21st CENTURY

«NORAVANK» FOUNDATION

21-ՐԴ ԴԱՐ, 21-Й ВЕК

1 (19)

YEREVAN

2016

21ˢᵗ CENTURY

Information and Analytical Journal

1 (19), 2016

21st CENTURY

Information and Analytical Journal

1 (19), 2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INFORMATION WARFARE
OF THE NEW FORMATION

Gagik Harutyunyan*, Sergey Grinyaev**, Hrachya Arzumanyan***

The dynamism of modern developments prompts geopolitical actors to develop new military-political concepts and technologies of their application as soon as possible. However, innovations in this area in no way imply abandoning old concepts, as the former enrich the latter and facilitate shaping a complex and effective new overall strategy. This pattern is especially evident in concepts of information warfare (*IW*), and therefore, the analysis of evolution of approaches to *IW* appears quite topical. Without referring to Martin Libicki's canonical definitions of first-generation *IW*, a pivot point to be taken in this analysis is going to be the perspective of *RAND Corporation* experts that consider *IW* a self-contained activity, regardless of whether there are ongoing military actions or not. Effectiveness and efficiency of new formation *IW* under this logic are often significantly higher than those of the traditional wars in past.

"Second-generation warfare"

Carl von Clausewitz, a prominent military theorist, at a time noted that "War is the continuation of politics by other means." Modern realities are different to such extent that it can be stated that "politics is the continuation of information war by other means." The main goal of modern *IW* is to reduce spiritual and intellectual resources of the adversary's society to a critical level, after which that country loses autonomy and is unable to resist the political will of the influencer in any significant way [1, 2]. In this context the objectives of *"second-generation IW"* are noteworthy, including:

---

* Executive Director, Noravank Foundation, (Yerevan).
** General Director, The Centre of Strategic Estimations and Forecasts (Moscow).
*** Political Science PhD, Military and National Security Expert, (NKR).

- Establishing an immoral atmosphere in the adversary's society and developing a negative attitude towards own cultural legacy;
- Manipulation of society's conscience and civilizational orientation of country's population groups to create political tensions and chaos;
- Destabilizing relations between political parties, provoking violence against opposition in order to create confrontations, lack of trust, sowing suspicions and intensifying political struggle;
- Reducing the information security level of government structures and prompting wrong decision-making in governance;
- Misinformation about the work of government agencies, compromising and discrediting the governing bodies;
- Instigating social, political, ethnic and religious strife;
- Discrediting international reputation of the country and damaging its cooperation with other countries;
- Harming vital political, economic, defense and other interests of the state;
- Embedding own cultural "code" in the consciousness of the adversary's society through manipulation technologies.

It is easy to notice that *"second-generation IW"* concepts are reminiscent of some strategems of Sun Tzu [3]. In this *IW* spiritual and ideological factors become more than important, and in this context all of the listed items deserve attention and analysis. Remarkably, authors of concepts of such warfare note that application of these technologies in society may often lead to unpredictable effects, which is vividly demonstrated by current developments in the Greater Middle East.

At the same time, given the uncontrollable information flows, it is practically impossible to use bans for protection from a number of information-generated threats emerging domestically, such as "*developing a negative attitude towards own cultural legacy.*" Information struggle of such nature is defined as "*culture war.*" In this area only clear ideas about cultural legacy in the society of a given country can be effective. It is also important to note that many of the items listed above were reflected in the events related to modern "color revolutions" [4].

Noopolitik: "victory" and "defeat"

Implementation of the *"second-generation IW"* strategy is the integral part of the concept of *Noopolitik*[1]. This approach is widely used in modern international practice, gradually replacing many of the elements of traditional politics. *Noopolitik* is the rationale basis describing the multifaceted character of modern warfare: "soft power", hybrid and total war and others, since all of these imply to one or another extent the systematized, mutually complementing and well thought out application of virtually all military, political and societal technologies. In particular, *Noopolitik* allows creating attitudes in the society toward other countries, shape new system of values and other things that are beneficial for the influencer.

In the new generation *IW*, the notions of "beginning" and "end" of war, "victory" and "defeat" receive alternative meanings, because actions against the "defeated" continue to be carried out through practically the same technologies. The notion of "defeat" has also changed radically. If in traditional "hot" wars, such as WWII, the defeated party would have to sign capitulation, give up territories, reduce its army, while the economy experienced downturn and knowledge-based technologies were taken away from the country, in modern wars the defeated often do not even realize they have been defeated. In this context, the "defeated countries" can be identified based on the S. Rastorguev's principles [5], particularly the following signs:

- In the defeated country the "sum" of knowledge and information shrinks constantly, and elements of state – national – societal system are destroyed. Such a methodical primitivization of society as a whole makes the defeated country harmless for the victor.

- Knowledge and science based technologies are carried away from the country, but not in a manner that happened in the past[2]. The fundamental difference is that the "external managers" might change the development priorities of the defeated country, replacing it with so-called "dead-end ideas". For instance,

---

[1] *Noopolitik:* translated as politics based on consciousness, knowledge or simply "smart" politics (νόος – "*nóos*" is Greek for "intelligence").

[2] For example, after the World War II the victors took away from Germany equipment and technology documentation from thousands of plants and research centers (the volume of the latter alone was more than 100 trains). Often using methods characteristic to intelligence services, many highly qualified specialists were moved from the country, most of whom then worked in military-industrial structures of the USA, UK and USSR [6].

one of the primary objectives can be turning a country that had advanced technologies in the past into a "tourist destination." An intense campaign in this direction then would be carried out in the media, "public discussions" are organized, and so on. In such "tourist" economy the defeated country would strive to get rid of the technological legacy that appears obsolete and export its equipment, perhaps, even as scrap metal. Obviously, in a "tourist destination" there is no place for scientists, technologists and other specialists, who would then emigrate. Sometimes the new "development programs" are implemented under a disguise, focusing on the change of the "non-advanced industrial economy" into a "service economy." However, a society deprived of its scientific/technological and industrial potential would be able to provide services only to the tourism business at the best [7]. One of the primary effects of the mentioned programs is the *qualitative* change in the demographic patterns of the country's population, since the proportion of those who possess knowledge and skills decreases, while that of commercial hospitality and entertainment service providers increases [8].

- In the context of intentional decrease of scientific and technological potential, specific activities are also implemented in the defeated country to limit the opportunities of research structures [1]. For example, in some of the post-Soviet countries a complex operation named "*Silver Key*" was carried out with general objective to "prompt" the scientific institutions to conduct non-productive research (such program is specifically called *False Aim*). Grant policies are another tool, which induces the researchers to do "imitation" work and solve non-topical problems. Interestingly enough, this program was called *Spoilt Weapon*, perhaps meaning spoiling the researchers, considering the grant sizes to attract them.

- The defeated country embarks on achieving objectives that were not characteristic to it in the past, and stem from the interests of the victor. Worded differently, common resources of the defeated country are used not for development and protection of own interests, but for meeting the requirements of the victor.

- Through appropriate technologies, the society of the defeated country is "helped" to shape a new "national memory" and create new mythologemes. For instance, if the defeated country is a post-Soviet republic, then a negative

attitude toward Soviet historical and cultural past is formed, and even those episodes of struggle against Soviet system are glorified that involved groups collaborating with the Nazi. This principle is used to shape and introduce new concepts and ideologemes that correspond to the worldview and value perceptions of the victor.

Implementation of the mentioned technologies brings the defeated country into the algorithm of the victor's strategy and turns into an element of the latter's value system. In such situation the defeated society not only does not realize its defeat, but may even perceive it as a victory, or at least, as an "integration" with advanced countries. Such reaction has been clearly observed especially in societies where so-called "color revolutions" happened.

Overton window

In the context of the mentioned realities the defeated countries become more sensitive to information influences used in the global information space, which also facilitate the "integration" of such country into the victor's algorithms. The method of "persuasion" proposed by Joseph Overton of the *Mackinac Center* called Overton window suggests that any ideas can be implemented and even legally effectuated. According to this method there is a so-called "window of discourse" in the society for any idea. Within this window an idea can be discussed or openly supported. By moving or expanding this window the "sheaf of opportunities" can be changed to an extent that an idea vehemently rejected by public in the past may appear in the agenda of actual policy as a result of consistent and disguised information operations. As soon as the public starts to perceive it as an important problem, the idea can be turned into a law. Thus is not a primitive brain-wash, but a more sophisticated technique.

One example of an effective implementation of Overton window is the legalization of LGBT relationships in the USA and EU. In the past, the Christian churches had a negative attitude towards this issue, while the public at large did not care much and considered it nothing, but a marginal behavior. However, consistent and increasingly intensive information operations filled the information space with a multitude of "scientific" arguments, literature and movies on the topic. A special

emphasis was placed on the fact that totalitarian rulers of the Third Reich and USSR were intolerant to homosexuals and persecuted them. As a result the issue became topical in the society, with subsequent legalization and transition to the area of human rights. After that everything else was just "routine paperwork". Overly enthusiastic TV coverage of same-sex weddings is very common these days. Moreover, in the modern information space those who do not accept such relationships are the ones considered marginal. Legalization of "soft drugs" took almost the same path, and today these drugs are freely sold in some countries and even are viewed in the context of human rights.

Many experts contend that big transnational corporations played a significant role in legalization of both soft drugs and LGBT. Revenue from sales of narcotics and sexual services constitutes trillions of dollars, and legalization of soft drugs and homosexuality expands the markets of the businesses and increases their profits. At the same time, development of these industries also bears some ideological overtones, since creation of these new consumption opportunities simplifies control over such societies.

Third generation information warfare

The doctrine of so-called *effects-based operations* (EBO) should also be considered as one of the theoretical and methodological developments in the area of *IW*. The objective of this concept is to influence the adversaries through special operations in a manner that they change their behavior towards a more desirable one for the influencer. In this context, both an individual effect and combination of those can be described as an information/psychological weapon in its own right. That is why expert community defined EBO as "third-generation *IW*" [8].

The EBO concept emphasizes that planning and execution of military operations should involve the following factors among the crucial objectives:

- The operations must cause effects that result in influence on behavior of the adversary desirable for the executor of operations, which is preferable than the defeat of its armed forces.
- The caused effects should impact not only the military situation, but also the political, social, economic and other conditions.
- The caused effects should impact not only the adversary, but also allies and neutral countries.

Worded differently, the EBO doctrine can be defined as a combination of operations aimed at shaping the behavioral model of the adversaries, allies and neutral forces regardless of whether there is war, crisis or peace.

In the EBO concept physical destruction of an adversary is just one of the methods and instruments of the war goals attainment, in the frame of a more widely implemented policy of coercing the adversary to follow a certain line of behavior. From this perspective EBO must be perceived as a type or system of military thought, rather than a new form of warfare, and it implies an ability to think in categories of national security, which requires going beyond of the scope of military.

