of the search of the Armenian letters Mashtots sent one group of his pupils to Samosat, another – to Edessa in order to prepare translators of the Bible from the Greek *Septuagint* and the Syriac *Peshito* versions. The pupil of St. Mesrop Mashtots Vardapet Koryun (V century) and the Father of Armenian historiography Movses Khorenatsi wrote that the work of St. Mesrop was hallowed by God's Right Hand. According to Koryun, St. Mesrop "suffered many tribulations in order to serve his nation. And Lord the Merciful with His Holy Right Hand finally granted him that good fortune and he became the father of new and wonderful offspring – letters of the Armenian language, and

¹ A king by name of Arshak who reigned in Armenia long before Arshak II (350-368 A.D.) is mentioned by Tacit (55-120 A.D.) in his "Annales" [(after the Armenian king Zenon-Artashes III (18-34 A.D.) Arshak reigned in Artashat (34-35 A.D.), the son of the Parthian king Artabanus III (12-38 A.D.) [26, pp. 31-33], and by Moses Khorenatsi in his "History of Armenia" [*Arshak I*, the son of Vagharshak (the brother of the Parthian king Arshak the Great) who ascended the throne in Armenia [22, pp. 118-119]. Some mountains and cities devoted to Dionisus – the youngest of the Olympian gods [27, p. 88] were called *Nysa* [25, 28, p. 1185, 29, p. 174, 180].

² J. Marquart expressed the idea that since his young age St. Grigor Lusavoritch was familiar both with the Greek and the Armenian languages [31, p. 120].

³ In the first half of I century A.D. the Armenian Apostolic Church was founded by the preaching of the Apostles St. Thaddaeus and St. Bartholomew, according to Movses Khorenatsi, at the time of Armenian King Abgar. Eusebius of Caesarea [32, p. 31, 32] and Movses Khorenatsi preserved "A letter of Abgar to the Savior" and "The reply to the letter of Abgar written by St. Thomas the Apostle according to the order of the Savior" [22, p. 149-150].

then and he quickly designed, named, determined their order and devised the syllabication". Arriving in Samosat, Mashtots (with the help of Hropanos, a calligrapher of the Greek writing) "devised all the variations of the letters..., after which he proceeded with translations, with the help of two of his pupils, Hovhan, from the province of Ekeghiats, and Hovsep from Paghnatun" [33, p. 279].

The Armenian language, owing to its millennia-old development, at the threshold of V century had reached such a perfection, that after creation of the Armenian alphabet (405 A.D.) St. Mesrop Mashtots with his pupils undertook the work of the Bible's translation from the old Greek language into the old Armenian-*grabar* language. They started the translation of the Bible from the Proverbs of Solomon, and the first translated sentence was: "To know wisdom and instruction, to understand words of insight". Returning to Armenia, St. Mesrop Mashtots with his pupils, after the Old Testament, translated the New Testament into Armenian [22, p. 327]¹.

The creation of the Armenian alphabet by St. Mesrop Mashtots signified a new stage in the history of Armenian culture. The old Armenian language was so rich, and the translated and original literary heritage so perfect that V century is considered "the Golden Age" in the history of Armenian culture. Educational life in Armenia, according to the Armenian historian Eghishe (V century A.D.), proceeded under the motto: "It is better to have blind eyes, than blind mind" [35, p. 28].

Taking into consideration the words of Koryun and Movses Khorenatsi about the divine vision of St. Mesrop Mashtots, S. Glinka noted: "St. Mesrop invented the Armenian letters as if by inspiration..." Mentioning high regard by M. La Croze (1661-1739), who called the Armenian translation of the Bible "the Queen of translations", S. Glinka noted that "undoubtedly, the power of the Armenian word also promoted the precision of the translation" [17, v. II, p. 90].

V. Brusov (1873-1924), speaking about the high level of the development of the Armenian language long before the creation of the alphabet by St. Mesrop Mashtots, writes that after the invention of the letters, fast evolution of national literature in the mother tongue "urges to suppose that it was preceded by the works of the Armenian writers not only in foreign languages. Contemporary science refuses to suppose that the same century saw both the origination of the Armenian writing and its rich flourishing expressed in a perfect translation of the Bible... followed by "the Golden Age" of the Armenian literature. That is why it is supposed that before the letters' invention, germs of the Armenian written literature existed... But all this ancient writing perished and for us Armenian literature starts not earlier than from V century A.D." [36, p. 45].

¹ St. Mesrop Mashtots created alphabets also for the Georgian and Gargarian (one of the tribes of Aluank on the left bank of the Kur River) languages (22, pp. 328-329, cf. 33, pp. 285, 288).

Together with the fundamental development of the national school in Armenia the principles of the Armenian translated and original literature were founded in V century. The high level of translations was guaranteed by the efforts of the Armenian scholars who knew perfectly well their mother tongue and continued their scholastic and theological education in the Greek and other languages in famous centers of antique science and culture - Athens, Alexandria and others [37, pp. 142-143].

“The Grammar” (*Ars Grammatica*) by Dionysius Thrax, 14 works by Philo of Alexandria, “The Romance of Alexander the Great” by Pseudo-Callisthenes, “The Demonstration of the Apostolic Teaching” and “Against heresies” by Irenaeus, Theon of Alexandria’s “Progymnaspatha”, “Refutation of the Council of Chalcedon” by Timothy Aelurus, “The Introduction” by Porphyry, “The Categories” and “The Discourses” by Aristotle and other books were translated from Greek into Armenian [37, pp. 186-188]. Listing the translated literature alone testifies to the wide cognitive interest of Armenian philosophic and historic scientific thought to the antique heritage, and this served a basis for calling Armenian translators the representatives of the *Graecophile school* in Armenia [38]¹.

The creative understanding and application of certain terms [37, p.140] and texts took place in the process of translation on the basis of the Armenian lexicon. Owing to the Armenian translations, “The Chronicle” by Eusebius Caesariensis [32, Introduction, p. xiv], “Apology for the Christian Faith” by Aristides the Athenian, 7 works by Philo of Alexandria, “The Definitions” by Hermes Trismegistus, “Concerning Free Will” by Methodius of Patar, “Panarion” by Epiphanius of Cyprus and some other works have been preserved, their old Greek originals being lost in the course of time.

In the V century, along with the translated literature, historiography and philosophy presented by the works of Agathangelos, Pavstos Buzand, Koryun, Movses Khorenatsi, Eghishe, Lazar Parbetsi, David Anhakht (the Invincible), Eznik Koghbatsi and others developed. The creative heritage of the plead of Armenian thinkers and scholars has a great significance from the viewpoint of studying the sources for the research of the history of Armenia and the Armenian people, as well as neighbouring countries and peoples.

Agathangeghos narrates the life of St. Grigor Lusavoritch and the Christening of Armenians in his book “The History of Armenia”. Koryun wrote “The Life of Mashtots” where he described the life and activities of his teacher St. Mesrop Mashtots. Pavstos Buzand in his book “The History of Armenia” narrated the history of

¹ One of the beloved national-church holidays - St. Translators' Day is celebrated annually (in October) by the Armenian people in memory of the activities of the translators.

the Kingdom of Great Armenia from the first decades of IV century up to the Roman-Persian division of Armenia (the middle of the 80s of IV century).

“The History of Armenia” by Movses Khorenatsi is the crown jewel of Armenian historiography. His work consists of three parts, including history of the Armenian people from ancient times till the beginning of the 40s of V century A.D. He wrote his book with a deep knowledge of the original ethnic roots of Armenian statehood, freedom-loving spirit of the Armenian people reflecting his adherence to the national and Christian spiritual values.

Eghishe is the author of several books the most famous of which is “About Vardan and the Armenian War” (450-451 A.D.). Lazar Parbetsi also devoted his book (“History of Armenia”) to the liberation struggle of the Armenian people headed by St. Vardan Mamikonyan and then - Vahan Mamikonyan (481-484 A.D.).

Based on Armenian sources, S. Glinka, contrasting the moral grounds of the Armenians inspired by the defense of the Fatherland to the ideology of foreign conquerors, wrote: “The main aim of their (Armenians-E.D.) arming, owing to the basic spirit of their moral qualities... is the defense of the Fatherland, protection of native independence, resistance to the encroachments of the outside violence” [17, p. VII].

In the IV century there was a famous Armenian thinker, orator and pedagogue, Prohaeresius (Paruyr Haikazn) (276-367) [39, p. 480; 37, p. 25].

Philosopher and theologian Eznik Kokhbatsi, the advocate of the teachings of the Armenian Apostolic Church, in his work “Refutation of heresies”, defending the Christian faith, considers in details philosophic ideas of the antique authors, as well as analyses critically Zoroastrian religion (which the Sassanids turned into an ideological servant of their aggressive policy) and different heresies.

David Anhakht (V century A.D.) is a prominent representative of the Armenian philosophic thought. The most famous of his works is “The Definition of Philosophy”. David Anhakht, analyzing the definitions of philosophy, brought also classification of sciences: natural philosophy, mathematics, theology. He considered philosophy as the best means of the nature’s cognition, because its main goal is revelation of the ways, following which it is possible to reject evil and, through goodness, reach spiritual perfection - *virtue*. During centuries the philosophic views of David Anhakht had a fundamental significance in the development of the Armenian philosophic thought.

On the basis of the achievements of “the Golden Age”, the Armenian culture and education in Great Armenia reached new heights also in the epoch of the Kingdom of the Armenian Bagratids (885-1045) and later, and the Cilicia's Armenian statehood (the Princedom - 1080-1197, the Kingdom - 1198-1375).

In Gladzor University (1280-1340), which the contemporaries called “the

Mother of Wisdom”, “the House of Wisdom”, “the second Athens”, and Tatev University (1390-1435), continuing traditions of the preceding epochs, teaching was provided on the basis of the *trivium* (grammar, rhetoric and dialectic) and *quadrivium* (arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy) subjects, comprising “seven liberal arts”, which centuries earlier were systematized in the works of David Anhakht [37, p. 295].

Armenian medieval culture, accumulating the achievements of the preceding epochs, introduced new values into the treasury of national and world culture. According to V. Brusov, “Armenia is a vanguard of Europe in Asia”. This formula suggested long ago determines correctly the place of the Armenian people in our world”, because, according to the great humanist, “the historic mission of the Armenian people - prompted by the whole process of its development – is to look for and acquire the synthesis of East and West. And this aspiration for the most part was reflected in the artistic creativity of Armenia, its literature and poetry” [36, p. 27].

At the current stage of geopolitical processes, considering historical truth as a cornerstone of inter-civilizational dialogue, Vladimir Yakunin writes: “Human communities are constantly changing identities, being in permanent dynamics. The philosophy of their evolutions is determined by historical conditions under which they have been shaped. In different periods this process acquires different facets, and it is always straight and, what is more, predictable <...> It would seem wise to approach setting goals and selecting means to reach them in the process of successive approximation, by sticking to historical truth and without upsetting the unity of the universal and special in the course of discussions about the role and place of inter-civilizational dialogue in bringing together peoples and races” [12, p. 141].

The principle of the prevention of the crisis of global security is a basic one in the concept of the dialogue of civilizations¹. Thus cooperation between sovereign peoples and states through the *dialogue of cultures* [40] is considered to be an important principle in the dialogue among civilizations.

In the ontological aspect, proceeding from the importance of the idea of the dialogue of civilizations, according to V. Segesvary: “An inter-civilizational dialogue has to be based on mutual understanding”, which “requires a firm commitment to one’s own civilizational values and worldview in order to appreciate differences with others. We cannot understand the fundamental order of being and the meaningful order of things in the universe without our place in them” [41, pp. 8-9].

¹ Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention Project, Expert Colloquy, Dialogue serving intercultural and inter-religious communication, Strasbourg, 7 to 9 October 2002, Council of Europe, Role of Religion in the 21st Century. Prevention of Crisis among Civilizations, Contribution by Prof. Masanori Naito, Directorate General IV: Education, Culture and Cultural Heritage, Youth and Sports, Directorate of Culture and Cultural and Natural Heritage, Cultural Policy and Action Department, DGIV/CULT/PREV-ICIR (2002) 4E, 3.

Philosophical comprehension of the civilizational future of the humankind is founded on the revelation and deepening the ways of the dialogue between civilizations, taking as a basis the historical experience of each people separately and the world civilization in its entity [42, pp. 7-17]. It is necessary to comprehend and realize on the international level the defense of cultural-historic heritage of each people (the monuments of architecture, the works of art, manuscripts etc.), especially, of the Armenian people in the Motherland, including its historic parts. It may become a guarantee of the security of the world civilization by means of the dialogue of civilizations.

In the system of cultural-historic heritage *writing* is an important link of the inter-civilizational relations. Armenian writing, presented by original and translated literature, in the context of historic realities, characterized by linguistic, spiritual-cultural, ethno-demographic and social and political peculiarities, has rich traditions in the development of inter-cultural relations, promoting the dialogue of civilizations.

January, 2010

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THE COUNTRY IMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 21ST CENTURY ENVIRONMENT

*Lianna Ayvazyan**

This article is primarily based on the analysis of the image projected by other actors, using the image of Armenia in the so-called “quality” American press as an example, since the influence of these media on making important political decisions is well known. These are *The Washington Post*, *The New York Times* and *The Wall Street Journal* (all materials published in 1991-2009) [1]. Unfortunately, so far it is difficult to discuss the opposite process (i.e. the image that we make). On the other hand, we believe this analysis and the provided examples might be more useful in making own image than a mere restatement of the known PR methods. Finally, although the examples provided are from printed media, our analysis is based on a much vaster material concerning images of other countries, global, regional and domestic developments, including official reports, academic and expert studies, comparison of publications, as well as interviews with diplomats, experts and journalists in Washington, DC (June 1998) and Yerevan.