General Giulio Douhet, an Italian military theorist had offered a number of considerations in his renowned treatise *The Command of the Air*, which are relatable to the concepts of the modern EBO:

1. Modern war does not allow differentiation between the military and civilian population;
2. Advantages of speed and height of aviation warfare leave no possibility to defend against an aerial offensive strategy;
3. The state and society must be ready to mass bombardments of the adversary's cities, government facilities and industry. To strike first and strong means to destroy the morale of the adversary's civilian population, leaving no other chance for its government, but to sue for peace;
4. To achieve that, first of all an independent air force is required, armed with long-range bombers that are constantly combat-ready.

Unsurprisingly, these viewpoints prompted the general in 1915 to propose a buildup of a force of 500 bombers for total bombing of Austria. Douhet's doctrine had a large influence on development of air force and strategy of using aviation as an independent class of military. There are many examples of its use during the WWII. Under the direct orders from Hitler and in accordance with the prescriptions of Douhet, Luftwaffe bombed the English town of Coventry to ruins, taking lives of 600 peaceful civilians. Bombardment of Dresden by the Allied Anglo-American forces in 1945 resulted in deaths of 25,000 people. However, the most impressive example of EBO so far was the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that killed about 240,000 peaceful civilians. This prompted the Japanese government

to surrender, and as a short-term additional effect, also impacted the behavior of another anti-Nazi coalition ally, the USSR. In long-term, the effect of using nuclear weapons shaped the whole logic of the post-war world politics.

Another classical EBO example from the information perspective was US State Secretary Colin Powell's operation in the UN during the debates on justifiability of American military intervention in Iraq, when he demonstrated a flask with "bacteriological weapon obtained by US intelligence services in Iraq". Later it turned out that it was some harmless white powder, but the "effect" already worked. This example is not unique in diplomatic practices, but its effect is remarkable by the fact that after US invasion of Iraq, a situation of "controlled chaos" began to shape in the Middle East, which became an "effect" at a global level. In other words, a small "effect" produced a bigger one.

Currently the approaches related to EBO are used virtually in all areas of strategic planning. This, in turn, allows referring to not only the concept and methodology of operations planning, but also the thinking based on achieving effects, which implies the following propositions:

- In order to achieve operative and strategic results, it is necessary to combine all actions and steps taken (political, diplomatic, economic and military);
- A constant evaluation of caused effects is needed, along with adapting the plans and actions to the combat situation and realities of the conflict, as necessary;
- A long-term prospect consideration and assessment of the effects and its corollaries is required.

Thus the EBO is essentially an analytical form of warfare, attempting to not only plan, implement and evaluate operations, but also foretell processes and possible retaliation actions of the adversary. It has to be noted that the culture of forecasting (including dozens of meticulously developed methods) is currently a component of implemented strategies, in particular, in military, political and information areas [2]. In this context the Chinese definition of strategy as "capturing the future" seems quite appropriate.

June, 2016

References

1. *Гриняев С.,* Поле битвы – киберпространство. – Минск: Харвест, 2004.
2. *Арутюнян Г.,* Распад «системы» и формирование будущего. – Ер.: НОФ «Нораванк», 2011.
3. Китайская военная стратегия (составитель В.В.Малявина). – М.: АСТ, 2002.
4. *Հարությունյան Գ., Գունավոր հեղափոխություններ,* «21-րդ ԴԱՐ», թիվ4(68), էջ 4, 2016թ. Арутюнян Г. «Цветные революции», 21-й Век,, #4(68), с. 16, 2016.
5. *Расторгуев С.,* Информационная война. – М: Радио и связь, 1999.
6. Итоги Второй мировой войны (сборник статей). – М.: Изд-во иностранной литературы, 1957.
7. *Հարությունյան Գ., Տեղեկատվական և հետինդուստրիալ հասարակություններ,* «21-րդ ԴԱՐ», թիվ4(68), էջ 4, 2016թ. (*Арутюнян Г.* «Информационные и деиндустриализован-ные общества», 21-й Век,, #4(68), с. 16, 2016).
8. ՀՀ Ժողովրդագրական իրավիճակի վրա ազդող գործոնների ուսումնասիրություն. Երկրորդ հաշվետվություն. (Ժողովրդագրություն, զարգացման ռազմավարություն և տեխ9նոլոգիաներ), ԳԿՀ «Նորավանք»,Երևան, 2014թ. (Исследование факторов, влияю-щих на демографическую ситуацию в РА // Демография, стратегия и технологии разви-тия. – Ер.: НОФ «Нораванк», 2014г., на арм.яз).
9. *Арзуманян Р.,* Сложное мышление и сеть. Парадигма нелинейности и среда безопасно-сти 21 века. – Ер.: НОФ «Нораванк», 2011.

"COLOR REVOLUTIONS"

Gagik Terterov[*]

In information space it is common to use the term "color revolutions" in reference to pre-mediated array of protests in various countries resulting in overthrow of the government. Actions with information/psychological impact and their resultant effects are widely used in such processes [1, 2]. Among the "color revolutions" the following are classical examples:

- Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia, 2000.
- Rose Revolution in Georgia, 2003.
- Orange Revolution in Ukraine, 2004.
- Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, 2005.
- Revolution of Dignity, more widely known as Euromaidan, in Ukraine, 2013-2014.

This list can be expanded by Lotus Revolution in Egypt, and coup d'état in Tunisia that occurred in the context of Arab Spring, which started in 2011. Some scholars also consider the 1990-1991 Liberal Revolution in Russia was also a "color" one. There have been a number of unsuccessful (to one or another extent) attempts of such revolutions in Belarus (2006), Armenia (2008), Moldova (2009), Russia (the so-called Bolotnaya Revolution[1] in 2011-2013) and China (Jasmine Revolution in 2011). In the latter case the activists were even able to temporarily capture a TV station in Shanghai and voice their objectives in a live broadcast).

As seen, the "color revolutions" or attempts of those happen quite often and thus, they have become an element of modern politics. In the course of the history, there certainly have been revolutions (French, English, Russian or Chinese) caused by social and economic order, and the need of relevant changes in political system.

However, the above mentioned examples of "color revolutions" were totally different in their nature and goals. This new type of revolutions is mainly based on geopolitical and geo-economic factors, and is a continuation of politics by some superpowers through use of the so-called "soft power". At the same time, "color revolutions" and attempts to implement them imply some preconditions, among which the following have to be emphasized:

External reasons and prerequisites of "color revolutions": As it is known, after the collapse of the USSR, the end of Cold War has been heralded numerous times at some very high political levels. However, traditional geopolitical and geo-economic antagonisms between the West, Russia and new superpower China evolved tremendously. Apparently, a new, Second Cold War is unfolding at global level, the arsenal of which includes new concepts of information/psychological warfare and methodologies of their application widely utilized in the situation arisen. Moreover, in conditions of the current multipolar world order, a significant role in such operations is played not only militarily and economically advanced countries, but also non-government organizations that possess great resources. In multi-faceted conflicts, in order to weaken the adversary, or in some cases overthrow the government, the controversies within specific countries are used, particularly those related to human rights or election irregularities. In this aspect, the following approaches are worth mentioning:

1. An attempt of "color revolution" is made in the adversary country, but it is aimed not at overthrowing the government, which is impossible due to a number of reasons. The goal for "revolutionary" actions in such situation is a large-scale show in information space that negatively affects the reputation of the adversary. As a result, for example, economic indicators of such country deteriorate (so-called "effects"). Also, the "actively protesting" groups in adversary country cause additional complications in domestic policies. The Bolotnaya Revolution in Russia and Jasmine revolution in China are examples of such revolutions.

2. A "color revolution" is executed not in the adversary country, but in a country under the latter's influence; the country's escape from the adversary's sphere of influence weakens its political, economic and other positions in the region. The most vivid examples of this are the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and

the Ukrainian revolution in 2013. Their obvious goals were to pull these countries away from Russia in civilizational, political and economic sense. Societies that carry out such revolution typically find themselves in a hot seat. For example, Georgia launched a war in South Ossetia and effectively, lost this territory for good, while Ukraine lost Crimea, got an uncertain situation in Donbass and Lugansk, and the Ukrainian GDP diminished 2.5 times between 2014 and 2015. Hence, the only purpose of such revolutions is creation of long-term tensions between the adversary and "target country", the interests of which are served in no manner. Worded differently, the well-known principle "the worse, the better" is in action.

3. The strategic goal of "color revolutions" is to create a regional "instability zone" around the adversary or even allied countries. As a result, the countries in the region encounter various problems. Examples of such large-scale operations are the "revolutions" in the Greater Middle East, in aftermath of which ISIS emerged, while Syria, Iraq and Libya pitched headfirst into chaos and other countries of the region face instability. This situation is a threat both for Russia and China, because the extremism and chaos reigning in the region may be (and in some case already are) exported to the territory of these countries. The European allies of the USA also face enormous problems related to millions of migrants that leave their region for Europe, and this can be considered as a "strait-jacket" for "friends".

Stirring intestine strife in adversary's society is not a new method. However, modern approaches differ not only in that they aggregate and systemize the past experiences. Importantly, these revolutionary approaches are programmed and implemented in the context of overall global strategy and total "cold" war, where information and psychological operations are the most important, often the decisive factor. In this sense, modern political and information developments have to be viewed in a "single package".

At the same time, while in the past only data from intelligence and diplomatic services were needed to create instability in one or another country, now the influencer tries to obtain as comprehensive as possible information on the targeted society. Special attention is paid to the political, socioeconomic conditions, study of psy-

chological and value system of the population. Obviously, only knowledge of this sort makes possible to effectively organize and use the "revolutionary force" of the society. Such knowledge allows uncovering the critical infrastructures of the society, which increases the efficiency of operations. Thus, the necessity to command knowledge on targeted society can be perceived as the main condition in the perspective of arranging an external intervention.

Internal prerequisites of "color revolutions": Not in all countries "color revolutions" are possible to implement. If in the ideological, scientific, technological, social and economic areas of a society effective examples and rules are in place, then the possibility of revolutions in such country can be considered only theoretically. However, ideal society is a utopia.

In all other cases, if the society has big problems and no trend is noticeable for their solution, then such country may at least become a target for active operations (of course, if the intended changes coincide with the strategy of the influencer). This factor has to be considered the *main internal prerequisite* for implementation of a color revolution in a specific country.

However, not all societies are ready to undertake radical steps and government overthrow, even if the problems objectively exist. In this context the primary task of the revolution organizers is to form the needed forces and infrastructures in the targeted societies, which can assist, and if necessary, actively participate in revolutionary processes.