The image building as the art of targeted perception management, or as it is now commonly referred to as public diplomacy, has accompanied humankind from the very first steps of its evolution [2].

However, the notion of “image” has become a subject for studies only in the first half of the 20th century, when the aftermaths of both World Wars uncovered the horrendous cost to be paid for creating, promoting and spreading an “image of enemy.” Diplomacy is no longer a “sport of kings”, as it used to be in the 19th century [3, p. 59]. Since 1945, the development of the mass media, especially television, and later on also of the other new technologies, has changed the picture international relations and the way they are presented by mass media.

In *Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media Since 1945*, Philip Taylor has emphasized the role of communication in the modern world in the

*PR officer for *CANDLE*

spirit Alvin Toffler, and at the same time, in addition to the diplomatic, economic and military dimensions in inter-state affairs he has identified a fourth one, which he termed as psychological or *informational dimension*: “This dimension involves the gathering and communication of information, ideas, perceptions and messages. Naturally this also takes place within the other dimensions, but it has become a distinctive aspect of inter-state relations in its own right... all communication involves the active transmission and reception of something. That something is invariably a signal or message containing information that can inform, instruct, persuade, educate, propagandize, incite or entertain. The information can take the form of words or sounds or images, or a combination of these, now also presented in other forms such as digital data” [3, p. 21].

Concepts of *media diplomacy*, *CNN diplomacy*, *TV diplomacy* are being articulated. It seems that it was quite recently when the notions of “public/popular diplomacy” and “soft power” were introduced and included in the foreign policy of many countries, while new ones are emerging at an incredible pace, for which no Armenian equivalents have been devised yet, such as: *net diplomacy*, *niche diplomacy*¹, *open-source public diplomacy* (see Fisher Ali, *Music for the Jilted Generation: Open-Source Public Diplomacy* for the latter), etc.

The idea of diplomacy as inter-state relations only, is as outdated as, say, parchment or quill for writing. The informational revolution has changed the global society. Presently no one holds the monopoly for information. The paradigm of diplomacy as government-to-government interactions is shifting to one of people-to-people format [4]. Predictions are already made about the latter’s huge potential for transformation of other societies.

The whole international system is changing, as well; new theories arise, the authors of which attempt not only to explain the new realities, but also to forecast the tectonic shifts in international affairs, forewarn about the threats they impose and point out the opportunities they render. In the post-modern period the media, emotions of masses, interests of distinct groups (including transnational) or regions are brought into action. The role of existing context, public sentiments and individuals is much greater than the textbooks suggest. Foreign policy becomes an extension of the domestic one [5].

In these conditions of information explosion, globalization, development of international communication and increased role of the public opinion in international relations, the significance of the *national and country images* is undisputable.

¹ Diplomacy aimed at achieving a specific position, place for a country, using any favorable conditions for that.

New subjects, such as businesses, international organizations, NGOs, and individual communicators get involved in the process in addition to the traditional ones; the nation states. Many authors argue that the informational revolution has changed the essence and traits of such a fundamental factor as the Power is. According to M. Kunczik (*Images of Nations and International Public Relations*), today half of a nation's power comes from image building, and he warns that in media diplomacy era statecraft may become a hostage of stagecraft [6].

Given the fundamental changes in international politics, the geopolitical processes in the region and the Armenian-Turkish initiatives, currently one may talk about the image-bound regional geopolitics.

Everything indicates that processes of targeted perception management, agenda setting, fabrication of credibility and new image creation have commenced here, wherein a multitude of actors are involved, objectives are set (long- and short-term), and various means are used (open and closed). Perhaps, we are dealing with something that the Americans call *Strategic Communication*. For example, they believe that successful strategic communication and public diplomacy shall target both the mass audience and specific groups, who affect the decisions and opinions to the extent of their experience, position and leadership capabilities (e.g. political and business leaders, the military, the clergy, renowned journalists, representatives of the science and education community, women's organizations, etc.).

Public diplomacy (including cultural, sports, museum and media diplomacies) are primarily used for long-term objectives and open means. The visual, and more importantly the real-time event dimensions supplement verbal communications in order to intensify the effect. The next characteristic concerns the audience: it expands and turns from a local to the global one (not only who says what, when and how is important, but also *to whom* it is targeted). ***Legitimacy, Credibility, Reputation, Leadership, Individuals, Popular sentiments, Fears and Expectations, Symbols, Identity*** and even the very *History* become indispensable means in this process.

The new trends in Armenian-Turkish relations showed that “we are not ready to protect our society” and that the statements of foreign statesmen have a stronger influence on us (Vigen Sargsyan, “Haylur” Sunday edition).

Different images clash in the region, and:

1. These images are not only created in the region, and actually, not so much in the region.
2. Various actors with different objectives are involved in the process.

3. The foreign policy and country image often are the extension of the domestic policy.
4. A struggle for identity affirmation or denial takes place.
5. The image or its construction are often portrayed as politics.

An erroneous analysis may lead to confusion, hinder achievement of the short-term objectives, and most dangerously, it may become an instrument in long-term ploys of other interested actors. The lack of understanding of the perception management essence and complexity may result in undesirable change of attitudes and beliefs not only among ordinary people, but also at the leadership level, which means some crucial decisions may become irreversible.

Perception management is defined as actions to convey or deny selected information and indicators to *foreign audiences* (to influence their emotions and objective reasoning), as well as to intelligence systems and *leaders* at all levels in order to influence official assessments, ultimately resulting in behaviors and formal actions favorable to the originator's objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, cover and deception, and psychological operations. Moreover, it is not unconceivable that we deal with or will have to deal with *cognitive viruses*. Some experts, including Thomas Rona who is credited with coining the modern term of *information warfare*, have extended the idea of memes to the system of information warfare (though others claim that there is no sufficient scientific evidence for that). T. Rona has described the idea of *“societal immunodeficiency virus”* or SIV, against which unwarned populations would have no effective defenses. **Meme is a unit of information, like an idea or a skill, that transfers from one mind to another through verbal or repetitive actions.** G. Stein and R. Szafranski call them the basic unit of cultural imitation, monads or building blocks of culture, thinking and behavior, the means by which a society reproduces itself [7].

In these conditions, there is an urgent need for interpreting information, sorting out valuable signals and image from noise and reality, respectively. We witness what Joseph Nye, one of the leading professors at Harvard University credited with coining the term “soft power”, called a **“paradox of plenty”**. Today, **Attention** rather than Information becomes the scarce resource, and those who can distinguish valuable signals from noise gain power. J. Nye states that in the conditions of increasing information flows, political struggles occur over the creation and destruction of **Credibility**. He contends that governments compete for

credibility not only with other governments, but also with mass media, corporations, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, and networks of scientific communities. According to Nye, politics becomes more theatrical and aimed at global audiences, and **in an information age, it is often the side which has the better story that wins** [8].

It has to be added that credibility, own agenda setting, as well as creating meanings (rather than eliminating them), respecting symbols (rather than destroying or mocking them) would ensure the minimally required integral mix to protect the social consciousness. It is also a critical process in terms of a country's self-image and international image, and its absence, or even worse, handing it over to others is extremely detrimental. There are examples of this in not so distant past; say, the collapse of the country a part of which we used to be. In G. Pochepstev's words, "International image is, above all, a system of links and supporting frameworks and rules. The defeat of USSR in the Cold War was essentially the loss of its image, and hence, the failure of its system of links [9, p. 414].

In this backdrop, the image as an important non-tangible factor for a nation state's power turns out to be even more sought after among other factors, and in the wider context of perceptions management, it grows to be **a strategic resource**. Furthermore, if important international actors do not endorse the policies of a nation state, then they will work against the political line of that nation using all available levers.

In this regard the President Serge Sargsyan's speech at the assembly of the Republican Party of Armenia is quite characteristic, where he stressed the following: "We develop our activities as a 21st century party. Virtually no issues remain that are of interest solely for us. All serious issues that we are concerned about fall in the context of the global interests. It is necessary to be well aware about the substance of this context. An artist's brushstroke can be accurate only in the context of the picture as a whole."

Therefore, in the 21st century it is necessary to consider the image of countries in international relations analysis. The positive international image for Armenia has to be formed with consideration of the 21st century's new realities geopolitical changes in the world and the region, and most importantly, the national interests. The strategy and tactics for image building, management and adjustment must correspond to the state's explicit or tacit short-, medium- and long-term objectives.

***Yet, what is a country's image?
Is it possible to manage or adjust it?***

The problem of the country image has been elaborated rather fundamentally, particularly in foreign literature. However, the existing approaches differ significantly. Image is contemplated in different contexts: international PR, strategic communication and public diplomacy, psychology, public opinion, media, branding, marketing and so forth. There are questions posed with no unequivocal answers readily available. Still, many nations invest heavily in their programs for image and reputation. Image making, as well as PR technologies are based on studies and results in social and political psychology, including social cognition, influence psychology, advertising, political and managerial psychology.

The interest of political scientists and experts of international studies in issue of the image arose in 1960-70s. The first publication that analyzed the impact of image on international relations was K. Boulding's *The Image* (1962). In exposing the national image – international system interrelations, Boulding defined the term “image” as cognitive, affective and evaluative structure [10, p. 423].

When discussing the images existing in the international arena, two things have to be noted. *First*, two different notions - “image” and “appearance” (in Russian- “obraz”) have to be identified, and *second*, the concepts of “country image”, “ethnic/national image”, “self-image”, “media-image” and others have to be differentiated.

In ordinary speech, political and scientific literature alike, the concept of “image” is used exclusively in context of premeditated influence and targeted shaping, as duly noted by A. Bodalev and L. Laptev. Also, E.B.Pereligina states that “... image is an appearance (“obraz”) created, i.e. the appearance formed as a result of certain actions, work.” E.N.Bogdanova and V.G.Zazikin provide even a clearer definition: “... image is nothing but a deliberately built psychological appearance that is created with some very specific objectives.” The same authors continue: “Worded differently, an object's appearance might exist “naturally”, whereas the concept of “image” comes up when there is a need for adjusting that appearance in collective or individual minds” [11, p. 36-37].

Another scholar, E.Galumov, underscores the active, functional quintessence of the image, too, and draws several important conclusions [12],:

First, image is a manageable category that can be willingly aligned, built and transformed.

Second, a country's image has a price and serves a tool for resolving competitive problems.

Third, image is not just an informational, but also a combative informational concept.

As M. Kunczik maintains: "The image is something created and cultivated by its possessor, that is, something that can be actively influenced by PR activities. By contrast, prejudices and/or stereotypes are created by the environment and are ascribed" [6, p. 39]. At the same time, some social psychologists have concluded that regardless of the efforts applied, the people's mentality and views are very resistant to sudden pressures from environment, and that almost nothing can change any nation's image in the eyes of the 40% of population even in 20-30 years.

It is also worth mentioning the observations of Robert Jervis [13, p. 6]:

- Nation states are capable of influencing other nation states by simply changing their image, without modifying the policies they conduct.
- The image may become a major factor in easier attainment of a nation's goals in international relations.
- Nations may pay an extremely high cost for having an undesirable image.
- Thus, to summarize the previously mentioned concepts:
- The notion of "image" may be applied exclusively in the meaning of *planned influence* and *targeted building*.
- The people's perceptions and views about *others* are extremely resistant to sudden pressures from environment.
- The "image" is consisted of cognitive, affective and evaluative integral parts.

Regarding the last bullet item above it has to be noted that different scholars who study the role of image in international relations underscore the significance of such notions as "*self-image*", "*media-image*", "*foreign policy image*", "*geopolitical image*", "*leader image*", "*territory image*", etc. However, these can be classified as country's *sub-images*. The Western researchers of these issues have mainly followed several distinct paths of study. We shall single out three of those, whereby the image is presented as:

- "**signals**" that international actors emit to each other, i.e. coded information about one's intentions, interests and so forth (O. Holsti, R. Jervis);
- a "**filter**" in the system of beliefs of the foreign policy decision-makers (K. Shimko, M. Cottam);

- a **factor of national identity**, particularly when forming a national image through political discourse (H. Larsen).

It has to be mentioned that in addition to this very image-focused approach, a country's image is also subject to **marketing** (*Place Marketing*) and **branding** (*Competitive Identity*) studies¹. However, it is out of the scope of our interest here.

The functions of image outlined in literature are mainly as follows:

- identification;
- idealization;
- contrasting.

Nonetheless, what is the role of the country image and what factor can it represent in international relations? What would be the outcomes of efficiently handling the country's image? Though the article format does not enable to answer all the questions in detail, yet we shall try to provide some answers.

To summarize the role of a country's image, it has to be emphasized that today it may act as:

- a factor/instrument in inter-state affairs;
- a part of strategic power;
- identity validation, rejection or creation;
- an alternative way of interaction;
- a resource that works through public opinion, which in its turn represents another resource;
- an inexpensive means to reach one's objectives;
- an ideological concept;
- exertion of Soft/Smart power;
- an extension of domestic politics;
- a means to address issues of country attractiveness and competitiveness;
- a part of Aid Diplomacy, Diplomacy of Deeds.

Studying the image of CIS countries in international mass media, one may observe that it:

- includes parameters of desirable image (democracy, human rights, stability, etc.);
- presents cause and effect relationship (in commenting on events);

¹ See Peter van Ham, *The Rise of the Brand State: The Postmodern Politics of Image and Reputation*, and Simon Anholt, *Countries Must Earn Better Images through Smart Policy*.

- ascribes responsibility;
- provides certain assessments.

There are various ways of image building in these media. Some of them are:

- news management,
- agenda setting,
- framing,
- naming,
- packaging,
- discourse;
- events management,
- pseudo-events,
- manipulation;
- visibility: low or high profile;
- saliency;
- spreading ideas.

In this regard, it is worth presenting the story of an interview, which might be quite instructive in respect to the analysis of the aforementioned mass media image making. In the author's interview with Paul Goble (one of the interviews with the diplomatic and media community representatives in Washington, DC, in 1998, was not intended for publication) regarding Armenia's image, when asked about the intent of his idea on Meghri corridor, he replied that it was supposed to get us, the Armenians, used to the idea of compromise, whereas otherwise he believed Karabakh is Armenian land. It is interesting *how* Goble called this process. In his words, it had to be a *Great Deal/Great Bargain*. Since he had put this very idea into circulation in mass media, let us analyze it based on the findings of this article and above-mentioned list of items.

First, it appears that above all, we are dealing with the memetic or *cognitive virus* (in the form of the compromise idea) mentioned earlier. **Second**, the *naming* of the supposed process is present (in this case, Great Deal/Great Bargain). **Third**, how it is presented or *packaged*. **Fourth**, how the *news management* is attempted. **Lastly**, how one initiates *agenda setting* and discourse, simultaneously aiming and *perception management*, and so on. All of this may significantly affect the formulation, pursuit, and finally, adoption of crucial decisions for the country. If one recalls the outcomes of Goble's idea over the last 15 and more years (as far as making or not

making concessions is concerned), then another peculiarity of the image is evident; the managed images, inter alia, shape the reality.

The example of coverage of Armenia in so-called Quality (Elite or Prestige) press in 1991-2009 may once again confirm that that media-image is a critical factor in international, and particularly, inter-state relations (though this article is not aimed at detailing the image of the Republic of Armenia in American press, which is a different subject matter). Based on the study of all materials about Armenia published in these years in The Washington Post, the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, one may conclude as well, that the country's image is an important factor not only in inter-state affairs, but also in the area of global politics. The media-image of a country may possibly be, become or mean the following:

- signal,
- threat,
- warning,
- probing,
- assessment,
- encouragement,
- agenda setting,
- ignoring,
- discrediting,
- management of internal processes, etc.

Several other circumstances have to be taken into consideration when discussing the country's image. **First**, image of the country is built by various actors: nation states, international organizations, corporations, interest groups, think-tanks, private brokers, individuals, mass media, academia, culture personalities, Diaspora (parties, organizations, community), as well as intelligence agencies and so forth. **Second**, in order to analyze the media-image of a nation, to adjust or make the new image, it is imperative to know the decision-making path in the given country. **Third**, as our studies indicate, the media-image of a small country like Armenia is not only and not so much a product of journalism, but rather a factor of international relations. **Fourth**, it can be a part or a component of propaganda, lobbying, PR (including international PR), public diplomacy (cultural, media, sports, museum and other diplomacies), branding, psychological and informational warfare, as well as intervention by intelligence agencies¹.

¹ In particular, about latter see *Boyd-Barret, Miller*, The New York Times, and the Propaganda Model.

I suggest to expound the country/national image as follows:

- core (identity/essence)
- layers or sub-images
- shell (current situation, topics, events).

A few other considerations are important to the analysis of image and foreign policy foresights. Our studies of Armenia's image indicate that for image assessment and political forecasting it is critical to pay attention to the presence of the following variables. **First**, whether the image is cohesive or split (an example of a split image came up in the previously mentioned interview with Paul Goble, who described Armenia as a country with a *noble past, troubled present*). **Second**, which attributes or elements of the image remain unchanged and which ones do vary? For instance, the Armenian Genocide has always been mentioned in all publications regardless of the subject covered (until recently the American Quality Press has been refusing the term *Genocide*). It is obvious that such a constant presence had been an omen of becoming an international politics factor at some point, which we eventually witnessed in recent developments. **Next**, attention has to be paid whether there is an attempt to change the *core* (identity/essence) of the image, or the changes merely affect the sub-images (e.g. the leadership) or are they simply touch the shell (e.g. are event-related)? **Finally**, another crucial thought; in addition to publications about the issue and changes in the country's *visibility* (i.e. number and volume of articles, editorials, series of pictures and other materials about the country), whether or not something that could be called *parallel support* is present, namely:

- articles and other reports on the country and its people in the sports, cultural and similar pages of the same newspaper,
- publication of international and other organizations' reports, announcements, telephone conversations of country leaders, etc.,
- publication of the results of various public opinion surveys,
- public diplomacy activity (cultural, sporting, exhibition-related events and episodes, celebrity diplomacy).

It is important to consider Western or local country's *journalism standards* and *news values* in assessing a country image in mass media. **However, the experience suggests that in international journalism the national interests raise above everything, including objectivity and impartiality.** Also important are the given media's ownership, class (Quality press, etc.), the page where material is published, priming

(in TV), genre, volume, name, references, sources, verbal means, authors, pictures, charts, maps and a few other things.

As mentioned previously, there is a *price* to pay for the country's image in international arena and its consequences, whether positive or negative. In summary, some of them are:

- Credibility, Prestige, Reputation;
- making wrong/incorrect decisions;
- isolation, downturn of investments;
- resolutions detrimental to Armenia and Armenians, adopted in various international organizations;
- interference with/management of internal processes of the country;
- self-esteem and self-image shifting towards the negative end;
- Societal Immunodeficiency;
- transformation of the national identity and values (in the long-term perspective), etc.

Coming back to the peculiarities of the small nations' image, we shall now consider the *open flow of information* in the modern world. Based on the bullet points above, one may contend that since it is often extremely difficult for small nation states (among other things, due to the lack of funds) to make a continually positive image, as well as to defend their societies against a negative image projected by some foreign actor, it is then paramount to have something that could be called a *"bulwark."* It would enable protect the *"immune system"* of the nation and society. The resources for building such a bulwark, so to speak, are ready to hands:

- national identity,
- own agenda, meanings, symbols;
- development of *strategic communication* for the national undertakings of utmost importance;
- news management instead of information control;
- educated society;
- development and safeguarding of historiography and Armenian studies.

And the most critical things are *formulated national interests, public trust, ideal legitimacy of the authority, justice*, or in a nutshell: *Esse quam videri* (to be, rather than to seem to be).

Case study: Turkey-Armenia “Football diplomacy”

Based on the materials and main ideas of this article, the following approximation of the process development can be pictured with regards to the subject matter:

- **a part of global geopolitical developments;**
- **perception management;**
- **efforts to modify identities;**
- **verbal, visual and event-related components;**
- **work with groups (Brown) [9, p. 733].**

Turkey

a) in the USA, EU and other countries (perception management process)

- Genocide recognition process (USA, Congress, states, other countries);
- Public diplomacy (Track 2 diplomacy) [15];
- Public diplomacy, informal contacts (TARC, etc.);
- Return of the bank deposits;
- Ambassadors (recalling Evans, refusing to appoint Hoagland);
- Live broadcast of the Congress hearings;
- Public diplomacy events (cultural/educational/academic components, etc.);
- Books by Peter Balakian and other authors;
- *Ararat* and other movies;
- *System of a Down* rock band;
- New policy of the *G word* in mass media;
- Changes in textbooks;
- Orhan Pamuk (Nobel laureate) and others,
- Armenian Genocide Museum in Washington, DC;
- Duduk, etc.;
- Football diplomacy.

b) in Turkey (“new policy”, credibility fabrication, efforts to alter the image, efforts to draw lines between Armenians)

- Genocide denial (deportations took place, not a Genocide);
- Taking the victim stance (there were victims on both sides);
- Dodging responsibility for genocide (Turkey has been involved in the WWI);
- Hrant Dink;
- “We are all Armenians” (*empathy*) and attempts to eliminate the lines between “We” and “Others”;

- “Forgive us, Armenians” (*fragmentation*, substitution of the whole by a part of the society, *building up emotionality and showing the way out of it*);
- Ergenekon, pro and con parties of the process;
- Seeming controversy with Azerbaijan;
- Repeated threats from Azerbaijan;
- Crypto-Armenians;
- News leak (alleging that Gül’s mother is Armenian, etc.);
- Pointing out the input of Armenians in Turkey;
- Renovation of Akhtamar church and other Armenian monuments;
- “We listen the same music”;
- Eurovision song contest (voting results in Turkey);
- Flag “wars”, etc;
- Attempts to link the normalization of relations with the Karabakh issue, etc.;

Armenia

(absence of an own agenda and chaos in informational arena, flowing with the current)

- Social consciousness is unprotected;
- Referring to international community, mass media, experts to support own policies;
- Taking the stance of a “small nation”, mentioning the blockade, development difficulties, etc.;
- Efforts to reshape the domestic political arena: preparation to the 2012 presidential elections (discrediting certain political forces, etc.);
- Attempts to modify the system of links and values inside the society (attempted attacks on identity);
- Attempts to revise some “moments”, culture, and personalities in the history;
- Criticism of the nationalism;
- Trying to change some symbols;
- Emergence of Armenia-Diaspora tensions;
- Constantly mentioning the Turkey-Azerbaijan controversies;
- The claimant is Diaspora (Recognition, Restitution);
- Celebrity diplomacy (Charles Aznavour), etc.

January, 2010

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ON THE ISSUE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY'S PERSPECTIVE

*Gevorg Hakhverdyan**

One of the most significant issues in the globalization context that draws the attention of the scholarly community is the perspective of the national identity¹. As U. Beck contends, “experiential space of the individual no longer coincides with national space.” [1, c. 24-53, 38] Many works have been devoted to the perspective of the national identity, but none of them appears to follow a more or less dominating direction, which can be explained by a number of reasons. First, it is difficult indeed to make forecasts about the perspective of the national identity in the overall uncertainty of the nation-state’s destiny. Second, many scholars are quite skeptical about the revolutionary nature of globalization and believe that the loss of national identity is just one of the so-called globalization mythology postulates that have become stereotypes engrained in collective consciousness. Third, the forecasts differ even among those who have no doubts that national identity undergoes transformation.

According to J.Habermas, “The nation-state owes its historical success to the fact that it substituted relations of solidarity between the citizens for the disintegrating corporative ties of early modern European society.” [2, c. 211] One may now state that the mentioned “relations of solidarity”, which at the time served a basis for shaping the national identity, currently weaken under the impact of the global society’s transnational ties. It has to be noted, that the notion of “identity” is quite a capacious one in philosophy and psychology, and there are many interesting works written on the subject. However, the framework of our subject matter does not necessitate referring to the abstract notions of *sameness* and *self-concept*. Let us just mention that P.Ricoeur distinguishes two sides or components

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¹ The identity based on ethnic unity rather than common citizenship is meant here.

of identity: identity as *sameness* (Latin: *idem*) and identity as *selfhood* (Latin: *ipse*) [3, c. 145].

At least three disciplines focus their attention on the problem of identity in the light of globalization: sociology, culturology, and political science. As far as the perspective of national identity is concerned, we would picture the outlines of the likely future in the following four scenarios:

1. *Citizenship based self-identification*. This scenario seems feasible given the scale of the modern democratization processes. J. Habermas notes that, “For a long time, “Staatsbürgerschaft”, “citoyenneté” or “citizenship” all only meant, in the language of law, political membership. It is only recently that the concept has been expanded to cover the status of citizens defined in terms of civil rights.” [4, c. 217] Currently this notion signifies not only membership in a state, but also a certain legal status and judicial content. In our days citizenship is, above all, a legal concept defined as a steady legal bond between a person and the state. It would be safe to say that it has completely lost the original ethnic component.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966 legalized everyone’s right at the international level to freely leave any country, including his own (Article 12)[5, c. 27-43]. The exponential growth of communication technologies truly increased not only the extent of practicability for this right, but also the very demand for exercising it. There are no grounds to predict an abandonment of the global democratization course (with an exception of few countries) and reversal of the integration processes. Conversely, there are valid reasons to presume that the demographic conditions in the overwhelming majority of countries tend to change rapidly, and this trend is going to accelerate. In such circumstances a less rigid structure of identity might develop based on the institute of citizenship, which could successfully replace the national identity

2. *Activation of the national identity*. Sustainable development under globalization is often portrayed as a nearly unattainable goal. The contrastingly uneven distribution of economic wealth is becoming a characteristic attribute not only in comparing regions and states, but also in exploring the internal situation of the societies. The deepening of environmental and demographic problems is perceived as an outcome of the exuberant globalization pace. Finally, the processes occurring in the cultural domain and the emotionally tragic perception of losing the national identity complete the circle of preconditions that can trigger national self-consciousness. In this regard, E. Todd has made an interesting observation using the

example of the Muslim countries. He concluded that transformation from ubiquitous illiteracy to higher general literacy rates, as a rule, is ensued by a surge of nationalism [6]. With intensification of globalization processes one may clearly observe a growth of nationalistic sentiments. This reaction upon relentless modern trends occurs in full harmony with the paradigm of anti-globalism. However, in all fairness it has to be noted that the ethno-nationally motivated participation in anti-globalist discourse as an embodiment of the anti-globalization movement constitutes a very small fraction. The international environmental NGOs are a lot more active in this direction. And generally, the anti-globalization movement as a whole seems to be an articulated opposition to the forthcoming transformations, rather than an efficient preventive mechanism capable of precluding their occurrence. As far as the anti-globalist discourse is concerned, unlike the paradigm of neo-liberalism, it represents a conglomerate of vague, incoherent and unstructured ideas.

This on no account means that the probability for emergence of nationalistic aspirations is minimal. The whole experience of humankind comes to prove that regress is as inherent (if not more inherent) to the course of the time as progress. All forecasts, even the most authoritative ones, by and large are just hypotheses rather projections of the future. In these circumstances, it would be imprudent to disregard in advance the probability for amplification of the national and ethnic factor.