These are various *non-government organizations* (NGO) financed by international structures. Experts estimate that in post-Soviet countries their number comprises several tens of thousands. In Ukraine alone, the number of experts that receive grants from international funds is about 40,000. These are the people who actively participate in "round tables" and rallies, become organizers and leaders of "revolutionary" movements. Unsurprisingly, in some countries these organizations are legally ascribed the status of an "agent", which to some extent limits their potential activities.

In preparing revolutions an important role is played by the so-called *"agents of influence"*. These are persons who exert influence on political circles and public opinion and represent interests of other countries in their own country. It has to be noted that recruiting such people does not involve methods featured in "spy mov-

ies". In the context of the discussed problem these could be simply people who are adherents of the political/ideological vector of the country or entity by which the revolution is organized. Such people or organizations are inclined to be not guided by the interests of own country, when it is needed, but rather by their own world-view conceptions or the specific advice they receive from foreign structures. In the politics, these persons are considered not traitors of their homeland, but of the national interests, while in influencing countries they receive a lot more pompous name: "evangelists of democracy".

At the same time it is wrong to think that all implementers of color revolutions are agents of another country or members of grant receiving NGOs. A certain part among those who participate in protest actions is comprised of regular citizens of the country (mostly residents of the capital city where the main events unfold), who want to see more justice and prosperity in their country. This part of population is influenced by a well-developed information/psychological impact and thus, assumes the role of the "people" in revolution. As demonstrated by the Ukrainian events, after a short while following the coup, this segment of the people are the ones who feel bitter disappointment when they see the ramifications of the revolution.

An important role is played by mass media that receive assistance from foreign structures, and also from the above mentioned NGOs (among which there are many "fighters for freedom of speech and media"). From the perspective of information influence it is remarkable that virtually all revolutions have attractive names (except the Serbian Bulldozer Revolution, after which the country was bombarded in 1999, and that can be perceived as continuation of the force show politics): Rose, Tulip, Orange, etc. Under pertinent news coverage these names become sort of brands, which in turn help attracting new adherents of a revolutionary movement.

To summarize the mentioned factors, it can be accepted that internal prerequisites of programmed revolutions are as follows:

- Existence of internal problems in the targeted societies;
- Existence of the necessary and sufficient quantity, or so-called "critical mass" of structures, including those with information resources, which represent the interests of the influencer in the targeted country.

However, in this regard it has to be noted that activities of such structures imply certain possibilities of targeted funding.

Funding the color revolutions: It is assumed that one of the main resource centers for "revolutions" is the *East European Democratic Center* (*Wschodnioeuropejskie Centrum Demokratyczne, WECD*) headquartered in Warsaw. This organization was established and is financed by the *Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe (IDEE)*.

The official website of *WECD* claims that they implement educational and training activities mostly for journalists, educators, regional publishers and NGO activists. In addition to the main programs, *WECD* collaborates with a number of scientific, research and analytic groups, cultural centers, as well as supports cultural and information publishing activities. The organization's objectives are indicated as: "spread of democratic ideology, assistance to civic endeavors and non-government programs, building open society, education on human rights and democratic freedoms, support to social and public reforms in post-communist countries."

Some researchers note that revolutions and protest movements are also funded by Open Society Institute of George Soros, US-based International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute, London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies and some others. Media reports suggest that only the latter invested about $100M in Serbian revolution. In this regard it has to be mentioned that color revolutions and other similar operations are incomparably less expensive in achieving geopolitical goals that military operations, which makes them attractive.

However, even all of the above is not enough to cause mass rallies, riots and consequent coups in targeted countries. In Tsarist Russia Bolsheviks meticulously developed revolutionary methods, and in the party's internal communications there was a concept of "professional revolutionary". The Bolsheviks could never dream though, that time will come when revolutionary activities turn into technological process and professional revolutionaries will be "produced" in thousands.

"Color revolution" technologies. In his young years Gene Sharp was fascinated by the ideology of permanent revolutions of Lev Trotsky, one of the Bolshevik leaders, and also by the philosophy of non-violent actions in politics of Mahatma Gandhi, the leader of India's independence movement. Perhaps, influence of these incompatible ideologies (Bolsheviks, and especially Trotsky, were known for their intolerance

19

and cruelty) was the foundation based on which Sharp published his quite volumi-
nous work *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (where incidentally, some technologies
of violent actions are also present) [3]. The book presents in detail 198 methods to
carry out political struggle, which can be divided in three main categories:

1. Nonviolent protest and persuasion;
2. Social, economic and political noncooperation;
3. Nonviolent intervention.

Many of nonviolent actions suggested by Sharp (rallies, petitions, strikes, hun-
ger strikes, etc.) are quite common in any protest actions, but there are also some
"novelties". For example, in the Chapter Symbolic Public Acts it is recommended
not only to light candles and torches, but also undress during rallies (which is en-
thusiastically performed by gender and LGTB activists). A special emphasis is placed
on "artistic design" of rallies. It is suggested that protests are more effective when
accompanied by songs, dances and theatrical performances. During Euromaidan ral-
lies the techniques of "love attack" were actively used to let everybody know how
many beautiful ladies and flowers are present in Euromaidan. In the evenings the
gathered protesters would light candles and sing the anthem of the country. Gener-
ally, the music component was used quite intensively in Euromaidan: enough to
mention that there was a rock music concert uninterrupted for 14 days. The
"Maidan songs" were mostly political. For example, two songs were the anthems
revolution: "Orange sky" and "Together we are many". The media pushed the thesis
that there are hundreds of thousands or even millions of people in Maidan. How-
ever, "beautiful tools" were not the only ones used in Maidan. For example, it was
announced and even "demonstrated" that those who are against Maidan are
"gloomy and evil soldiers, old-timers, hooligans and criminals that support the gov-
ernment for money. This how the "image of enemy" was formed: as provocateurs
with criminal past that beat women and children in protest rallies and get paid for
that. The images of violence were followed by actual violent actions; in frantic
shooting both protesters and law enforcement were killed. Consequently, in parallel
to deepening political crisis, a new enemy image in South-West was discovered:
Russian military terrorists.

Not all recommendations of Sharp can be considered even formally nonviolent. In paragraph 158 of Chapter Psychological Intervention one of the methods is "self-exposure to the elements", which may include self-suffocation and self-immolation. Obviously, urging and preparing people to suicide is a direct violence against person.

Thus, application of Sharp's methods implies training and preparedness of "professional revolutionaries". For this purpose, even special structures were created. For example, Political Academy for Central and Southeast Europe was established in Bulgaria, where special trainings were organized for Serbian opposition. Balkan Academy of Leading Reporters provided financial and technical support to Serbian opposition media. There were also some special computer games. The well-known game *A Force More Powerful* was developed by International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, which, among other things, trains opposition activists in a simple format how to change the political situation in their countries.

In any case, the value of Sharp's advices is in that he was able to aggregate and systemize the existing protest methods, provide a theoretical foundation for them and turn them into a political technology. Interestingly enough, he later founded the Albert Einstein Institution ("an attractive name"), which is financed, particularly, by National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute that consistently support organizations involved in "color revolutions".

However, protests are organized not only by advocates of liberal ideology, but also by their opponents. The most prominent one among such actions of protest so far is the *Occupy Wall Street* movement launched in 2011, aimed at "uncovering" and tearing down the modern "unjust capitalism" and "global economic system" [4, 5]. The movement was founded by a Canadian anti-consumerist NGO that periodically organized campaigns like "Buy Nothing Day" or "TV Turnoff Week". The *Occupy Wall Street* call was quickly responded by many trade unions, as well as tens of thousands of people. The renowned hacktivist group *Anonymous* assisted the movement in its characteristic manner, by carrying out hacking attacks on electronic systems of banks and exchanges. Interestingly, the polls organized by *CBS* and *New York Times* indicated that the movement enjoys support of some 43% of Americans, whereas only 27% oppose it.

As a result, protest marches, rallies and mass actions took place not only in the USA, but in many other countries. In 2016 in relation to the US presidential elections, protest actions were organized with slogans along the lines of "down with oligarchy and long live fair elections". The organizers (including Noam Chomsky, a political scientist known for his dissident views) gave quite a resonant name to this movement: *Democracy Spring*. Thus, everything was done as prescribed by Gene Sharp…

In any case, it can be stated that Sharp's technologies are widely used today both as intended (in political "color revolutions") and in various other protest rallies the number of which grows by day all over the world. Moreover, sometimes these technologies are used by the "technologists" of the very same countries where protests take place, in order to "discharge" the tensions accumulated in the society.

June, 2016.

References

1. *Нарочницкая Н.А.*, Оранжевые сети. От Белграда до Бишкека. – М. , Изд-во: СПб., 2008.
2. *Гундарева Л.*, Как готовят цветные революции // НВО, #19 (902), 2016.
3. *Sharp, G,* 198 Methods of Nonviolent Action,
   http://www.aeinstein.org/nonviolentaction/198-methods-of-nonviolent-action/
4. *Арутюнян Г., Гриняев С.*, Состоится ли «захват Уолл-стрит»? // «21-й ВЕК», #1, с. 5, 2012.
5. *Арутюнян Г., Гриняев С.*, Революции оптом: достраивание нового миропорядка и сценарии глобального управления.
   http://noravank.am/rus/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5617.

POLICY CONVERGENCE ISSUES WITHIN HIERARCHICAL INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS: ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE RUSSIAN-ARMENIAN DEFENSE AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIP

Vahagn Aglyan[*]

Phenomenon of hegemony in international relations continues to evolve both conceptually and empirically, reflecting the dynamic features and aspects of the 21st century's transformations. As a type of rule and a certain form of relations, hegemony at the global, as well as regional levels presupposes existence of several structural "preconditions" to acquire a relatively sustainable character. Historically, hegemony rested on premise of existence of subordinate relationships between the preponderant power and subordinate state(s) whereby the hegemonic power structures the regional/ international context to conform its longer term interests and preferences. Yet, according to the hegemonic stability school, Great Power provides public goods by establishing regimes that open up opportunities for the other members of international relations to be users of the benefits that come forward as outputs of the order established by the preponderant power in the system. In this variation of hegemony, the material capabilities and power asymmetry come forward as major precondition for the hegemonic rule to take shape.

However, the term hegemony is a semantically and politically overloaded definition to explain variations in practices and patterns of interstate relations across the modern systems of international relations. In retrospect, hegemony and domination terminologies have been primarily associated with a disrespectful and one-sided rule over subjugated entities, whether those being (ethnic) nations or tribal formations in less developed parts of the world. Prime examples of the more recent hegemonic rule cases might include strong-handed and ideologically nurtured forms

[*] PhD, Associate Professor, Yerevan State University, Head of the Chair of Public Administration, Head of the Centre for Political Studies at the Noravank Foundation.

of domination, with a heavy totalitarian or extreme nationalist tinge in the employed policies of the dominant states.

However, along with the material and power-based set of factors, an alternative variation of hegemony rests on ideational assumptions, and mainly associated with the constructivist stand of thinking that emphasizes norms, ideas and ideational social attributes: "a state strives to be a hegemon because it views itself and others recognize it as such" [1].

According to the one of the interpretations, hegemony in international relations is explained through the lens of hegemonic stability theory that presumes an existence of certain legitimate settlement between the subordinates and the dominant power on accepting the hierarchical principles of order maintenance and benefits of sharing common "goods" produced by the hegemon such as stability, financial sustainability, trade regimes and, most importantly, relative peace and security of the regional/ international order. At the same time, hegemony is viewed not solely as a status or everlastingly fixed state of affairs, but also as a predominant influence that the leading state exerts upon and within the system. The later aspect presupposes that the leading state possesses required capacities to formulate and enforce the "the common rules of the game" [2]. Within this scheme of interstate relations, the dominant state has to take into consideration the interests and preferences of the subordinate and the smaller states in order to keep the hierarchical system sustainable and not to endanger its own status of hegemon, specifically in case of unfavorable trends in material distribution patterns, emergence of rival powers or in case of subordinate actors trying to upset the hierarchical order.

For the IR hierarchy researchers, the major conceptual dimension of this approach postulates a prominent role for the non-material factors in structuring the hegemonic pattern of international relations, however with an important reservation for substantial coercive potential that the dominant state ought to keep as "a reserve option" in case of non-obedience. Hierarchy in international relations, thus, is relational phenomenon that rest on social contact between the dominant and subordinate entities whereby the both sides of "contract" accept the mutual obligations and rights as emerging from this specific type of interaction practices. In operational terms, as D. Lake notes, the hierarchical patterns of international relations presup-

pose the existence of some range of actions that subordinate actor is willing to accept and observe in its relations with predominant state [3].

Given the complexity of the current international relations and an apparent tinge towards the technocratic apprehension of many policy-making domains, one of the key dimensions indicating the degree of (regional) hierarchical relationships can be the policy convergence dynamics between the predominant and subordinate state(s). Here, the main factor in qualitative "assessment" of the levels and degrees of the preponderant state's hierarchical engagement may concern the intrusiveness of dominant actor into the variety of policy domains of the subordinates, in terms of not only "correcting the behavior of another (weaker) state" [4], but also through guiding the processes and channeling the expected effects.

Policy convergence in security and defense realms is longer-term phenomenon as it concerns institutionalized patterns of relationships. Yet, the convergence pay-off perspective is certainly a value in itself. As J. Ikenberry notes, in a long-term perspective it is much more effective to shape the interests and orientations of other states than directly coerce them to follow the certain acts; that decreases the necessity of spending huge costs to constrain and disciple these states along the course determined by the leading state [5].

Policy Convergence: Security and Defense domains

The traditional understanding of policy convergence defines the latter as a gradual borrowing and transfer of policy-related practices between the states. The connotation of convergence is mainly positive, while the basic case exemplifying the positive spillover effects of converging policies in the modern times has been the European Union. Though policy convergence might be series of short-term decisions, yet the (political) logic of policy convergence refers to the gradual confluences and elimination of diverging policies. At the macro-level, the three prominent mechanisms come forward as "transmission belts": (1) harmonization of policies through the international agreements or supranational regulations, (2) the coercive imposition of policies, and (3) the interdependent, but un-coordinated diffusion of practices by means of cross-national imitation, emulation or learning [6, pp. 3-4]. Meanwhile, an important and distinct difference between the policy imposition and dif-

fusion should be noted; in case of policy imposition the policy-making elite in the targeted country has only limited (if at all) opportunities to influence or change the already adopted policies, whereby for the imposing state the major objective is to export and enforce its principles, values and modus operandi. The targeted states usually prefer to cede to the demands of imposing actor in hope to secure their access to the economic, social, or security benefits that the stronger actor could provide in exchange. Conditionality is the central factor in policy imposition process [6, pp. 4-5]. Policy imposition is usually works in the context of existing political and economic asymmetries that the imposing actor utilizes in its own or collective interests. High degree of institutional similarity is an important facilitating precondition for the development of convergence in polices [7]. Existence of similarities in socio-economic institutions, structures and development trajectories is yet another factor that contributes and facilitates the transfer of policies across the boundaries. Path dependency in its turn

Diffusion, in difference to previous mode of convergence, is more about voluntary, decentralized, but also interdependent interaction processes that lead to imitation, emulation or learning with respect to one and the same policy item [6, pp. 5-6]. An important aspect of diffusion is its emphasis on process and policy characteristics.

As for the parametric characteristics and the frames of defense and security policy convergence then the both ones, in analytical and empirical terms, belong to the specific cluster of cross-national policy convergence practices. Policy convergence in these areas directly relates to the national interests of the states concerned. Security and defense policies comprise the primary set of national interests with tangible and empirically focused applicability characteristics. In this context, instrumental characteristics and policy means are principally important to reach the strategic objectives within the triangle of strategy/policy – means – convergence process/effects. For instance, in opinion of a Russian researcher the convergence means of Russia's national interests realization in the CIS space can be defined as collaborative and joint efforts of the states to secure their common national interests. The fields where these interests coincide opening the playground for convergence development are: collective peacekeeping activities; creation and development of military -political alliances; training of foreign states' military staff; provision of military and

technical assistance to the states of Russia's "near abroad"; enhancement, equipment and protection of the CIS external boundaries; and deployment of military bases [8].

Reviewing and analyzing the case of the European defense policy convergence between France, Germany and the UK, A. Pannier and O. Schmitt define the main building blocks of convergence processes in defense field as the gradual adoption of similar policies in terms of doctrines (enunciated principles or/and discourses), means (or instruments) and practices related to the use of military force. Further, the authors examine the correlative and casual links between the level(s) of institutionalized cooperation (enhanced and formalized via bilateral agreements and treaties) and policy convergence dynamics of the three key European actors in defense and security sphere as three separate pairs [9].

Membership and active/passive participation of states in international alliances and pacts are the typical feature of the modern system of international relations. Sometimes rationales behind the memberships may overlap or contradict each other, yet the states' attitudes towards the variety of issues in international forums are indicative factor in assessing their converging or diverging policies with regard to political or other problems on agenda. For instance, in spite of certain similarities in institutional design France's, Germany's and the UK's attitudes towards certain security-related issues or decisions to use the force in multilateral formats differ not only on case-specific base, but also as reflection of normative, ideational of discursive preferences in their respective foreign and defense policies.

In this context, membership patterns are certainly indicative of status and policy directions that states pursue in their international politics; these preferences are institutional manifestations of longer-term purposes that the states strives to achieve in their foreign policies. As an important variable in assessing the level and the degree in sustaining the security hierarchy between the dominant and subordinate states, D. Lake put forward a criterion of security/military alliance membership that both the subordinate and the dominant states share or not share (i.e. checking if the subordinate state participate in other security pacts or institutions where the dominant/hierarchical state does not participate; the number of overlapping alliances) [10]. In the post-Soviet Eurasia, which is a unipolar region in terms of power distribution [11] any perspectives, opportunities or even discussions of membership in non-regional (without Russian participation) alliance(s) is of paramount and princi-

ple importance given Russia's negative stance towards any talks of NATO engagement in the region.

Hierarchy and policy convergence:
the case of Russian-Armenian Relations

In literature, a generally accepted point in achieving hierarchy is the solid basis of hegemon's authority, whereby sources of such authority derive from variety of dimensions. In case of the post-Soviet Eurasia, Russian-centered hierarchal pattern of relations rest, in principle, on structural power asymmetry between Russian Federation (RF) and that of all other FSU countries combined; perception of Russia, in terms of degree of acceptance of its authority; and regional (hegemonic) stability provision, including credible arbitration and mediation capabilities [12].

Another aspect of regional leadership in international relations posits that one of the dimensions of the leader's sustained power is the coalition building that comes along with the efforts of institutionalizing the regional context [13]. What was specific for Russian policies in its own milieu is that Moscow first of all strived to nest the potential functionality of coalition into the bilateralism as primary vehicle of upholding hierarchal dependency links while placing these arrangements into the organizational frames *en route*. The major reason behind this approach is apparently analogical to N. Macfarlane's observation concerning the US regional policies: bilateral relations between the strong outsider and the weaker regional party enhance the outsider's capacity to control the agenda [14].

Since the beginning of the 2000s, Russia made clear its preparedness to translate its structural preponderance over the post-Soviet space into an organized and institutionalized dominance, pivoted around the political expediency of sustaining "the new architecture of international relations" in the CIS space.

Policy convergence dynamics in foreign and security realms between Russia, on the one hand, and its post-Soviet neighbors is specific case whereby the dynamics of convergence is strongly tilted towards the policy imposition pole of relations. Given the existence of huge resource asymmetry between Russia and the aggregate resources of all other former Soviet republics, phenomenon of foreign and security policy convergence(s) can potentially be approached as manifestation of hierarchical relationships. In difference to the European realities where no state can afford to

take role of the predominant trend-setter actor in foreign and security fields, Russia's position within the CIS space is still overwhelmingly dominant (even Germany, the economic and industrial European leader has just 20% of EU combined GPD share, while the population is 16% of EU[1]).

In this context, one analytically important objective can be to track the Russia's broader stance and the adopted policies in terms of facilitating or inducing first of all its allies to follow the convergence logics along the path developed in Moscow. Pivoting on the two interrelated dimensions of defense and security policy convergence – level of institutionalization of military-political/defense (bilateral/ multilateral) relationships and the level of policy convergence (military-political/ defense) – it is possible to make some broad periodization of Russia's efforts and policies to institutionalize its leading position within the post-Soviet space. Level of institutionalization means the degree of formalization and enhancement of bilateral as well as multilateral (but clearly centered on Russia) relations as mainly manifested in interstate agreements; intensity and depth of interaction practices regulated and proceduralized within the structured frameworks. Policy convergence in defense and military-political domain in case of the whole post-Soviet space is tilted towards the policy imposition pole for the quite obvious reasons: huge resource asymmetry between Russia and all other neighboring states, willingness to pursue a longer term and purposeful policy of macro-regional engagement strategy on the part of the Russian leadership, and absence of any serious structural preconditions to balance either internally or externally against Russia.

However, the processes and the dynamics of policy convergence are not viewed as a coercive exercise of the Russian power over its smaller neighbors, though the structural preponderance of Russia over the region and processes unfolding in this part of the Eurasia is an key prerequisite of hierarchical international subsystem centered around Russia.

Russia's strategies and longer-term security interests in the Southern parts of the CIS region have undergone series of transformations over the past quarter of century since the demise of the Soviet Union in early 1990s. Military and military-political factors have always comprise the basic dimension of the Russian regional profile in the region as the Moscow's security concerns shaped the overall policy

---

[1] Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, 2014, CIA [e-version].

directions and content of its regional engagement strategies. Given the volatile and to some extent unpredictable social and political developments in the whole Caucasian region, military and security considerations have loomed large in Moscow's regional calculus, and the clusters of defense collaboration and security policies coordination emerge within the newly created CIS security structures or through the bilateral agreements with the individual states of the FSU.