3. Growth of the civilization factor. In the backdrop of the active integration processes and arising global economy, the civilization factor draws much interest. The question whether to what extent the relations between civilizations would determine the shape of the future world order, appears quite topical. In this regard, a number of issues arise, without resolving which it is impossible to ascertain effectively the role of civilizations in the emerging world order. First of all it is necessary to figure out what is the basis for defining modern civilizations; secondly, to attempt compiling the list of existing civilization, and lastly, to assess the real capabilities for each of them to act as a new geopolitical player.

We should not go too deep into the etymology of the term “civilization”, since it would have been necessary to quote at least several dozens of authors in order to present comprehensive information on its genesis and expound the existing definitions, which might turn into a diverting abstraction from the subject matter of this analysis.

The notion of “civilization” had been developing over the 350 years since it appeared, adding up more and more meanings. A. Toynbee, whose contribution in

the study of civilizations cannot be underestimated, offers the following components of civilization identity: religion, history, language, traditions and culture [7]. On the other hand, S. Huntington limits the definition of civilizations to the single tenet of religion. He believes that the great divisions among humankind will be cultural, and the dominating sources of conflict will be at the fault lines between civilizations [8, c. 754]. M. Khatami responded to that in 1998 by putting forward an alternative world outlook, where he replaced “clash of civilizations” by “dialogue among civilizations” calling for a multi-polar and multicultural world. This spurred extensive discussions around the world. Nonetheless, this paradigm too does not eliminate the significance of civilization identity. Referring to the demographic situation in most of the countries, I. Vasilenko contends that “today, many countries are simultaneously within a single civilization and themselves consist of a multitude of civilizations.” [9, c. 74]

Despite intensification of the integration processes within realms of certain civilizations, the cultural factor as a source of self-identification still exposes weak effects. However, with the present realities, there are enough reasons to assume that the “us-them” conflict might elevate to the civilization level.

4. Triumph of cosmopolitanism. In the scientific literature this scenario is, perhaps, the most widespread prognosis on forthcoming transformations. The roots of cosmopolitanism extend from the ancient Greek philosophy at the times of Antisthenes and Diogenes, and its essence is contained in its etymology (Greek cosmopolites – citizen of world). The idea of “human race unity” lies in the foundation of many religions. However, this universalistic and extremely utopian line of values has served some sort of a goal to be aspired in the course of the humankind development. Conversely, today cosmopolitanism is often referred to as a possible (unplanned) consequence of contemporary processes. Thus far, the Kantian idea of the world government seems unrealistic, too.

The advocates of this scenario judge from the actual circumstances and trends of modern times. In their opinion, the accelerating integration processes and general democratization, the scale of transnationalization and formation of global economy, technological development and emergence of informational dimension, all lead to the decline of national and civilizational self-consciousness. U. Beck envisions a peculiar model of the future global society. For the author, “cosmopolitanization” implies “globalization from within” that transforms the “nation-state’s inner quality of the social and political itself.” [1, c. 24-53, 38] He

does not predict elimination of the national identity, but reckons that akin to post-Westphalia period developments, when church and state were separated, the cosmopolitanization will separate nation and state.

One may unequivocally agree with P. Berger that “isolation from the global culture necessarily requires isolation from the global economy.” [10, с. 17] The era of globalization has brought a new incarnation to the old idea of cosmopolitanism, which gained a particular topicality. This scenario, though maintaining a certain degree of utopianism, in our opinion is not less realistic than the previous three scenarios.

In conclusion, the following inference is to be made, which in our view is a crucial finding on the presented topic. Under the influence of technical and technological progress, emergence of the global informational society and demographic processes, the national identity enters the arena of competition with various types of other identities. At the same time, we believe that it is pertinent to talk about long-term process of national identity's decline, whereas in the short-term perspective outbreaks of nationalism might well accompany it.

May, 2010

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GEORGIA: THE NATIONAL IDENTITY IN POLITICAL PROGRAMMES AND IN PRACTICE

*Tamara Vardanyan**

Introduction

During the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st century the social and political developments in Georgia may be characterized as a process of creation of a nation state, which is generally characteristic of the modernization period. The “National Project” initiated by Georgia back in 1918-1921 in its essence was a process of state creation, which had a continuous character and was not interrupted even in the period of Soviet Georgia. And since 1991 this process entered its next, most active stage and is still on the political agenda. It will remain long on the political agenda of the ruling elite, regardless of what are the ideological grounds uniting these forces.

The underlying logic of the above-mentioned social and political processes has conditioned the gradual change of the demographic picture of the country, which can be characterized as **the process of monoethnification**. And monoethnification of the country to the largest possible extent is a process which results in decreasing number of representatives of other ethnic groups in the country that automatically leads to weakening the potential of their counteraction. The weakened ethnic communities, in their turn, would not be able to challenge the Georgian nationalist programme with any counter-programme.

Back in 1983 E.Gellner, a prominent theorist of the nation and nationalism issues, mentioned that the perfect model of the society is when the boundaries of nation and state coincide [1]. According to him, nationalism is a principle that implies matching these boundaries of political and national units. This model is regarded also as an efficient means to prevent and settle ethnic conflicts.

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The mono-ethnic composition of a country is also important from the national security viewpoint. Undoubtedly, the largely mono-ethnic nature of demographics in the Republic of Armenia, which is a direct consequence of the loss of historically Armenian territories, today is one of the crucial guarantees for the internal political security. Both the history and today's reality also come to prove that ethnic or religious minorities often become an opportunity for external powers to interfere with the internal political processes of a country, turn the minorities into a leverage and, thus, in fact, pose threats to the political stability and societal solidarity of a country.

Of course, being aware of these realities, the Georgian national elite aspires to carry out a policy of integration of ethnic and religious minorities, which is often regarded as a policy of forcible assimilation/ due to its radical manifestations. The Georgian nationalist intelligentsia plays a great role in the ideological substantiation of the aforementioned policy. Formulated back in 1860s, the Georgian nationalism is a comprehensive ideological system with rich traditions and historical roots. Deriving strength from the past, today's nationalist intelligentsia at the same time uses extensively the assimilation mechanisms customary in the modern world.

The policy of integration/assimilation of the minorities in Georgia is a consistent and systemic one. It includes educational and cultural, spiritual and religious domains, the aspects of mutual perception and stereotypes, as well as underlies the national/state ideology and is presented as a "National Project".

Certainly, the key role in this process is given to the administrative system, university centers and academic community, which have to scientifically substantiate the logic of all these processes from the national interests' point of view. Hence, **the state administrative system in Georgia serves the national project**. Let us mention at once, that this state of things is natural and logical, because the protection of the national interest is one of the main functions of the state, and the administrative system is a major resource for the state.

Theoretically, the process of monoethnification in any country occurs by the following mechanisms:

- Gradual emigration of ethnic minorities which is a mostly latent process and for this reason does not draw attention of the general public and mass media. It may become visible to them only in its extreme manifestations, e.g. large-scale ethnic cleansings, forced deportation, etc.

- Slow assimilation of ethnic minorities, which is also a latent process and due to this it is not visible to the naked eye. It may trigger a wide response in mass media or be condemned by the progressive masses only in case of its extreme manifestations, e.g. forced religious conversion, imposing foreign language, tough imposition of the customs, mentality and mores of the titular ethnic group.
- Loss of the territories densely populated by ethnic or religious minorities (this process mostly occurs in a result of wars or collapse of the empires).
- Genocide.

The first two mechanisms in their non-extreme manifestations, i.e. **the gradual emigration of the minorities and slow assimilation**, are characteristic of our neighbour Georgia. Generally, these two mechanisms are the most frequently used ones all over the world. Since these processes take place slowly, they do not appear in the spotlight and the public “wakes up” only when the results become tangible and obvious. The other important peculiarity is that these processes often occur in peacetime and they can be implemented without violence, in a soft and “civilized” way.

Nevertheless, there is another very important peculiarity characteristic of these two mechanisms: the emigration of the ethnic and religious minorities and their assimilation do not encounter serious resistance or resentment in the civilized world. These processes are often considered a natural course of development. Thus, the emigration is often perceived and interpreted as a result of migration processes, and assimilation as an inevitable effect of globalization and integration.

“The National Project” of Georgia

The theorists of nation and nationalism single out two main types of nationalism: ethnic and civic (state). At the same time, according to the renowned nationalism theorist Hans Kohn, there are two main models of nations and nationalism: Western (French) and Eastern (German) [2]. The civic type of the identity and nationalism corresponds to the Western model, and the Eastern model encompasses the ethnic identity and ethnicity based nationalism.

In modern globalizing world the ethnic nationalism is usually criticized and the civic one is considered to be democratic, and hence, more acceptable.

Nevertheless, Georgian nationalism is generally of ethnic nature and, as well-known Georgian researcher G. Nodia rightly states, it is closer to the German model [3, pp. 84-101]. Another researcher of Georgian nationalism, G. Zedania, agreeing

that Georgian nationalism has an ethnic nature, tries to explain it by the peculiarities of its origin. *“The tendency of the Georgian nationalism towards “ethnic character” is to be explained by its origin – when there was no possibility of equating nation with the state – as was the case for Georgians in Russian Empire – language, ethnicity and religion were taken as the defining moments of identity”* writes G. Zadenia [4, p. 80]. Furthermore, the author mentions that this tendency maintains to the present days [4, p. 80].

Georgian ethnic nationalism is based on the principles of the dominance of Georgian language and Georgian Orthodox Church, instilling and accepting interpretations of the Georgian history approved and put into circulation through the educational system, Georgian ethnicity's priority and development concept in its Fatherland and other factors.

On the other hand, civic nationalism in the theory implies equality of rights for representatives of all ethnic groups living in the country, their involvement in the social and political life of the country, creation of an environment with ethnic and cultural diversity; in other words, creation of a new identity based on citizenship (in academic literature this is called ethnicity-blind policy).

Nevertheless, in practice very often the civic nationalism (or state nationalism) serves mostly not to form a new identity but to impose the identity of the titular ethnic group on the ethnic or religious minorities. The Georgian researcher G. Zedania expresses similar ideas: *“The phenomenon, which is being described by the term “civic nationalism”, is nothing else but the loyalty towards the state or patriotism”* [4, p. 79].

The postulates of the Georgian “National Project” presented recently by G. Nodia, according to the author, generally reflect the way Georgia has chosen since 1918. The item 4 therein reads: *“Georgia is a tolerant country that accepts and recognizes culturally distinct ethnic minorities on its territory but demands from them loyalty to the Georgian national project”* [3, p. 94]. And the first point of that very “National Project” says: ***“The Georgian nation-state is the only acceptable political framework for the development of Georgian nation”*** [3, p. 94]. The contradiction here is obvious. If “The National Project” implies creation of the nation-state, which in its classical model presumes the dominance of the Georgian ethnos, it is then incomprehensible how it can recognize the cultural diversity of the minorities, and how the place and the role of ethno-religious minorities in the society are defined. In fact, one may suppose that nothing but loyalty to “The National Project” is required from the minorities.

If one talks about tolerance, then the role of the minorities in the development and prosperity of the country should be stressed and presented with clear-cut facts. History text-books are one of the most important indicators of the tolerance level in the country. If the society is multi-ethnic, in the modern civilized world the principle of Multiculturalism is used in the school text-books. **According to this principle, the school history syllabus must include in official history the key events from the history of the ethnic minorities, a number of facts about the contribution they made in the development and state creation of the country, general information about their culture, etc.** Meanwhile, the history text-books in Georgia are strictly ethnocentric and do not reflect the demographic picture of the country¹. These text-books tell not so much about the history of Georgia but the history of Georgians, and the minorities are left out of the context.

Why do we attribute such an importance to the history text-books? The point is that the feeling of having a common history and past is a factor for unification of different parts of ethnos and one of the components of ethnic identity. While depriving ethnic minorities of their own history and thrusting upon them the history of another ethnos – in this case Georgians – is nothing else but a mechanism of assimilation, i.e. Georgianization.

In fact, the Georgian reality is that the rhetoric of authorities on tolerance does not match the policies carried out by them.

Thus, the civic nationalism rhetoric is used, while in practice the ethnic nationalism reigns.

So, the assimilation and emigration of ethnic and religious minorities is possible in simultaneous application of both nationalism models (ethnic and civic). In the M. Saakashvili period, Georgia tries to make a maximum use of both ethnic and civic (state) nationalism on its way to form a nation state, and this distinguishes the incumbent leader from his forerunners.

There are many examples of assimilation policy carried out under the pretext of the civic identity creation. For instance, the process of creation of the “Soviet human” in the Soviet period actually led to gradual Russification rather than to formation of the “new identity”, which was manifested at the level of the Soviet republics mainly in the Russification of the elites and change of the demographic composition of the republics in favour of the Russians. Essentially similar processes take place in

¹ For the brief examination of the Georgian history text books see Թ.Վարդանյան “Աշխարհի էթնիկ պատկերը. վրացական մոդել”, “Գլոբուս . Ազգային անվտանգություն” ամսագիր, թիվ 2 (6), 2009թ., Երևան, էջ 69-74, նաև՝ <http://www.noravank.am/am/?page=analitics&nid=1888> (in Armenian), <http://www.noravank.am/ru/?page=analitics&nid=1875> (in Russian):

Turkey, as well as in other countries to a varying degree, whether these are so-called modern democratic states or those yet to pass the way of modernization.

Both models of nationalism (ethnic and civic), not only because of the history textbooks but also because of many other problems in Georgia, target the same objective, i.e., to form the Georgian nation state through assimilating and squeezing out the ethnic and religious minorities.

The Triad of Georgian Nationalism: Fatherland, Language, Religion

Fatherland

Had the process of Georgianization of ethnic and religious minorities not possessed strong, comprehensive, systematized ideological grounds, it would not have scored any considerable success. Besides, the aforementioned ideological bases, as a rule, achieve a tangible success only when they are adopted by the state system, because in this case the entire administrative and propaganda machine is put to service for implementing this task.

G. Nodia appropriately notes that “in 1860s I. Tchavtchavadze offered the triad, which later on acquired the status of the formula for creation of the Georgian nation – Fatherland, language, religion (*mamuli, ena, sartsmunoeba* in Georgian)”. I. Tchavtchavadze persistently expressed and developed his ideological views on the pages of “Iveria” newspaper published in Tbilisi.

Meanwhile, by the beginning of the 20th century nationalism had acquired the shape of a political programme. The idea of the nation state creation had been formed. It was expressed through the slogan “Georgia for Georgians” as a programme for creation of the national statehood.

It is known that at the beginning of the 20th century the ethnic composition of the Transcaucasia and the inhabitancy of population varied a lot. The Russian Minister of Public Education, Count I. I. Tolstoy wrote in his memoirs about the situation in Transcaucasia: “There is no territory with homogeneous population. Nobody can say distinctly whether Tiflis is a Georgian city or an Armenian one..., or whether the Armenians would agree to recognize the province of Baku as Tatar land.”¹

In our region the processes of territorial centralization gained momentum particularly in late 19th and early 20th century. The political programmes for creation of homogeneous administrative and political units were formed among the ethnic mi-

¹ Воспоминания министра народного просвещения графа И.И.Толстого (31 октября 1905г. – 24 апреля 1906г.), Серия “Мемуары русской профессуры”, кн.2, 1997, с.122.

norities living on the territory of the Russian Empire. They would later become the territorial basis for creation of nation states.

Since May 1, 1903 in Paris “Sakartvelo” (Georgia) political bulletin in two languages (Georgian and French) had been published. The goal of this bulletin was to awaken national and civic consciousness among the Georgians thus preparing grounds for the autonomy of Georgia¹. Then, in 1904 the nationalist Georgian Social-Federalist Party of was formed. G. Galoyan mentions that “...the main body of that organization was the aforementioned “Sakartvelo” bulletin – the organ of Georgian national-federalists abroad” [5, էջ 451]. The leader of nationalist organization “Sakartvelo” was A. Georgadze. The organization took the slogan **“Georgia for Georgians”** as the main exponent of its political goals.

The main programme demand of the Georgian national-federalists was “the creation of the Georgian autonomy within the borders of the Russian bourgeois-feudal state” [6, c. 20]. It means that for creation of a nation state the Georgian nationalism needed ethnically homogeneous territory. The autonomy had to serve as the territorial basis for creation of such an administrative and political unit. Actually, in the Georgian reality the idea of territorial centralization had been put on the political agenda back at the beginning of the 20th century (*by the way, similar processes were happening among the Eastern Armenians, though in the Armenian reality the whole attention of the political struggle was focused on Western Armenia, and among the Caucasian Tatars this process became active mostly in 1905-1906 during the Armenian-Tatar clashes*²).

The territories to form the autonomous Georgia, mentioned by the federalists were not ethnically homogeneous. There were many Armenians, Russians, Tatars, Circassians, mountainous Lezghins and others who would inevitably find themselves in the status of national minority under the autonomy.

The idea of creation of the ethnically homogeneous territory found a wide response in the local press in Tbilisi, too. “Akhali Droeba”, newspaper published in Tbilisi, also advocated immediate creation of the homogeneous administrative and political unit. Here is the stance of the newspaper’s editorial stuff on the national issue: “We are the adherents of that very noble nationalism which does not wish to other nations what it would not wish to itself and hence, nobody will dare call us “chauvinists”. We are for the full autonomy of the nation, because where

¹ Վրաստանը և ազգային ինքնավարության հարցը Կովկասում, Դրոշակ, Ժնև, 1903, թիվ 9, էջ 147-148:

² See particularly: Թ.Վարդանյան, «Տարածքային կենտրոնացման գործընթացները (1905-1906թթ. հայ-թաթարական ընդհարումների լույսի ներքո)», 2 մասով, «Ուխտ Արարատի», թիվ 4, օգոստոս, 2005, <http://www.oukhtarati.com/amsagrer/Oukth-4.pdf> (մաս 1-ին), «Ուխտ Արարատի», թիվ 6, հոկտեմբեր, 2005, <http://www.oukhtarati.com/amsagrer/Oukth-6.pdf> (մաս 2-րդ):

100 languages are spoken it is difficult to understand the needs and demands of an individual citizen, thus, ***the common political life is not possible either***”(underlined by T.V.)¹.

Georgia’s monoethnification project continued over the Soviet period as well, which is vividly evidenced by the demographic changes in the republic (see below). The modern researcher of the Georgian identity Marie Chkhartishvili, marking out the role of the Armenians in the process of formation of the Georgian identity, mentions: “*In the Soviet period as well Georgian-Armenian identities’ interrelations were marked with tension. The marginalization of Armenians continued, people with Armenian family names were not able to occupy managing positions in Soviet Georgia. However, when Armenians changed their family names to have Georgian endings, they could reach positions even higher than those of Georgians*” [7, p. 124]. Interestingly, the author of these lines attributes it to the Soviet policies, but not to the Georgian National Project.

At the end-period of the Soviet Union’s collapse and in the first years of the post-Soviet Georgia the policy of monoethnification became an unconcealed phenomenon. Back in the years of Perestroika – in 1989, in the issue of “Akhalgazda komunist” (Young Communist) newspaper for June R. Mishveladze’s letter was published which clearly reads: “Georgia is on the verge of a real disaster – extinction.... We have to increase the proportion of the Georgians at all costs (today it is 65%). Georgia can tolerate no more than 5% of guests.... We have to persuade these suspiciously fast-breeding alien nationalities that there are no conditions for them on the soil of David the Builder”².

The radical nationalist Z. Gamsakhurdia, President of Georgia (elected in 1991) adopted that very ideology, and during his rule not only gradual Georgianization threatened the Armenians of Georgia, but there was also the danger of physical assault. G. Ioseliani’s non-formal paramilitary groups – “Mkhedrioni” (The Horsemen) inspired fear among the peaceful population, including minorities (despite the cases of open confrontation between Z. Gamsakhurdia and J. Ioseliani). In those years even in Tbilisi’s Armenian quarter Havlabar the local Armenians undertook self-organization and self-defense measures in order to avoid possible gang assaults.

The policy of the incumbent president M. Saakashvili also contributes to the creation of the Georgian nation state, though he uses the modern rhetoric. For example, he often mentions that Georgia is a multi-ethnic country and that the prosperity and development of Georgia is possible only under the equality of the representa-

¹ See “Кавказ” newspaper, Тбилиси, 1906, no.52.

² See: <http://www.otechestvo.org.ua/main/20071/520.htm>

tives of all the nations living there. One may see many posters expressing such an approach in the streets of Tbilisi. At the same time a year after coming to power – 2004, he announced the year of memory of Z. Gamsakhurdia thus stating the succession of Gamsakhurdia's model of state creation and his adherence to that model.

G. Nodia also speaks about this succession. Reminding the items of the "National Project" he writes: *"Despite all the differences between the first Georgian Republic of 1918-1921 and the post-Soviet period, as well as important differences among the political regimes of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze and Mikhail Saakashvili, these points constitute invariable guidelines of the Georgian national project"* [3, p. 95].

The problem is that the programme of the nation state creation in Georgia does not contradict at all to the plans of the big Western stakeholders in the region who see no threat in the Georgian nationalism and encourage it because it is largely based on anti-Russian sentiments.

For instance, one of the reports of civil society circles submitted to the European Council reads:

The main gaps with regard to the minority policy in Georgia bringing isolation and marginalization of the minority communities are:

- absence of the comprehensive policy approach to the minority issue and consequently absence of adequate legal frameworks ensuring minority participation and civil integration;
- Solid lack of political representation of minorities on national and to some extent on local levels;
- Lack of the appropriate skills and capacities of those representatives of the ethnic minority groups who have been elected to the local self-government bodies necessary for the adequate fulfillment of their powers and representation of the ethnic minorities within local self-government authorities;
- Lack of culture of political participation and extremely low level of legal literacy among representatives of minority groups;
- Informational vacuum in the areas of the compact settlement and lack of attention to the problems of minorities leading to isolation of minority groups from the society;
- Previous one-sided language policies which contributed to the lack of knowledge of the official state language by ethnic minorities and thus to the isolation, employment problems and inadequate law enforcement [8].

Though the West is well aware of those obstacles, the Western democratic institutions do not exert any pressure on Georgia's authorities on the issue of improving the situation with the minorities and they will not as long Georgia maintains its anti-Russian orientation in its foreign policy. Under the situation concerned the marginalization and isolation of the minorities continues. Although even in such a situation the Georgian researchers manage to cast the blame on Armenians who because of *their (Armenian. – T.V) experience of existence in Diaspora makes great obstacles to the integration of ethnic Armenians in a non-Armenian national community* [7, p. 125].

At present, many of Georgian researchers consider the Saakashvili period as a period of democratic and civil society building. Comparing the national projects of Gamsakhurdia and Saakashvili the Georgian researcher D. Aprasidze mentions that in *the Gamsakhurdia period ...a political construction of a Georgian nation started with ethnocentric nationalism.... At present, Georgia is on the stage of a state-led nationalism* [9, p. 72]. In reality the difference is only in the rhetoric and in practice the result is the same – the gradual monoethnification of the country and creation of a nation state on that ground.

Nevertheless, some differences can be observed as a result of using different rhetoric. For example, the blatant and “hard-core” nationalism of Z. Gamsakhurdia urged mostly emigration of minorities, while today, due to the “soft” policy of Saakashvili with the stressed civic nationalism, the gradual assimilation mostly prevails among the minorities.

Language

The second pillar and weapon of the Georgian nationalism triad is the Georgian language. Many researchers of the nation-building process (O. Bauer, Yu. Bromel, Yu. Arutyunov, L. Abrahamyan and others) mention that the language is a key and visible indicator of the identity and plays a great role in ethnogenesis. Modern Western researchers also mention that the form of language orientation is very developed in the national consciousness of Georgians. *Any visitor to Georgia is immediately struck by the centrality of the Georgian language, both in everyday functions and in cultural contexts* [10, p. 168].

Hence, the Georgian language is a powerful means, which being spread among the ethnic and religious minorities, boosts the transformations of their identity towards Georgianization – a process that targets the final assimilation into the Georgian populace. As ethnographer L. Abrahamyan mentions: “*Both the language policy*

of the former Georgian Soviet republic, and that of the newly independent Republic of Georgia, clearly reflects all the political problems Georgia has had and continues to face in regard to its ethnic minorities”[11, p. 72].

The Georgian language as a key component of the Georgian identity was particularly stressed in the 19th century and in the Soviet period. It was even more significant than the religious identity. The reason was that being part of the Russian Empire religion could not play a differentiating role for the Georgian national idea but it could have rather unified Russians and Georgians. That is why the ideas of language and motherland were stressed. Besides, when Georgia became part of Russia, Georgian language had not been used during the liturgies and Georgian Church lost its independence in 1811. Consequently, Georgian became the language of the secular literature and turned into nationalism nourishing source. The Georgian Orthodox Church could not perform the function of a differentiating element in the Soviet period either. Only in our days it acquired a considerable power and is getting stronger every day.

Thus, Georgian language is the most important component of Georgian nationalism, distinguishing Georgians from others. For this reason, when in 1978 Moscow wanted to deprive the Georgian language of its status of official language in the Soviet Georgia (and Armenian in the Soviet Armenia) Georgian national intelligentsia put up a serious resistance to that, owing to which Moscow's attempt failed.

If we consider developments in Javakhq from the aspect of crucial importance of the Georgian language for the Georgian identity, it will become clear why the status of the Armenian language in Javakhq causes serious antagonism on behalf of the Georgian governmental, social and scientific circles. The fact that the Armenians of Javakhq do not speak Georgian causes deep repugnance. It means that this circumstance is a serious signal to the Georgian elite that the policy directed to assimilation of the Armenians in Javakhq may fail. G. Khaindrava mentioned during one of the interviews: “The problems in Javakhq are connected not with the Armenian language but with the Georgian. And it would be a friendly gesture on behalf of Armenia to think about spreading the Georgian language in Javakhq, because people there already speak Armenian anyway.”¹

Generally, the language policy in regard to the minorities is an important area in the interstate relations between the receiving nation and the motherland of the national minority, because in motherland they understand the consequences of losing the mother tongue. One of the obvious examples is the German-Turkish high-

¹ Хаиндрава Гоги, «Армяне и грузины – никакие не друзья, да и друзьями никогда не были». <http://news.am/ru/news/7153.html>

level controversy concerning the demand of Turkey to teach the Turkish language to immigrant Turks living in Germany¹. But the Armenians in Javakhq are not immigrants; they live on a part of the territory of their historical motherland, and therefore they have some privileges in exercising their language rights.

It has to be mentioned that through introduction of the Georgian language thousands of Armenians were assimilated in Kakheti. Armenian schools in the Armenian villages step by step were turned into Georgian schools and two-three decades later part of the local Armenians were fully **Georgianized**.

By the way, the same policy is carried out in the Armenian schools in Tbilisi, where Georgian sections were introduced together with the Armenian classes. During several recent years Armenian schoolchildren gradually move to the Georgian sections where the teaching level of the Georgian language is higher and thus, it is more preferable for Armenians who are the citizens of Georgia. As a result, Armenian sections are losing the prospects of existence.