Over the early and mid-1990s, the patterns of bilateral relations between the former Soviet republics in security and defense domains were characterized by the hectic and sometimes harsh attitudes on contentious issues of military hardware distribution approaches and the principles of developing the initially planned joint military system that had to replace the defunct Soviet military body. In spite of the efforts to preserve the centralized command and control structure within the so called CIS joint command, the newly established Russian MoD, since its creation in 1992, shifted the emphasis to the urgent need of developing the set of bilateral agreements with the CIS republics to formalize the new formats of military cooperation and secure the legal status of Russia's military presence (bases) in the CIS[1]. The major objective was to halt the possible loss of defense infrastructure footholds in the post-Soviet space and consolidate Russia's influence leverages over the military-political processes, including the ethnic conflicts, unfolding in various hotspots of the former Soviet Union.

The operational objectives of Russia's security policies were centered on providing the accelerated institutionalization of the newly defined and legalized formats of bilateral accords with the member-states of CIS Collective Security Treaty through signing series of binding treaties on Russian military bases in a number of CIS states. However, given that the strong nationalist sentiments and pro-Western tinge with sometimes pronounced anti-Russian emphasis were typical attributes underlying the foreign and security policies of the majority of the newly independent republics over the 1990s, policy convergence rationale was deemed an unsustainable objective both politically and operationally.

Yet, over the 1990s Russia's relations with several post-Soviet states were substantially institutionalized. Particularly, still in 1992 Russia and Armenia, among the firsts, signed series of framework agreements and treaties institutionalizing the

[1] Линч Д., Реализм россиискои внешнеи политики, *Pro et Contra*, N6, Осень 2001 [эл.версия].

allied relationships that reached its highest political and strategic point in August 1997 after the Russian-Armenian Treaty on Friendship and Mutual Assistance was signed in Moscow[1]. Russia and Armenia entered the 21st century with well-institutionalized framework of military and defense relationships.

Under V. Putin's presidency, since early 2000s onward, the Russian new leadership dropped off previous grand schemes of overwhelming integration of the whole post-Soviet area under the CIS guise, instead actively prioritizing bilateral relations as a more efficient way of securing Russian national interests [15]. Simultaneously, the rise of Russia's international profile and engagement in a variety of regional formats and its openly stated priority to uphold its status of world power actualized, on the one hand, a necessity to sustain Russian-led/dominated regional organization, while on the other hand, new preferences later made it urgent to coordinate the foreign policy stances of its allies on the international and regional scenes.

Over the period of the two V.Putin's presidential terms (2000-2008), Russia substantially bolstered its positions in the post-Soviet space not just though exploiting the asymmetries or skillfully using the leverages over its weaker neighbors, but also via active economic (mainly in energy industry) engagement. The basic principles of the new modus operandi rest on several policy assumptions. First, while stating Russia's foreign policy shift towards the pragmatic course and economization [16] of its foreign policy-making both regionally and in international arena, nevertheless Moscow set some limits and kind of access denial provisions for the "third parties" involvement into the spheres its traditional interests. Several revisions of RF Military Doctrine, Foreign Policy Concepts as well as National Security Concepts contained the clauses on unacceptability for Russia of any foreign military presence in the CIS space. Secondly, serious efforts were put in creation of regional groupings of states integrated around the Russian-centered core. In 2002/2003 on the basis of the older CIS Collective Security Treaty a new organization was established (CSTO, with its 6 member states: Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). At the same time, Russia intensified discussions on the Custom Union as well as other regional integration formats. Bilateral institutionalized formats were clustered into the newly refashioned multilateral formats.

---

[1] ДОГОВОР о дружбе, сотрудничестве и взаимной помощи между Российской Федерацией и Республикой Армения, Собрание законодательства РФ. 21 декабря 1998 г. N 51. Ст. 6274., *Бюллетень международных договоров*, 1999. N 2, стр. 71 – 77.

From the heights of economic and financial prowess based on high oil prices and relatively sustainable growth dynamics, in 2005, V. Putin in his Federal Address proclaimed: "Today on the post-Soviet space emerged and have taken on the development path independent states, and together with them we wish to correspond the humanitarian values, […]to the standards that could provide us the common economic, humanitarian, and legal space. While defending the Russian foreign policy interests we are interested in development of the economies of our nearby countries and emboldening of their international weight. *We are interested in synchronizing the pace and parameters of reformation processes in Russia and the states of the Commonwealth, and we are ready to in practice retake the experiences of our neighbors as well as to share our ideas and our working outcomes with them* "[1].

One of the strategic motives for Russia to forge broader and more intensive policy coordination and convergence initiatives with its neighbors was premised on the assumption to counter the EU's programs within Eastern Neighborhood. Given the scope and consistency of legal, normative, and economic conjunction with the European internal market implied by the EU's EP program for the 6 post-Soviet states, Moscow's policies to foster its own institutionalized integration project was deemed as highly required. Moreover, what is important, for Russia the EU and NATO have become increasingly associated as unified Western front in opposing the Russian interests, which marked a political shift that contrasted to earlier Russian posture for a softer attitude towards the European structures [17]. As D. Averre notes: "Moscow's increasingly sophisticated efforts to integrate and promote common understandings through regional organizations—the CIS, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the Eurasian Economic Community and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation—signals a greater reliance on their collective normative potential to enforce the rules. These efforts have produced patchy results, stemming from the absence of a genuine common ideology and differing strategic aims among the regions' states, so that in practice bilateral relations have often predominated" [18].

In the field of foreign policy coordination, an apparent trend is visible in stronger coordination and convergence dynamics among the grouping of CIS states as compared to the earlier period of the 1990s. Foreign policies coordination has been proclaimed among the basic goals within the Collective Security Treaty Or-

---

[1] Послание Президента Федеральному Собранию РФ, 2005г.

ganization (SCTO), a primary multilateral security institution in the post-Soviet space. At the least, in case of voting behavior patterns at the UN the available data proves the evidence that post-Soviet states voting practices on a variety of international problems converging closer to mean with the central role being reserved to the Russia's voting position as "medium" for making the voting decisions. Although several post-Soviet states are in open opposition to Moscow's international initiatives for political and strategic considerations, but for the closer allies Russia would supposedly continue to play a leading role, serving as source of learning for the others or coercing the rest to follow its suit [19].

If earlier the Russian regional policies and its strategic objectives were primarily aimed at limiting the potential (available) foreign policy options and external extra-regional alignment variants for the neighboring post-Soviet states, while simultaneously containing the engagement of the "the third party" actors into the zone of its traditional influence, the newly formulated Euarasianist foray after 2012 strives to reach more institutionalized alignments of the foreign and security policies of the member-states of Eurasian Union and CSTO. These changes became particularly visible visible after the 2008 Russia-Georgian military conflict and the economic crisis of 2008/2009 that revealed financial dependency of the smaller CIS states on the Russian crediting resources.

Two major trends can be discerned in Russia-Armenia relations after 2010; more intensive securitization of Armenia's foreign policy and broader clustering of its security policies along the institutionalized framework of strategic partnership with Russia. Particularly, the foreign policy orientations and alignment patterns have been attached significantly sharper edge of making ideational and normative choice in terms of future development perspectives and, as such, making choice which is (pre) determined by longer term security considerations. The most recent case of making such choice was September 3, 2013, Armenia's decision to join the Russian-led Eurasian Union and dropping, at least for that moment, the signing of Associative agreement with EU, including its most important free trade clause. Because of existence of the unsettled conflict in the region concerning the future status of Karabakh Republic and militarily strained relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the problem of choosing the security complex currently concerned not only the defense and military -political areas, but also a wider spectrum of state and national interests. The Arme-

nian leadership openly alluded that the rationale behind the Eurasian Russian-centric choice has been highly security predisposed decision [20].

Yet, Russia's active drive to establish a more consolidated positions in the region through bolstering its relations with Armenia rest on the imperative of not just further institutionalization of security and defense partnership, but also achievement of efficient convergent dynamics between the foreign, economic, defense and security policies framed as convergence in strategic objectives and institutional forums. Moreover, one of the likely outcomes of the trend can potentially be normative convergence. Analyzing the experience of the leading European states' military reforms convergence specifics, T. Dyson refers to this problem: "normative convergence is a product of policy-learning process consequent upon interaction through joint military operations and "elite socialization" within EU and NATO institutional forums, leading to the gradual convergence of domestic norms concerning the objectives and instruments of defense policy and the development of a "European strategic culture"[1].

In case of military-political and defense area, Russia's regional priorities have started to anchor more and more on the joint modes and frameworks of cooperation that presuppose higher communication intensity and sustaining closer institutional culture between the participants. In 2013, the commander-in-chief of the Russian main military base in Armenia (Gyumri) mentioned among the mutual priorities a necessity of further deepening field-level cooperation, "that will assist us to better understand each other, to interact at higher qualitative levels. […] In spite of similarities of our military systems some differences are certainly still there"[2].

In 2010 Russia and Armenia agreed on prolongation of the Russian military presence in Armenia (until 2044), supplementing the treaty with a wider security guarantees to Armenia. A number of other military and security-related agreements and other types of documents were signed since then between the two countries,

---

[1] T.Dyson, Convergence and Divergence in post-Cold War British, French and German Military Reforms: Between International Structure and Executive Autonomy, *Security Studies*, Volume 17, 2008, Issue 4, pp. 725-774. [ref. to: Cornish and Edwards, "The Strategic Culture of EU: A Progress Report"; Howorth, Security and Defense in the European Union, 188; Jones, The Rise of the European Security Cooperation, 218; Christoph Meyer, "Convergence towards a European Strategic Culture", European Journal of International Relations 11, N 4 (winter, 2005): 536; Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defense in the European Union].

[2] Ю.Белоусов, Южный форпост России, *Красная звезда*, 10.10.2013.

ranging from military-technical cooperation in field of interoperability and force deployment to the military-political issues like peacekeeping and CSTO rapid reaction forces. In June 2013, during the Russia's Security Council secretary N. Patrushev's visit to Armenia, Russian-Armenian agreement was signed in Yerevan on development of military-technical cooperation that contained a provision for each party to export military production with same characteristics, and with identical characteristics for their national military forces, paramilitaries, police and special forces.

In 2015 agreement on united regional air defense system was signed that included more specific steps in operationalization of an earlier agreements in this field[1]. Once joined with the Russian air defense system, the Armenian Air Defense Troops will have access to all the information available to Russian Southern Military District units and the country's air and missile defense troops[2]. Yet, the perspectives and the dynamics of convergence in defense and security areas, including the normative dimensions of military partnership, have been substantially pushed forward after November 2016 approval of joint Russian-Armenian group of forces in the Caucasian region. Though the decision on creation of a joint military contingent was approved back in April 2001[3], the new agreement implied more efficiency and wider scale for establishing common defense space, including joint plans for training and combat use of troops. A treaty does not include a NATO-type key dimensions for defense policies convergence such as joint military budget, military policy, and so on, but it "comes down to an improvement in the cohesion of the two armies during fighting"[4].

In retrospect, if we review the aspects and dynamics of Russian-Armenian relationships in defense and security fields over the past quarter of century since the Soviet break up, the dynamics of "genuine" policy convergence became more operational and visible since the early 2010s, and proceeded along the already well institutionalized and integrated modes of strategic partnership between Russia and Armenia. A novel emphasis, within the newly formulated frames of common defense space, would likely be put on normative convergence in a joint operational context and development of new strategic culture of the allies in the region,

[1] Russia, Armenia unite air defense, create regional system in the Caucasus, *Russia Today*, 23.12.2015.

[2] V. Litovkin, Russia, Armenia to set up joint air defense system in the Caucasus, *UPI*, 12 October 2016.

[3] Armenia, Russia agree to create joint military contingent, *RFE/RL Newsline,* 17.04.2001.

[4] V. Litovkin, Russia and Armenia to create joint defense force in Caucasus, *UPI*, 16 November, 2016.

though the policy convergence has been occurring in the settings of highly hierarchical patterns of interactions.

December, 2016

References

1. *E. Ringmar*, The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia against the West, *Cooperation and Conflict,* N37 (2), 2002, pp.115-136.
2. *А. Богданов*, Американская гегемония и факторы системной нестабильности в XXI веке, *Международные процессы*, т.12, N3 (38), 2014, стр.9.
3. *D. Lake*, Hierarchy in International Relations, Ithaca 2009.
4. *J. F. Garzon Pereira*, Hierarchical Regional Orders: An Analytical framework, *Journal of Policy Modeling*, 2014, p.34.
5. *J. Ikenberry*, Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order, in *International Order and the Future of World Politics*, T. Paul, J. Hall (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp.123-145.
6. *P-O. Busch and H. Jorgens*, The international Sources of Policy Convergence: explaining the spread of environmental policy innovations, Journal of European Public Policy, 12:5, October 2005.
7. *Ch. Knill*, Introduction: Cross-national policy convergence: concepts, approaches and explanatory factors, *Journal of European Public Policy*,12:5 October 2005, p.770.
8. *Р. Мухаметов*, Национальные интересы России на постсоветском пространстве: сущность и основные средства реализации, автореферат диссертации на соискание ученой степени кандидата политических наук, Екатеринбург, 2009, стр.17.
9. *A. Pannier, O.Schmitt*, Institutionalized cooperation and policy convergence in European defence: lessons from the relations between France, Germany and the UK, *European Security*, Feb. 2014: Routledge: Taylor&Francis , pp.3-4.
10. *D. Lake*, Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics, *International Security,* Vol. 32, No. 1 (Summer 2007), pp. 63-64.
11. *B.Buzan, O. Waever*, Regions and Powers: the Structure of International Security, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.489.
12. *V. Aglyan*, Dimensions of International Hierarchy in the post-Soviet space: analytical approaches and empirical reflections, *Herald of RUPF: International Relations*, Moscow, 2014, N4, pp.185-192.
13. *D. Nabers*, Power, Leadership and Hegemony in International Politics in *Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers*, Edited by Daniel Flemes, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Ashgate 2010, pp. 56-57.
14. *S. Neil Macfarlane*, The United States and regionalism in Central Asia, *International Affairs*, 80:3, 2004, p. 448.
15. *S. Torjesen*, Russia, the CIS, and the EEC: Finally getting right? In The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy, Edited by E. Wilson Rowe and S. Torjesen, N.Y. Routledge 2009, p.154.

16. *Bobo Lo*, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy, Chatam House, RIIA: UK, 2003, pp.69-71.

17. *L. Delcour, H. Kostanyan*, Towards a Fragmented Neighbourhood: Policies of the EU and Russia and their consequences for the area that lies in between, *CEPS Essay*, No. 17 / 17 October 2014, p.3.

18. *D. Averre*, Competing Rationalities: Russia, the EU and the 'Shared Neighbourhood', *Europe – Asia Studies*, Vol. 61, No. 10, December 2009, 16, pp.1696-1697.

19. *F. S. Hansen*, Do the CIS member states share foreign policy preferences?, *Journal of Eurasian Studies* , N6 (2015), pp.74-76.

20. *A. Grigoryan*, Armenia Poised to Make a Pivotal Decision about Further Cooperation with European Union, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, vol.12, iss.55, March 25, 2015.

PRAXIS OF INCREASING PUBLIC TRUST TOWARD BUREAUCRACIES: IN SEARCH OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES OF STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS OFARMENIA

Robert Khachatryan[*]

Introduction

The 21ˢᵗ century may very well become known as the century of globalization. The surge and process of globalization, the "spirit of the time" for democracy (Diamond 2008b), the escalating importance of ideologies and the pursuit to construct, safeguard and sustain democracy, and a sense of group identities (including national identity, cultural identity, political identity, educational identity, among the most significant ones) elucidate much of what is going on in the world nowadays. Furthermore, a changed understanding of the relations between the state and society demands extensive streamlining in the practices of democracy and bureaucracy in the 21st century. This is more expounded in terms that the last century has witnessed arduous efforts of world polities to sustain drastic transitions and shifts in their systems of government. This is particularly relevant about post-Soviet countries, where there has been a new wave of democratization since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Both democratic and bureaucratic practices entail public trust, for it is a fundamental value for any democratic polity or political system. However, lower levels of public trust or distrust towards the government comprise negative effects on the effectiveness of the implementation of public policies, including education policies. These constructs diminish the significance of shifts in complex bureaucratic practices in the Republic of Armenia from the rigid Soviet practices to the ones of a democratic polity. The overarching objective of this article is to reveal the relationship between

[*] PhD, Head of Quality Assurance Center, Head of Chair on Education Management and Planning, Yerevan Brusov State University of Languages and Social Sciences.

lower levels of public trust or distrust towards the government and perceived failure to deliver a wide range of public policies in the Armenian context, including education policy. This has been exacerbated by the reality that the processes of policy development in Armenia have become increasingly inaccessible to citizens and stakeholders. Thus, these processes have created explicit consequences in citizens' perceptions on transparency, accountability and visibility of public policy making in Armenia. The impenetrability and distanced processes of public policy-making and consequent decision-making processes in Armenia, combined with the lack or extreme weakness of mechanisms to ensure transparency, accountability and visibility of education policy making, have significantly contributed to angst about the competitiveness of higher education system in Armenia and efficient stakeholder engagement practices in higher education. This is expounded by the fact that higher education traditionally has been a national responsibility, the consequence of which is that the concepts of transparency, accountability and visibility have usually been interpreted in particular national contexts (Burke 2005; Trow 1996).

Participatory models of stakeholder engagement in the works of education bureaucracies might ensure that bureaucracy promotes and supports democracy. Accordingly, the level of trust among citizenry toward bureaucracies will increase, bringing a shift in citizens' and stakeholders' attitude that that the government serves their needs, they can affect decision-making, and that government is able to deliver. The purpose of this research is to theoretically contribute to the advancement of body of literature and the concepts of the relationship between public trust and effective bureaucratic practices in the field of education in Armenia.

As it has already been mentioned, the 21st century is characterized by several global trends, which mostly determine the geopolitical picture of the world. One of the main trends has been the process of establishment of new independent and democratic countries. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, insurmountable serious problems fell onto the Caucasian countries: transition from totalitarian regime to democracy, transition from the socialist economic system to free market economy, development of competitive education systems, among others. The South Caucasus constitutes a regional formation with its own characteristics. The Caucasus region has become the site for some of the most serious inter- and intra-state con-

flicts. The political elites of the newly independent states have been well aware that their security could not be considered apart from each other. This awareness of the regional dimension of the security problem has not led, however, to the creation of a unitary institutional framework for the Caucasus favoring conflict settlement and regional cooperation. Armenia is no exception to this general pattern.

The significance of this theoretical discussion is both timely and practical for two foremost reasons. First, there has been a growing and meaningful body of research and literature that focuses on trust in mature democracies on the part of sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, and economists (Baier 1986, Gambetta 1990, Coleman 1998 and 1990, Fukuyama 1995, Seligman 1997, Hardin 1998, Braithwarte and Levi 1998, Warren 1999, Inglehart 1999, Uslaner 2002). Further on, government and non-government organizations have been conducting surveys and collecting data to measure levels of trust in mature democracies and obtain reliable and trustworthy data on democratic innovations. These include the World Economic Forum, Global Barometer Surveys (GBS), the Eurobarometer, the Asia Barometer, Participedia, Transparency's Corruption Perception Index, and Swedish Social Science Data Service (SSDS), among others. Despite trust has caused a great deal of scholarly debate about both its definition and its measurement in the contexts of mature democracies, a dearth of systematic and comprehensive research, relevant literature and empirical data on public trust is available for the context of post-Soviet Countries, especially for the countries in the region of South Caucasus. Accordingly, the topic of public trust in the Armenian context remains an underinvestigated area of research both in theory and measurement.

Second, in the globalizing world, for emerging democracies that are at the stage of economic and social transitions, it is vital to adjust through localizing some of the best practices and mechanisms of governance that have been effectively and efficiently implemented in mature democracies and economies. In this context, this research will contribute to the body of literature on the topic of different dimensions of public trust as it is manifested in bureaucratic practices in education. This discussion is driven by theoretical propositions and grounded in examples or approaches of accountability in the higher education system in Armenia, which may set up the ground for exploring a model of relationship between decreasing public trust towards bureaucracies in Armenia.

With the emergence of the New Public Management Doctrine and managerialism, new accountability schemes were legitimized (Bovens 2006: 7), whereas, the previous accountability schemes, such as the one in which citizens held the politicians accountable through electoral processes, became not practical and viable. This is specifically expounded for accountability is about finding a good balance between conflicting demands and expectations and that higher education institutions should "serve all while submitting to none of these imperatives" (Burke 2005: 23). To this end, accountability schemes continuously develop throughout the world and this expansion of accountability measures characterizes perhaps the most dominant trend that is creating the new hybridization and complexity. Stensaker and Harvey (2011: 19) suggest that "developing accountability schemes often contain both hard and soft elements, they combine internal and external needs, the distinction between national and international elements is blurring and there is an increase in the number and types of stakeholders interested in holding higher education accountable."