On the other hand, there is a comprehensive system of unwritten laws. For instance, you can often hear in Georgia, especially among the Armenians living in Tbilisi that “speaking Armenian in the streets is a shame”. At the same time, no such social norm exists that “for an Armenian it is even more shameful not to have a command of Armenian language”.

Religion

The next important pillar of the Georgian nationalism triad is the ***Georgian Orthodox Church***. The religion plays a role of catalyst in the processes of national consolidation in Georgia in the years of independence. Unconcealed processes for creation of “One nation, one religion” model are taking place here. As M. Javakhishvili mentions: “... since the 90s of the 20th century the notions of “Georgian” and “Orthodox” had been equalized. Entire Georgia must become mono-confessional country and all Georgians should be Orthodox” [12, c. 116]. Till our days other religious minorities in Georgia have no legal status. The Georgian Orthodox Church and its leader enjoy high reputation in Georgia. Thus, when in 2003 it was planned to sign an agreement between Georgia and Vatican, the Georgian Orthodox Church immediately halted the process. Georgian Patriarch stated that “other confessions may make use of this fact in order to establish themselves in Georgia, which may cause new and serious problems for our state.”²

That very Javakhishvili mentions that Catholics in Georgia are called

¹ See particularly: “Учите турецкий: Турция требует открыть в Германии школы с обучением на турецком языке, <http://lenta.ru/articles/2010/03/30/schulen/>

² <http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1063998660>

“sectarians”, “heretics”, “aliens”. The Orthodox preachers often call Armenians “heretics” and “Satanists” because of the absence of any knowledge about the Miaphysitism of the Armenians [13, էջ 112].

There are many facts of proselytism carried out among the Armenians by the priests of the Georgian Orthodox Church. For example, in Havlabar, the quarter inhabited mostly by the Armenians, a sizeable and luxurious Georgian church Sameba was built during the Saakashvili period. Today the Armenians from Havlabar often visit that church. One of the opinions expressed on the site was that the Georgian side is proselytizing mostly the wealthy and outstanding Armenians.

The acts of proselytism are also carried out in Javakhq. There were no Georgians in the village of Poka in Ninotsminda region. But Georgians bought five houses in the village where Georgian nuns and monks of Poka’s St. Nino Church reside. In one of the interviews the mother superior Elizabeth mentioned that she managed to baptize one whole Armenian family in accordance with the Orthodox rite, because, as she said, they realized that Orthodox faith is more righteous¹. Later on, according to the accounts of S. Karapetyan, in 2003 the Georgian church in Poka managed to re-christen in Georgian Orthodox Church many Armenians in Poka, alleging that the local Armenians themselves turned to the Georgian Church to be re-christened because they understood the “advantage of the Orthodox Church” [14, էջ 515].

The Georgian Dioceses of the Armenian Apostolic Church have to take serious measures against proselytism. Recently Church Calendars and brochures were published by the efforts of the Georgians Dioceses of the Armenian Apostolic Church which will allow the Armenians in Georgia celebrating church fetes in accordance with the Calendar of the Armenian Apostolic Church. But the Armenians of Georgia do not fully realize all the possible consequences of the assimilation through religion yet, and most of them still stay within the field of the spiritual missionary of the Georgian Orthodox Church.

Monoethnification of Georgia in figures: Demography²

Let us present the process of the country’s monoethnification in figures by examining the official demographics. These processes are mainly conditioned by the declared state ideology, the ethno-mobilization potential of the titular ethnic group, and also by some logics of the intra-communal developments inside the ethnic or religious minorities.


¹ See particularly Մեկիքիշվիլի Նինո, Ռեզոնանս, թիվ 161, 21.06.2001թ., թարգմանեց Վ. Սարգսյանը:

² We rely on the official statistics. At the same time it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that often a non-Georgian person may deliberately present himself as Georgian in official questionnaire though in their milieu his real ethnic origins is known and yet for quite a long time depending on the situation he may identify himself according to his ethnic origins. This fact proves that gradual assimilation of the person.

The diagram below presents the dynamics of monoethnification of the country.

Diagram 1

The dynamics of demographic composition of Georgia (1926-2002)¹



Armenians in Georgia

The diagram above clearly depicts the process of Georgianization of the society and country, i.e. the continual growth of the number of Georgians on the one hand, and the gradual decline in number of the ethnic and religious minorities on the other hand. Thus, if in 1926 according to the official census Georgians constituted 59.9% of the population of the republic, in 2002 the proportion of the Georgians grew up to 83.3%. And just the opposite, if in 1926 Armenians constituted 17.6% of the population of Georgia, in 2002 the number of Armenians decreased down to 5.7%. It can be observed that Georgianization is accompanied by the process of de-Armenization (see below *Table 2* and *Diagram 3* presenting this process).

The number of the Armenians in Georgia declined because of **both gradual assimilation and slow emigration**. Thus, according to the 2002 census part of the Armenians living in Georgia (with total number of 248,929) does not consider Armenian their mother tongue – 5,692 people consider Georgian to be their mother tongue and 7,525 – Russian². In fact both of these groups are being estranged from the Armenianness openly either through assimilation (Georgian speakers) or through emigration (Russian speakers). These groups, in fact, neither resist assimilation any more nor make any effort to preserve their Armenian identity and consciously estrange themselves from their national roots³.

¹ Let us mention that the 2002 demographics is presented without Abkhazia and South Ossetia <http://www.geostat.ge>

² www.ecmi.de/emap/download/Samtskhe_Statistics.pdf

³ To compare, the number of those who consider Georgian or Russian their mother tongue among Azerbaijanis is much smaller (385 and 934 people correspondingly). Ibid:


Table 2

The number of the Georgians and Armenians in Tbilisi in 1803-2002 (in %)¹

	1803	1817	1864	1876	1897	1926	1939	1959	1970	1979	2002
Armenians	74%	75,6%	47,4%	41%	29,5%	34,1%	26,4%	21,5 %	16,9 %	14,5 %	7,6 %
Georgians	22,6%	18,9%	24,9%	24,1%	26,3%	38,1%	44%	48,4 %	57,5 %	62,1 %	84,2 %

Diagram 3

The number of the Georgians and Armenians in Tbilisi in 1803-2002 (in %)²



¹ See: <http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/rngeorgia.html>
² Ibid.

In addition to the groups of the Armenians who are downright estranged, there are many Armenians who despite considering Armenian their mother tongue, widely use Russian and Georgian as a language of communication even while communicating with their fellow Armenians. Though the process of assimilation of these groups may take place more slowly, nevertheless, in a course of time it will become inevitable if appropriate measures are not taken.

It is remarkable that among the emigrating ethnic minorities Armenians take the first place in numbers. Accordingly, after the independence total 550,000 thousand ethnic Georgians emigrated from the country, which constitutes 39.7% of all the emigrants from Georgia¹. At the same time and the Armenians take the biggest share in this number. Over the same period 60.3% of ethnic and religious minorities left the country.

Thus, when the 1990s emigration process is discussed the Georgian party mentions that Georgians emigrated too, which was caused by the difficult social and economic situation and war in the country. However, the point is that the rate of emigration among minorities was much higher and, probably, the causes cannot be attributed to the two aforementioned factors alone. The nationalist sentiments and ethno centric environment also played an additional and significant role in boosting emigration of the minorities.

Besides, it should be mentioned that owing to migration of the ethnic minorities not only a quantitative decline took place in the aforementioned communities, but also a qualitative one. It is known that it was socially active masses who emigrated and this caused a qualitative regression in whole Georgia (these same processes took place in the Armenia and other post-Soviet republics). However, in case of Armenians the social niche occupied by this socially active part has not been filled because in the ethno-centric environment the social growth of a person faced many obstacles. Thus, the community was left without elite.

On the other hand, in case of Georgians the old elite was substituted by a new one – again ethnic Georgians. Actually, this transformation might have been a slump in quality for the Georgians too, but **in case of Georgians the national outlook and composition have not only been preserved but also reinforced at the expense of minorities**. Therefore, the viewpoints of some experts that emigration equally affected all ethnic and religious minorities, and its main causes were mainly of social and economic character are not objective².

¹ www.ecmi.de/emap/download/Samtskhe_Statistics.pdf

² Such opinions are often sounded by the political figures and they are also rather popular among some experts. See, e.g. M. Komakhia, Georgia's ethnic history and the present migration processes, Central Asia and Caucasus, 2008, 1/16, http://www.ca-c.org/online/2008/journal_eng/cac-01/16.shtml

Other ethnic or religious minorities

It has to be mentioned that the ethnic Georgians' growth in the number is not a result of the high birth rates and the natural growth, but mostly a result of assimilation of other ethnic groups, fast Georgianization of sub-ethnic groups (Mingrelians, Svans, Imeretians, Gurians, etc.).

For example, in the results of the census carried out back in early 20th century in the Russian Empire [15, c. 108-124] and in other sources, we can run into such term as "the Kartvelian peoples, including Georgians". B. Ishkhanyan in his valuable studies uses 2 terms: "Georgians in a broad sense" and "Georgians in a narrow sense". "Georgians in a broad sense" means that this group includes not only the Georgians proper, but also Svans, Imeretians, Mingrelians. Later those groups were considered by Georgians as sub-ethnic groups of the Georgian ethnos and were incorporated in that ethnos. The statistics show that in case of including those sub-ethnic groups the proportion of the Georgians compared to the rest of the population in Caucasus grows by nearly 50%. For example, B. Ishkhanyan's work presents the number of the "Georgians in a narrow sense" in comparison to the whole population of Caucasus; it constitutes 9.29%, and in case of "Georgians in a broad sense" the number comes to 14.87% [16, էջ 148].

The usage of two different terms means by itself that at the beginning of the 20th century there was a differentiated attitude towards Mingrelians, Svans, Imeretians – they were sometimes identified as Georgians, and sometimes were not. All of this comes to prove the existence of ethnic identity among them different from the Georgian one back at the dawn of the 20th century. Today the Georgian self-perception in these groups is a commonplace phenomenon. For instance, among Mingrelians the Georgian ethnic nationalism may be manifested even more vividly than among Georgians. Perhaps, the reason for this is the involvement of Mingrelians in the ruling elite of Georgia and the fact that the Georgians do not differentiate the Mingrelians and regard them a sub-ethnic group, and their spoken language, which does not have writing and is used solely in day-to-day life, is considered a dialect of the Georgian language.

In fact, the same trend of demographic decline can be observed in regard to all ethnic or religious minorities in Georgia (see *Diagram 1*).

Though in the Soviet period Abkhazians and Ossetians had a status of autonomy, these two ethnic groups still did not avoid the demographic decline. Thus, in 1926 the number of Abkhazians in Georgia was 2.8%, whereas in 1989, i.e. before the Georgian-Abkhazian war, it was down to 1.8%, and the number of the Ossetians in the same period decreased from 5.3% to 3.0%.

The Georgian researcher D. Aprasidze mentions that the ethnic nationalism spread in the Soviet Georgia did not include only two regions – Abkhazia and South Ossetia¹ [9, p. 72]. Expanding this idea and reformulating the task, it can be stated that Georgians did not manage to accomplish the process of Georgianization of the Abkhazians and Ossetians most likely due to that reason. Consequently, such a policy in the territory of Georgia caused Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian interethnic conflicts after the collapse of the USSR. Hence, despite the processes of Georgianization occurring all over the territory of Georgia, Abkhazians and Ossetians managed to preserve their ethnic self-perception. D. Aprasidze correctly mentions that these two ethnic groups were able to oppose the Georgian nationalist project by their own national counter-projects [9, p. 72]. Undoubtedly, this fact is indicative of the high level of ethnic self-perception among Abkhazians and Ossetians.

S.Cornell, professor of John Hopkins University, Doctor of the National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan contends that in the post-Soviet territory, particularly in the South Caucasus, the existence of the autonomies such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, was one of the crucial factors that fueled the ethnic conflicts [17, pp. 245-276]. In reality, the existence of the autonomies could not cause or stimulate conflicts by itself, but quite the opposite, such autonomies allowed ethnic minorities to more or less preserve their national identity. The cause of the ethnic conflicts was not the existence of autonomies but their forcible annexation to the Georgian and Azerbaijani Soviet Republics, and the philosophy underlying the national policies of authorities in these republics, which was far from the principles they declared.

In the Soviet period Russians were the exception – their number started growing rapidly after the Sovietization of Georgia (from 1.2% to 10.1% in 1959), and it slumped as rapidly as it grew in the post-Soviet period, decreasing to 1.5% in 2002 (see *Diagram 1*). These changes also are certainly explained by the prevailing political ideology, and the modern Georgian historiography qualified them as a manifestation of Russian imperial policy [18, c. 195].

In case of Azerbaijanis, their high birth rates should be taken into consideration while examining the demographics. But even with a glance at that, in 1926-2002 the number of the Azerbaijanis, in fact, remained the same (6.4 and 6.5% respectively). Taking into account the high birth rate, the durable immunity and less inclination to assimilation among Azerbaijanis, that indicator may only point to their emigration, mainly to the Azerbaijani SSR, and since 1991 – to Azerbaijan and Turkey.

¹ <http://identitystudies.ac.ge/1/>

So, since 1989 the pace of Georgianization and monoethnification of the country has been growing constantly, and the numbers of the minorities have been decreasing (see *Diagram 1*)

The peculiarities of demographic changes

The gradual emigration and slow assimilation – two main processes conditioning the Georgianization of the demographic picture of the country – as a rule occur simultaneously. Though the goals of both processes are completely the same, their paces may differ, e.g. by administrative areas, ethnic minorities or historical period.