One of many available classifications of accountability is worth discussing in this article that might visualize the above-mentioned trend. Vidovich and Slee (2001) identify four different forms of accountability: *upward, downward, inward*, and *outward*. By upward accountability, Vidovich and Slee denote any forms of accountability that take the form of a principal-agent relationship including bureaucratic, legal and procedural means. Downward accountability includes the responsibilities of the principal towards the agent, which, translated into higher education, could imply a number of collegial mechanisms. Inward accountability relates more to how individuals, professionals or disciplines adhere to ethical or professional standards, while outward accountability   implies how institutions respond to markets, users and clients in higher education, including the political arena.

Nevertheless, the extent and scope of accountability as a "lubricant of relations" geared towards the increasing the legitimacy of (and trust in) higher education should be further researched. One potential consequence of current developments with respect to accountability is that there is an "emergent 'market' for accountability. With numerous providers of accountability, and increasing complex ways and methods to demonstrate accountability, the question is what consequences this might have for higher education. If institutions, countries or states 'buy into' the accountability scheme that suits their interest best, the results need not to

be increased legitimacy, at least not if the benchmarks are more global" (Stensaker and Harvey 2011: 20).

Trow (1996: 232) distinguishes between two central dimensions of accountability. First, Trow suggests the first dimension between external and internal accountability, where the first notion relates to the obligation of universities and colleges towards their supporters and funders, and the second relates to the extent of which different constituents or parts of the institution are performing, the scope and the level of commitment of staff towards the vision and mission, and how units and staff are committed to improve the quality of their activities. The second dimension is between 'legal/financial' and 'academic' accountability, where the first notion relates to the obligation institutions posses, for example, to report on how resources have been spent and whether institutions are acting in accordance with the rule of law. The second notion relates to the obligation the institutions to inform about teaching and learning activities. Nevertheless, any form of accountability takes the form of a principal-agent relationship including bureaucratic, legal and procedural means. The distortion of this classification is manifested in the evident blurring between legal/financial and academic forms of accountability. This might be illustrated by evidence of the new systems and schemes for internal quality assurance that higher education institutions are often externally obliged to establish in Armenia. In such systems, legal requirements concerning stakeholder participation; the need to conduct certain kinds of evaluations and assessments contributes to undermining the traditional boundaries between more administrative and more professional accountability.

Bureaucracy and Its Significance in a Democracy

From an array of theories that contemplate foundational pillars of the interplay between the practices of bureaucracy and democracy, this article pursues the objective of choosing the most appropriate theory – the Weberian legacy of hierarchical order. According to Merton (2007: 97), in many respects, the classical analysis of bureaucracy is that by Max Weber. Weber put forth the rationale of modern bureaucracies and described the bureaucratic form as being the ideal way of organizing government agencies (systematically bringing knowledge to systematically bearing on public problems). Subsequently, bureaucracy is a hierarchical structure for organi-

zation designed to perform a particular set of tasks. Max Weber was the first to conceptualize bureaucracy in its modern structure and its potential significance for large-scale organizations, which also encompass public institutions. Max Weber's classic theory of bureaucracy serves a focal basis for the discussion of organizational accountability in higher education, because it is the theoretical base of most contemporary education management theories.

The term bureaucracy is multidimensional. The bureaucratic theory encompasses the "analysis of public administration by making distinctions between either political and administrative acts or actions and/or by making distinctions between political and administrative actors" (Frederickson and Smith 2003: 16). Accordingly, the concept of bureaucracy encompasses a range of primarily administrative ideas and premises. A bureaucracy is a group of individuals hired as civil servants on the basis of merit and charged with "distributing the outputs of public policies" (Wilkins 2007: 78) and serving the public. Within the framework of this article, the concept of bureaucracy is primarily defined as "administrative body of appointed officials" (Albrow 1970: 42). Additionally, the concept of bureaucracy refers to the administrative body of street-level bureaucrats, defined by Michael Lipsky, as "public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work" (Lipsky 1980: 3). This distinction is vital because "street-level bureaucrats are neither elected nor appointed by elected officials, they are largely immune to electoral accountability. To the extent that elected officials cannot fully control street-level bureaucrats' day-to-day decisions and actions, citizens have few mechanisms for assessing, much less controlling their impact on policy" (Meyers and Nielsen 2012, 311). Thus, this dichotomy is further exacerbated in Armenia because civic oversight and assessment of bureaucracies and consequent bureaucratic practices in the process of "distributing the outputs of public policies" is weak or in some cases non-existent. However, in the case of education bureaucracies from local school systems to state authorities of education, as well as state higher education institutions are designed to be accountable to various groups, including both internal and external stakeholders.

The most fundamental components for bureaucracy are broadly categorized as structure, knowledge, and power. The structure, including hierarchy, is the required and ongoing feature of any organization or society, made up of various social

groups that embed different values and interests. Bureaucrats, considered as a group or hierarchy, must first develop an underpinning of experiential knowledge before that group of hierarchy, known as bureaucracy, can accumulate power. The New Public Management Doctrine may illustrate the knowledge component of bureaucracy, including professional expertise. This doctrine "represents an approach in public administration that employs knowledge and experiences acquired in business management and other disciplines to improve efficiency, effectiveness, and general performance of public services in modern bureaucracies" (Vigoda-Gadot 2009: 18). Accumulating professional expertise is one construct, yet gaining power is another one. Bureaucracy embeds an inherent tendency to accumulate power, which includes managing administrative discretion. The crux of Weber's classification is the legitimacy of authority. Weber describes this as an ideal-type construct, considering it to be a rational and efficient form of organization, once bureaucrats accumulate sufficient administrative discretion. In a mature democratic polity, the authority of bureaucracy is traced to the law – this is why Weber referred to a legal-rational ideal type. Bureaucracy is the embodiment of the legal-rational source of authority that Weber posited in contrast to tradition and charisma.

According to Weber, bureaucracy is derived from legal authority. Rules are the basis for the decisions and means to efficiently accomplish organizational goals. Weber argued that power was the "ability to direct other's behavior, regardless of whether those being directed believed it was proper and acceptable" (Weber 1954). Thus, the legal authorization of individuals to behave in a certain manner is a crucial dimension under legal authority and derives its powers from the system of bureaucracy and the system of democracy. This is promulgated in emerging democracies, in which the nexus between bureaucratic power and the rule of law is not established as strong as it is in mature democracies. Additionally, Weber also placed boundaries on bureaucracy. He was not only worried about the danger of internal bureaucratic inefficiency or mismanagement, but rather the inherent tendency of a bureaucracy to accumulate power. In other words, elected officials come to realize how dependent they are on the expertise of bureaucrats, who exercise the power in emerging democracies, such as Armenia.

The bureaucratic form of administration has become so commonplace that there is a general assumption that the normal way of organizing almost any en-

deavor is bureaucratic. Alvin Gouldner contends that the "ideal type of bureaucracy" might serve a base for determining the design a formal organization is bureaucratized. It is worth mentioning that some organizations will be more bureaucratically structured than others with one major condition that a given organization might be more bureaucratized on several characteristics and less on others. Nevertheless, the common trend is that bureaucracy has become a hallmark of modern democratic polities. However, the capacity of those bureaucratic procedures is subjective, depending largely on how the public's interests are affected by such procedures. Meier and O'Toole succinctly recapitulate that "bureaucracies are hierarchical institutions that can provide the capacity and expertise to accomplish complex social tasks, but they are frequently characterized as undemocratic and even threatening to democracy. Democracies are systems of government that are based, directly and indirectly, on the principle of popular control" (Meier and O'Toole 2006: 2). This contention is explained by the existence of inherent tensions between values associated with democracy: equality, participation, and individuality, and values associated with bureaucracy: hierarchy, specialization, and impersonality (Thompson 1983). After all, the main potential of ideal bureaucratic procedures is to bring a balance among competing interests and needs of citizens.

Inherent Tension between Democracy and Bureaucracy

Public trust embeds in-depth assurance of or implicit confidence on expectations of the public towards the government without conclusive evidence. In this regard, this design necessitates that public trust is not in short supply. Trust is especially critical for new regimes, however, "in which it also is likely to be in short supply" (Mishler and Rose 2001: 30). This is fundamentally true because new regimes, whose predecessors including most post-Communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, proved unworthy of trust (Dogan and Higley 1998). The general pattern is that the public tends to express a great deal of dissatisfaction in public administration, in the result of which public trust continues to deteriorate. The situation in Armenia is not an exception. Therefore, a conceptual discussion of public trust and a critical examination of literature on the constructs of trust and stakeholder engagement offers practical benefits since it is imperative to understand why trust towards the practice of bureaucracy shrinks and what can be a useful an-

tidote for the Armenian context. This antidote might be constructive for those engaged in designing governance arrangements in Armenia and beyond.

At the outset, there is an immense fissure between two major antithetical engines of change in a democratic polity: the concept of democracy and the power of bureaucracy. More specifically, Vigoda-Gadot states that democracy "relies on the broad, collective support of the people who hold power that can be delegated upward to leaders. In contrast, bureaucracy is based on the power of the few and on delegation downward to employees or other individuals who make up the majority in organizations (or around them)" (Vigoda-Gadot 2009: 45). This dichotomy is particularly evident in the contexts of both mature and emerging democracies. More specifically, the design of mature democracies incorporates bureaucratic accountability to elected bodies, whereas the design of emerging democracies incorporates the rule of law contrasts, i.e. bureaucracies employ their own source of power and little accountability to elected bodies. Thompson (2005: 50) further contends that "many of the values we associate with democracy – equality, participation and individuality – stand sharply opposed to the hierarchy, specialization, and impersonality we ascribe to modern bureaucracy." However, some mature democracies, including Western democracies, embrace the reconciliation of the paradox of a strong bureaucracy in a democracy. Not all polities concur, but some contend "both governments and citizens, as partners, are the essence and the target of the modernization and advancement of a prosperous democratic society" (Vigoda-Gadot 2009: xii). Along similar lines, Kaplan (2008) states that a "country's ability to advance is crucially tied to its citizens' ability to cooperate – both among themselves and in partnership with the state – in increasingly sophisticated ways." The bureaucratic-democratic paradox additionally incorporates intrinsic tension between citizens as clients and citizens as partners. Citizens as clients can be factored in the "unidirectional" process of the responsiveness to the people's needs and demands and responsiveness to a vague public will. Whereas, citizens as partners can be factored in the "bidirectional" process of effective collaboration between those of power and those who delegate power – authorities and state administrators, who "must see themselves as committed to citizens who have agreed to be led or 'governed' on condition that their lives continuously improve" (Vigoda 2002: 529). This fact also embeds the rising sentiment of consumerism in higher education, which is reflected in

the increasing demand of students to participate in the decision-making processes that impact both the quality and trajectories of their education.