If in the Soviet period the policy of the gradual assimilation of ethnic minorities was the more active one, in post-Soviet period – in 1990s – the pace of the emigration of the minorities intensified (Greeks mostly left for Greece, Jews – for Israel or Russia, Azerbaijanis – for Azerbaijan and Turkey, and Armenians, unfortunately, mostly left for third countries, though part of them came and settled in Armenia¹, etc.)

The processes of assimilation and emigration among Armenians differ in their intensity depending on the administrative areas. For instance, **if today the gradual assimilation is characteristic of the Armenian community in Tbilisi, among the Armenians in Javakhq this tendency is less stressed but instead, the main cause of depopulation of Armenians in Javakhq can be attributed to the emigration.**

In case of the Russians one can see a rather interesting picture depending on Soviet and post-Soviet historical periods. If in the Soviet period a considerable inflow of Russians could be observed, from the very first day of independence the highest rate of emigration in Georgia was registered among Russians. According to the independent researchers, 200,000 out of 264,000 Russians living in Georgia, i.e. 76%, emigrated (according to the 1989 census, without data on Abkhazia and Ossetia)².

Summary

To summarize, over the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st century Georgia has been implementing a National Project and one of its main goals was the creation of the nation state. Since this task has not been accomplished yet, it will remain on the agenda of Georgia's vision on state creation. The recent statement by president

¹ It is remarkable that the inflow of the Armenians from Georgia to Armenia was much more notable in the first and proceeding years after the creation of the Soviet Armenia than after the collapse of the USSR.

² How emigration affects Georgia, Publication: Prism Volume: 4 Issue: 13, 1998, by Zaal Anjaparidze, www.jamestown.org

Saakashvili that they are ready to provide apartments for ethnic Georgians who decided to return to their motherland at costs twice as low as the market prices are¹ and will simplify the procedure of acquiring dual citizenship will contribute to the process of Georgianization.

After the August war Georgia has gradually begun paying more attention to territories remaining under its control after the war, and neutralization of the problems related to the minorities.

Judging by the above-mentioned figures the only ethnic minority in Georgia which has not had a demographic decline and even has grown by 0.1%, is the Azerbaijani community. At the same time if for many years Armenians held the first place among the ethnic and religious minorities in Georgia, today it belongs to Azerbaijanis.

The strengthening of the Azerbaijani community is mostly boosted by penetration of the Turkish capital into the Georgian market which provides the Azerbaijani community a new impulse for feeling safe. Azerbaijani and Turkish companies mostly employ local Azerbaijanis. Because of the penetration of the Turkish and Azerbaijani capital, there is almost no emigration observed in Kvemo Kartli region inhabited by Azerbaijanis, unlike Javakhq, where the rate of emigration among Armenians is quite high, which contributes to the final de-Armenization of Javakhq.

Thus, the continual growth of the Turkish-Azerbaijani penetration into the economic life of the country and traditionally high rate of the natural growth of Azerbaijani population may be considered the main obstacles on the way of Georgia's monoethnification.

May, 2010

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DOMESTIC POLICY OF MODERN GEORGIA

*Hrant Mikaelyan**

The Domestic Policy of Georgia before Saakashvili's Presidency

After gaining independence in 1991 chaos reigned in Georgia. The economy totally collapsed due to a number of serious problems. Among them were the lost war with insurgent Abkhazia and Ossetia, the civil war, the collapse of the former governance system. The wrong policies of the authorities, including the initiative by Shevardnadze to deposit funds in the Savings Bank with the promise to return twice the amount, contributed to this as well. In a consequence, the economy of Georgia actually became bankrupt and has not come out of recession to date¹.

The first president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, initially won the elections by a landslide, securing 86% of votes [2]. In just a few months his rating considerably sank because of his absolutely wrong policy, the opposition intensified and the civil war broke out which had dire consequences for Georgia. Soon Eduard Shevardnadze arrived in Georgia who in his turn won about 80% of the votes.

In the Shevardnadze period, the clan structure of Georgia was particularly obvious. His party consisted of two groups – “men of the old school” who were his friends and relatives, and young reformers. The Shevardnadze regime considered the stability their main achievement, meanwhile there had been no promised economic development². The reformist wing of The Union of Citizens of Georgia – the ruling

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¹ Among the republics of South Caucasus only Georgia failed to regain the economic development level of the Soviet period. For example, the purchasing power parity per capita in 2007 prices for Georgian SSR in 1985 constituted \$7,604, whereas in 2007 - \$4,400. For comparison, in Armenia it was \$5,693 in 2007. Other than Georgia, also Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan failed to meet their Soviet-time standards. [1, pp. 195-198]

² The economic growth in 1996-1997 changed to stagnation. In 1996 and 1997 the economy of Georgia was growing at a rate of 110-111%, while in 1998-2002 the economic growth was 1-5% annually hardly felt by the population. See: CIS Statistics Committee, Georgia. cisstat.org/rus/georg.html; Department of Statistics of the Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia, statistics.ge

party of Georgia, included those who later became the leaders of the future revolution – Zurab Zhvania, Nino Burdjanadze, Mikhail Saakashvili, Vano Merabishvili, Gia Bokeria and many others. Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burdjanadze held the post of the Parliament Speaker, while Mikhail Saakashvili used to be the Minister of Justice. This is rather typical for the post-Soviet space when the former high-ranking officials from among the young reformers become oppositionists and demand for the revolutionary change of power in the country.

In the 1990s Georgia was like many other post-Soviet countries: abuse of power by officials, mass corruption, plundering international grants and humanitarian aid that Georgia have been receiving for quite a long time. Additionally, there were bread coupons, interruptions of electricity supply, campfires in the yards, and many more. Georgia faced two frozen conflicts – with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in both which it had been defeated. Determining the reasons for these defeats is beyond the scope of this article.

In the first half of the 1990s Georgia was in real chaos – petty rulers controlled most of the country, the roads were unsafe, and the private property and the very life of the citizens in general were not protected either. The crime rates were very high and criminal elements were rampant. In addition, Aslan Abashidze's Adzharia was out of control; it was a unique phenomenon in Georgia of those times.

In 1991, then President Zviad Gamsakhurdia handpicked Aslan Abashidze¹ as the leader of Adzharia. Abashidze created a model of “quasi-state” in Adzharia. Here are some facts that characterize it: (1) Over the whole period of Abashidze's rule not a single cent was transferred to the state budget of Georgia; (2) with the help from Russia Abashidze managed to avoid the civil war spreading over Adzharia; (3) Adzharia, in fact, had a state border and checkpoints not only with Turkey but also with the rest of Georgia; (4) Adzharia had semblance of state structures functioning in a regular state, such as parliament, armed forces, which consisted of the 25th Brigade of the Armed Forces of Georgia with rather large number personnel by Georgian standards – up to 3000 soldiers; (5) control over the sea port and all the profits from the business on the sea and transit to Turkey from the whole post-Soviet space; (6) there was no economic collapse in Adzharia; (7) The regime of Abashidze in fact had a Ministry of Foreign Affairs masked under the office of the Assembly of European Regions; (8) Abashidze pursued independent

¹ At the time Zviad Gamsakhurdia stated to the parliament members: “those who support the independence of Georgia will vote for Aslan Abashidze”.

foreign policy, and he had some success in that – he gained the support of Russia and Council of Europe¹.

However, the differences of Georgia from other post-Soviet countries are remarkable. Firstly, although Georgia is very rich in water resources, the problems with the electricity supply lasted longer. Back in 2000 the capital of Georgia was still in darkness. Secondly, political instability had manifested itself in quite frequent attempts on the president's life. Thirdly, Georgia had virtually no combat-fit army; the armed forces numbered 12,000, and the conscription was accomplished only by 3-10%. Fourthly, in Georgia the third sector and free mass media developed rather fast, and Zurab Zhvania played a major role in the development of the non-governmental organizations. This circumstance turned into a ground for the future revolution.

President Saakashvili and Georgia in 2003-2008

The aforementioned was all what Georgia entered into the 21st century with and later met the “Rose revolution.” As one may guess, the effect of the revolution was the change of situation to a completely opposite one. Thus, the first step made was strengthening of the president's power. It was followed by the arrests and repressions of the old corrupted officials, caused among other things, by the fact that it was impossible to implement all the populist promises given to the people before, and scapegoats had to be found before the winter. At the elections on January 4, 2004 Saakashvili won 97% of votes, and his victory was much more convincing than the ones of his forerunners.

What has been done after that may be called a state creation process. Saakashvili chose the way of creating an authoritarian and sometimes even dictatorial line of command. He relied on the military and police, and because Saakashvili trusted to a restricted circle of people, the rotation of the ministers on different posts has been going on since that time and to date. In average, every minister holds the same position for a half a year to a year. Thus, sometimes the Minister of Education moves to the post of the Minister of the Defense and the Minister of Defense is tasked to find new markets for wine. The only irreplaceable official is the Minister of the Interior Vano Merabishvili².

¹ In 1992, the president of Russia Boris Yeltsin bestowed the rank of General-Major to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Adzharia and in 2004 Walter Schwimmer Secretary General of the Council of Europe saw no problem when the police broke up a rally in Adzharia before his eyes.

² It has to be mentioned that it was the forced resignation of the Minister of Interior Kakha Targamadze in 2001, who was the right hand of Shevardnadze, that made the regime helpless against the November 2003 revolution.

In May 2004 Saakashvili organized a velvet revolution in Adzharia and overthrew Aslan Abashidze; the corruption and bribery were reduced, traffic police was abolished and this solved the problem of the budget revenue. The military and police expenses grew rapidly, and the funding of army, which was about \$30 million annually before Saakashvili, have increased 30 times and reached \$1 billion by 2007. The funding of police and state security constituted about half of that amount. At the same time, the allocations for social needs, education and health grew slower¹.

Table 1

The Economy of Georgia, 2003-2008

	Economic growth	Budget revenue of Georgia, billion lari	Defense expenses, billion lari	Social expenses billion lari
2003	+11.1%	1.321	61.2	342.5
2004	+5.9%	2.283	160.4	481.2
2005	+9.6%	3.257	396.0	625.1
2006	+9.4%	4.430	722.2	690.1
2007	+12.3%	6.032,5	1502.9	640.1
2008	+2.3%			

Sources: *Georgian Statistical Yearbook, 2008, p. 247*;

Cisstat.org, Georgia cisstat.org/rus/georg.html ;

IMF World Economic Outlook imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/02/weodata/index.aspx

The personnel number of the Georgian armed forces has grown three times and now totals to 36.5 thousand. Saakashvili declared merciless war on the criminals and local arbitrariness and almost completely eliminated them within two years. The problems with electricity were solved rather easily. It should be mentioned that Georgia had a potential to solve them, as one of the main reasons for the lack of power and heating was the resale of electricity to Turkey. Steps were taken towards creation of a rule-of-law state but all this was done by non-democratic means.

¹ Thus, the overall defense, Interior Ministry and state security expenses in 2003 constituted 10.9% of the expenditure budget; in 2007 they constituted 36.6% of all the expenses.

The official repatriation declared by the government, as well as the confrontation with Moscow in 2005-06 and the expulsion of the Georgian citizens from Russia yielded some results – in 2005 the number of those who entered country was by 76.3 thousand more than those who left it. Despite the official rhetoric of the Georgian authorities, the Russian embargo on some Georgian products seriously affected the Georgian economy. This problem was partially solved by total privatization and economic reforms carried out by the Minister of Economy Kakha Bendukidze who used the slogan “we will sell everything but our conscience.” Later, a new post was created special for him – the State Minister for Coordination of Economic Reforms – and in that capacity he continued implementing his at times radical reforms. As a result of privatization and a number of other actions, as well as repatriation of a considerable number of Georgian citizens, the government of Georgia gained considerable tangible assets that boosted the development of the country for several years.

Table 2

*The dynamics of the number of the analytical programmes
with political debates in 2003-2008*

TV	October 2003	October 2006	March 2008
<i>Rustavi-2</i>	1 daily programme	1 weekly programme	2 weekly programmes
<i>Imedi (Hope)</i>	1 daily/1 weekly programme	2 weekly programmes	Channel closed
<i>First Public Television of Georgia</i>	1 daily/1 weekly programme	None	1 daily programme
<i>Mze (Sun)</i>	1 daily programme	None	None
<i>9 Arkhi (9 Channel)</i>	1 daily programme	Channel closed	Channel closed
<i>Iberia</i>	1 daily programme	Channel closed	Channel closed
<i>Kavkasia</i>	1 daily programme	1 daily programme	1 daily programme
<i>202</i>	None	1 daily/1 weekly programme	Channel closed

The situation for 2003 and 2006 – from the book "საქართველოს პოლიტიკური ლანდშაფტი", p. 212 ("Political Landscape in Georgia", in Georgian).

Interestingly, Saakashvili's administration also restricted free mass media. For instance, in 2005 "Samshoblo" publishing house was closed, the building of which was home to many editorial offices of the oppositional newspapers and TV

companies. Privatization and resale of the building to a foreign investor was the pretext for that, but even as of now (2010) this building in the downtown is still deserted. Some TV companies were closed and others were subject to pressures (see Table 2).

In addition to the aforementioned, the following features can describe Saakashvili's administration:

- The current authorities of Georgia are “the strong hand” the Georgian people had been longing for in the period of chaos; and several years later they were disillusioned with it;
- The revolution resulted in the growth of the democratic rhetoric and the decline of the level of democracy – that very specific level which allowed revolution to take place [3, c. 13];
- The marked *messianism* of Saakashvili: the president of Georgia describes most of his initiatives as “the first time in the history of Georgia”, “for the first time in Europe” (or even in the world). This can be added by regularly drawing of parallels between himself and the historical kings of Georgia, and first of all David the Builder. This gave some analysts ground to believe that one of Saakashvili's goals is “to leave a mark in the history of Georgia”.
- Saakashvili is a charismatic leader. He is emotional, aggressive and vigorous in attaining goals. This could be vividly seen during the events in 2001-2003 when he did not settle for a minor role and managed to win initially stronger competitors represented by the ruling party, the Labour party, Zhvania's and Burdjanadze's party, and Abashidze's “Revival” party.
- Saakashvili set a course for radical “westernization” of the country and carries it out through tough reforms. The orientation to the West is combined with anti-Russian rhetoric. In a consequence, this causes confrontation with a considerable part of population who consider themselves deceived and estranged.

From the very beginning Saakashvili drew attention to the mystique and symbolism, and sometimes even to the “magic of numbers”, linking all of his large-scale initiatives to religious holydays and other memorable dates and hinting that it was predestined. However, later on the opposition adopted this method and he dropped it.

The Issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

As one may probably notice, one very important issue remained undiscussed; the issue of secessionist republics Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which won their independence in a result of wars in 1991-1994. Georgians are very emotional people. The image of the warrior Georgian takes a prominent place in their national myth. The issue of the separated regions for Georgia is above all an emotional matter – a matter of hurt dignity.

According to the official data, the number of Georgian refugees from Abkhazia is 300-500 thousand. In reality, this number is significantly overstated. In 1989, 239 thousand Georgians lived in Abkhazian ASSR; the 2003 census showed that there are about 45 thousand Georgians (including those who called themselves Mingrelians) living in Abkhazia¹. Taking into consideration that over the aforementioned period the natural population increase was nil and most of the refugees left for Russia, their overall number may constitute 200±5 thousand and no more than a half of them live in Georgia today.

Saakashvili's populist promises made during the pre-election campaign, his ideas of messianism and later the acute lack of legitimacy make him take active steps in regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Among them the followings stand out: the local military confrontation in the firing line with South Ossetia (2004); shutting down the contraband market in Ergneti, off which most of the population of South Ossetia lived (2005); setting control over the Kodori Gorge, renaming it North Abkhazia and locating there an alternative administration (2007); creation of the alternative government headed by Dmitri Sanoyev in the part of South Ossetia controlled by Georgia (2007); launching propagandist "Alania" TV Channel (2007) and as a culmination, the military conflict with South Ossetia which immediately turned into an interstate conflict with Russia in August 2008.

The issue of the separated regions is still topical for Georgia. A part of population still expects reclaiming them for Georgia, while the other part accepts that they are irretrievably lost. If before the August War the number of the first group exceeded considerably that of the second group, today one may assume that those groups are equal in number.

¹ The results of the census in Abkhazia from 1897 to 2003 <http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/rnabkhazia.html>

Political Opposition in Georgia: Origins and Current Situation

The parliamentary elections in 2003 were the most competitive ones ever in Georgia. Six political forces cleared the 7% barrier. The alternative poll carried out by the non-governmental organization “Fair elections” showed somewhat different results. Here the percentage of the votes secured by opposition parties was higher than in the official reports and, correspondingly, the results of the government were lower. After his resignation, on November 25 Shevardnadze admitted that the elections were falsified. Their results were overturned and new elections were set in spring 2004.

Table 3

The results of the parliamentary election in 2003-2008

Elections	2.11.2003	28.3.2004	21.5.2008
For New Georgia	21.32%		
Revival	18.84%	3.86%	
National Movement	18.80%	66.24%	59.18%
Burdjanadze – Democrats	8.79%		
Labour Party	12.04%	6.01%	7.44%
New Rights Party	7.82%	7.56%	
United Opposition			17.73%
Republican Party			3.78%
Christian-Democrat Movement			8.66%

By early 2004 the situation had radically changed. The parties which did not take part in the “Rose revolution” were marginalized in the eyes of the public and isolated by the official propaganda. However, the authoritarian methods of ruling caused growth of the number of its opponents and its rating began falling right after the presidential election when Saakashvili secured about 97% of votes.

At the 2004 elections the authorities mustered 66% of the votes and took 220 out of 235 seats in the parliament. Amid the growth of public concern such ratio did not reflect the real popularity of the political parties in the society. The parliament started to be perceived as something non-legitimate, especially when its powers were trimmed under the strong president. The policy implemented by the new authorities outlined new marginal circles, which included various strata

of the society. At first, it was intelligentsia from Tbilisi, then street traders, the representatives of different parties. The metaphor of Saakashvili about the moving train and those who do not get on board will be left behind, in fact, can be paraphrased as “those who are not with us are against us”. Eventually, that policy turned against himself.

The forces weakened by the post-revolutionary developments became stronger riding on the wave of radical criticisms of the government, and the ruling block began splitting into parts and groups, as for example, the Republican Party. The centre of the political activity gradually shifted from parliament to the TV and then to the streets. The public protest reached its height in 2007. In September a test meeting took place and in November the protest action began. Judging by the number of the participants it was the most large-scale action in the history of the post-Soviet Georgia. However, as the programmes of the parties differed and they changed constantly during the rally and, due to natural causes, the number of the participants reduced rapidly, on November 7 the rally was broken up, and declaration of the state of emergency ensued with ban of oppositional channels broadcasting.

The opposition adopted many of the methods used by Saakashvili several years before, but the main differences were the absence of a charismatic leader and strategic action-plan. Their consolidation was based on the protest against authorities. However, the coalition of the oppositional parties never discussed what they should have done next. The preliminary consensus was the creation of the parliamentary republic. The opposition vacated their seats in the parliament won in 2008 and renounced the results of the elections. The street protests continued from April to September 2009, which finally came to nothing.

The tension arisen after the election of Saakashvili has been easing and intensifying again in the recent years, but the protest remains rather strong. Of course, it is very difficult to talk about the exact numbers, but one may try making some assessments based on a number of public opinion polls and recent elections.

The ratio can be approximately estimated in the following way: in the capital city: supporters – 30%, opponents – 50%, the rest are not sure/undecided; in the regions – supporters – 40%, opponents – 15%, the rest either hesitate or are indifferent to the domestic political struggle.

As for the external powers, Russia, till recently, supported Igor Giorgadze who used to be the Minister of State Security of Georgia but who has been accused in arranging attempt on E. Shevardnadze's life and fled to Moscow back in the 90s. This fig-

ure had been finally marginalized in Georgia in 2005-2006, but Moscow could not find any alternative. Washington prefers cooperating with several groups simultaneously as to avoid problematic situations.

If one tries to simulate the situation in future, no dynamic developments are expected because Saakashvili's failures recur both in domestic and international policies. At the same time, opposition proved unable overthrowing Saakashvili and consolidating for any serious goal. It seems the number of people disappointed in politics of the country grows with time.

In the domestic policy, "national treachery" and "collaboration with Russia" mostly used by the official circles remain the main arguments.

Religion in the Politics of Georgia

One of the main peculiarities of post-Soviet Georgia is the marked religiousness of the population and the factual involvement of the Orthodox Church in the politics. The Constitution of Georgia declares the freedom of religion. The Article 9 of the Constitution reads that the State accepts the exceptional role of the Georgian Orthodox Church in the history of Georgia and at the same time it proclaims ... the independence of the church from the state. In 2001, a second paragraph was added to this article, according to which the relationship between the State and the church are determined by the Constitutional agreement that is subject to controversial assessments [4, c. 59, 62-63].

So far, no law on religion has been adopted in Georgia and there are many problems concerning the religious minorities. First of all, the Jehovah's Witnesses sect and a number of traditional religions in Georgia – Armenian Apostolic Church, Catholic Church, etc. – are discriminated against. At the same time, as of now, no religious organization can be registered in the status other than that of non-governmental organization and naturally, this does not make Armenian Apostolic, Catholic and other churches happy.

According to the census of 2002, the share of the ethnic Georgians and members of the Orthodox Church is approximately the same – 84%¹. However, among the members of the Orthodox Church there are Russians, part of Armenians and other national minorities, while part of Georgians are Muslims².

Today the Georgian Church is a competitor to the state in the national projects and tries to establish its absolute influence. Under these circumstances, the conflict of

¹ See: http://statistics.ge/_files/english/census/2002/Religious%20beliefs.pdf – the population of Georgia according to its religious affiliations – countrywide and in the regions.

² These are mostly Lazes and Adzharians.

interests between the government and the church as a centralized structure is natural. Meanwhile both parties try to conceal and even out the conflict. Since the Church is the only comprehensive structure in Georgia that survived in the Soviet period, at the same time claiming to be the highest moral authority, its role and authority are indeed high and in fact they exceed those of the state structures.

Today the Georgian Church in essence is taking over the issue of consolidation of the nation. This may be proved by many facts but it is suffice to mention only one of them – in his Christmas address delivered on January 7, 2010 the Georgian Orthodox Church's Patriarch said: "There are forces that urge some small minded people to translate Bible and other books into Mingrelian, Svan, Avarian and Laz, in order to prepare grounds for declaring these variants of Georgian as separate languages. ... The maps and qualifications are spread all over the world that allege Georgia an artificial unification of Adzharians, Lazes, Svans, Mingrelians and others; and supposedly each of them has its own language and culture. Thus they aspire to present our nation as a combination of different nations. This brings us close to the collapse of the state."¹ In ecclesiastic terminology, this is called phyletism, but, as it has already been mentioned, the Georgian Church sees its main mission in the consolidation of the nation.

In 2001, the level of confidence in the state institutions was very low; only 4% gave confidence to police, whereas church had 63%. The runner-up was the institution of Ombudsman – 14% [5]. Since that time the reputations of both the state institutions and church has grown. In order to clearly understand the dynamics of the situation with the Georgian church, it has to be noted that in 1978 only 1% of the respondent students at the Tbilisi University admitted that they believe in God, while in 2000 their number constituted 89% [6]. It is clear that in 1978 not everybody who believed in God dared to admit it, and in 2000 not all atheists admitted their atheism, but the trend is absolutely clear. According to another poll, 65% of the population shared the opinion that "faith and religious values should condition all aspects of the life in the society and state". Moreover, about 70% of students were among the adherents of the fundamentalism.

It is important to mention that the Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia has held the office for 32 years². The day of his enthronement and the birthday of the Patriarch of the Georgian Church are celebrated as national holydays. Thus, the modern Georgian Orthodox Church and the name of Ilia II are virtually synonyms in today's Georgia. Every political power in Georgia appeals to him, especially the opposition that hoped to find a support in him for the struggle against Saakashvili.

¹ <http://www.apsny.ge/2010/soc/1262901255.php>

² His enthronement took place on December 25, 1977

Today the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) tries to carry out independent policy, including *foreign* policy. The GOC, headed by Ilia II is in diplomatic contact with Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and even achieves some results¹. For instance, the ROC so far has not recognized the Abkhazian and South Ossetian self-proclaimed churches independent from the Georgian Church and calls GOC its main ally in the struggle against “schismatics” in Ukraine².

Among the recent incidents between the church and state one may mention the demolition of a hilltop church under construction near Batumi, which was being built without permission. Later the blame for that action was placed onto some low-ranking official who would have never dared to do that without an instruction from above. Consequently, the public was so outraged that the church was re-built at the state expense.

In late 2009 Teya Tutberidze, one of the leaders of the Liberty Institute made some clips and placed them in *Facebook*, as well as gave an interview where she “unmasked” Patriarch and his pro-Russian and anti-state activity. That caused a scandal in Georgian society³; the conflict has been aggravating because the Liberty Institute was one of the main structures that brought Saakashvili to the power and it is considered the ideological base of today’s Georgian authorities.

Conclusions

The whole last century Georgia strived for unity. That result is partially attained though it caused conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The interim tension maintains in the inter-ethnic relations.

In Georgia the phobia of territorial losses and further breakup of the country is explicitly manifested. The anti-Russian rhetoric remains one of the main political claims in all debates, and although the opposition tries to reduce the tension in the Russian-Georgian relations, the authorities avert any thaw.

The rating of Saakashvili and his regime remains at the mark of about 40%, which grants him some freedom of actions; some forces routinely put forward allegations in treachery and support of the Armenian demands related with construction of Batumi-Gyumri highway and opening of Kazbegi - Verkhni Lars border checkpoint. Nonetheless, Saakashvili will most probably remain in power until the end of

¹ Patriarch of Georgia: Abkhazia and Ossetia will return to Georgia. After the meeting with Patriarch of Russia Cyril in Baku. <http://ru.trend.az/news/politics/foreign/1611936.html>

² <http://www.stavropolye.tv/russian/view/12702>

³ <http://www.inosmi.ru/sngbaltia/20091027/156438658.html>
<http://evrazia.org/article/1143>

his second term and he will appoint a successor from his team.

The influence of the foreign policy on the domestic one is significant; however, it is not that crucial and military defeat suffered from Russia made virtually no difference for the inner conflict.

The role of the political opposition will remain stable; meanwhile the role of the Georgian Orthodox Church may continue growing. This circumstance will complicate both the interstate relations between Georgia and Armenia and the issue of concessions to the Armenian community in Tbilisi.

January, 2010

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“21st CENTURY” information and analytical journal
Editorial Board

Founded by the “NORAVANK” Scientific-Educational Foundation
State register certificate no. 221 granted on 17.05.2001
by the Ministry of Justice of the RA
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Printed: 20.07.2010.
No. 1 (7), 2010.
Print run: 200 copies.

Art paper, size: 70x100 1/16
6 sheets. Font: Sylfaen
Printed at Gasprint Ltd