Thus, the bureaucratic-democratic paradox is strongly intertwined and potentially reconciled with stakeholder engagement in the process of decision-making, both when this participation is at an individual level and when it is in an organized manner through social groups, interest groups, social movements, and other social platforms. In this article, the terms of citizenry or citizenship are used interchangeably and denote two concepts: a legal status and a practice.

Be that as it may, the generic tendency in current methods of governance is to pursue a reasonable compromise between evolving democracy and evolving bureaucracy. A "mechanism for reconciliation between the political order of democracies and the administrative order of bureaucracies must be constructed if citizens and leaders wish to build a stronger society" (Vigoda-Gadot 2009: 2). Though the last century had turned into an "age of democratic triumph" (Dahl 1998), it also produced a "democratic recession" (Diamond 2008a). Explorations of a compromise frequently produce dissatisfaction with both concepts and generate a democratic rollback in the bureaucratic state, which in turn produces a cynical citizenry. In the confines of this article, democratic rollback is used as the overarching concept that embraces different dimensions, such as democratic recession, democratic deficit, a crisis of power, a crisis of legitimacy, and a crisis of citizen alienation from governments, among others. In order to explicate the contention that democratic rollback is intertwined with public trust and bureaucracy, it is essential to understand that both "people (the citizens) and the leaders (the politicians and the senior bureaucrats) must obey the rules of the democratic game" (Vigoda-Gadot 2009: 67). The following section will provide a brief overview of what constitutes the "democratic game" within the context of emerging democracies, such as Armenia.

Constructs of Public Trust

Any democratic polity embeds a system for measuring how closely governmental policies match public preferences or needs. This interplay is known as democratic responsiveness, which in its turn is based on value system. Bureaucracy is a locus for democratic responsiveness. Both democratic and bureaucratic practices entail public trust for it is a fundamental value for any polity. Fukuyama (1995: 7) articulates this

fundamental value eloquently, a "nation's well-being, as well as it stability to compete, is conditioned by a single, pervasive cultural characteristic: the level of trust inherent in a society." Stemming from this contention, it may be inferred that trust is an amorphous and highly contextual construct. Due to this complexity of the meaning of the construct *trust*, both conceptually and by definition, it deems necessary to provide a brief discussion of its definitions. The construct *trust* denotes different meanings.

A multitude of researchers have identified more specific components that contribute to the construct of trust. The concept of *trust* has been further explored as a general social problem (Braithwaite and Levi 1998; Cook 2001; Sztompka 1998) and has been elaborated in scholarly literature, including sociology (Coleman 1990; Coleman, Brudney, and Kellough 1998), economics (Fukuyama 1995), organizational science (Gambetta 1990, Shaw 1997), and education (Tshannen-Moran and Hoy 1998). In this literature, there is an implied notion that trust is paramount to establishing and maintaining positive relationships, whether they are at the interpersonal, group (Barber 1983) or organizational levels (Likert 1967) in each of these respective fields of study. Generally, trust is associated with group stability and permanence in relations (Kale and McIntyre 1991), performance (Zand 1972), productivity (Golembiewski and McConkie 1975), leadership styles (Likert 1967), organizational development (Golembiewski 1985), and even with "administrative evil" (Menzel 2001). Broadly defined, trust is considered to be a "willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectations that that party will perform an action of importance" (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer 1998). To this end, trust embodies a level of risk and consensual dependence from all parties involved. It may be inferred that trust denotes an element in a consensual relationship, in which there is equal risk and equal benefit of performing an "action of importance" as perceived by the parties involved.

These factors vary greatly according to the type of relationship at issue – that is, individual, group or organizational – and they change over the duration of the relationship. The most commonly used definition in the literature is that of Mishra (1996), who contemplates on trust from a multidimensional perspective and incorporates the components of competence, openness, benevolence, and reliability in the definition. Yet other researchers (Cummings and Bromily 1996) incorporate a

fifth dimension, honesty, in the construct of trust. Thus, these dimensions of the construct *trust* – competence, openness, benevolence, reliability, and honesty – have extensively been used in research to measure an individual's perception of a corresponding party's trustworthiness in their relations. Based on these definitions, trust could be defined as a sustained combination of communication acts with certain limited probabilities that gradually develop a system of shortcuts, optimizing the time of communication and the utility of end product. Efficient administration incorporates practices that make the communication efficient creating management modes of operation that would result in effectiveness of service delivery, which is correlated with increasing trust among citizenry.

Based on this discussion, trust embodies a substratum of a legitimate democratic system and is seen as "purposive, a lubricant of relations" (Berman 1997: 105) in the context of political system. Hetherington (2005: 9) defines political trust as the "degree to which people perceive that government is producing outcomes consistent with their expectations." In those social exchange relationships, people expect government or its representatives to be ethical and fair concerning citizen's rights and interests (Carnevale 1995). This is the overarching reason why the "ability of the state to provide effective public services tends to contribute to public trust and, ultimately, to public participation" (Peters 2010: 642). More specifically, the concept of trust in government is based on the "trustee's fiduciary responsibility to preserve and enhance the assets of the trust, keeping always in mind the good of the beneficiaries …." (Brown 1994: 71). Correspondingly, citizens are entitled to have means to force corrective actions when government acts in an illegal, immoral or unjust manner. Thus, trust is institutionalized in a polity's practices and relations and there is direct correlation between trust and government performance perceived by citizens. Furthermore, "confidence in or satisfaction with the work of any institution is not simply a reflection of its record but depends on a relationship between expectations and performance. Hence, confidence could erode because expectations have increased even if performance has remained the same" (Bok 1997: 56). An array of citizens' expectations is wide-ranging, including performance (actual and perceived), government policy directions and alternatives (actual and contemplated), probity (public opinion on ethical issues), denunciation of government (the "advent of sweeping changes in media technology and practice), among others.

This relationship has been exacerbated because public trust has been declining. Hetherington (2005: 5) claims, "even if people support progressive policy goals, they do not support the policies themselves because they do not believe that the government is capable of bringing about desired outcomes." Thus, it may be stated that the public tends to express a "great deal of dissatisfaction in public administration" (Vigoda-Gadot 2009: 14). Citizens frequently denigrate politicians and bureaucrats, criticize the established institutions, and point out government failure and incompetence. This denigration and public dissatisfaction may ultimately harm democracy since public dissatisfaction "hampers governing in a constitutional structure that intentionally makes action difficult without strong popular approval... It hinders the task of recruiting and retaining capable public servants." (Orren 1997: 79). Hetherington (2005: 16) summarizes an array of factors on which public trust depends, such as policy satisfaction (Miller 1974, King 1997), economic evaluations and performance (Citrin and Green 1986, Kinder and Kieweit 1981), media negativity (Cappella and Jamieson 1997), war (Parker 1995), the president's personal characteristics (Citrin and Green 1986), and the size and scope of government (Masnbridge 1997)." Thus, the cause-effect relationship between all of these constructs creates this public dissatisfaction and in some cases, this public dissatisfaction can be defined as "cynicism."

Substratum of Continuum from Increasing Distrust to Cynicism

It may be overgeneralized that across both mature and emerging democracies there is a great deal of dissatisfaction in governments and in the public service delivery. Bureaucrats are most often blamed for the ugly side effects of management as they are "alleged in all quarters to be lazy, incompetent, devious, and even dangerous" (Goodsell 2004: 3). Elected officials and interest groups have also at some point blamed their problems on bureaucracy. The unethical behavior of elected officials lowers trust not only toward them, but also toward bureaucrats (Meier 2000: vii). Moreover, this is further complicated by the fact that elected officials often give "inconsistent, contradictory, and hence irreconcilable tasks" to bureaucracies, which complicates in turn the bureaucracies' success at operational level (Goodsell 2004: 59). Thus, this practice creates an overall situation when bureaucracies do assuage failures of elected officials. The latter process in its turn creates instability and

low permanence in relationships between citizens and bureaucrats, which is the main rationale behind the concept of public distrust both in mature and emerging democracies. This is specifically appropriate also for the case of Armenia, where democratic mechanisms of civic oversight and assessment are not yet fully engrained in all the bureaucratic practices and procedures.

The public is mainly unsatisfied about how the government serves its needs, and this dissatisfaction creates cynicism. Vigoda (2002:532) further explicates that cynicism toward government and bureaucracies is exacerbated by the fact that citizens are "remote from decision-making centers." Manifestations of public cynicism embody pervasive beliefs that government policies and public officials are incompetent or low performing (Johnson 1993). Thus, cynicism is seen as a "phenomenon that is linked to unsatisfied citizen needs… Cynicism and trust are deeply rooted in the management of government-citizen relations" (Berman 1997: 110). The upward trend of exploiting the term a "cynical polity" additionally indicates that to "misdefine cynicism as mistrust is to misgauge citizen attitudes about their politics" (Eisinger 2000: 59-60). Norris (2011: 1) makes a clear distinction between the ideas of "institutional confidence (a belief in the capacity of an agency to perform effectively), trust (a rational or affective belief in the benevolent motivation and performance capacity of another party), skepticism (suspended judgment), and cynicism (jaded negativity)." Based on this continuum, cynicism is more than mild distrust. Thus, a cynical polity might further impact on democratic rollback to a level where democracy can be undermined as a form of government in emerging democracies. There is no continuum in effective use that delineates the levels of public trust towards government and that explicates how each level of public trust creates pathologies or tangible circumstances for democratic rollback.

Consequently, the pathologies of democratic rollback lead to an idea that "bureaucracy tends to be inert" and produces "bureaupathologies," such as "dedication to the status quo, delay, fear of change, foot-dragging, imperviousness to suggestion, inability to learn, indecision, inflexibility, lack of imagination, obstruction, procrastination, rigidity, stagnation, stalling, and vested interests" (Caiden 1991:491). Additionally, Scott (1998) suggests four bureaupathologies – alienation of workers, overconformity in following rules, unresponsiveness to their publics, and relentlessness of organizational behavior. Prior to this array of malperformance

practices by Caiden, Pierce (1981) eloquently proposed comprehensive types of bureaucratic failures, which are particularly worth mentioning because they may be highly pertinent to emerging democracies. These bureaucratic failures are as follows: corruption (theft of materials, misuse of time on the job, bribery, misuse of office, conflicts of interest), misallocation of resources, technical inefficiency (waster, diseconomies, poor management, inappropriate investments, lack of innovation), ineffectiveness (useless activities, quiet ineffectuality, bad advice, egregious errors), subservience to clients, lack of coordination, conflicting objectives, spoils system, displacement of mandated objectives, favoritism, foot-dragging, arbitrariness, and inflexibility (Pierce 1981). There is a dearth of research on these bureaucratic failures and bureaupathologies in emerging democracies in the region of South Caucasus, including Armenia. Consequently, this setting of not empirically researched, and investigated situation or unawareness places the bureaucracy and bureaucratic practices of education in Armenia in a vulnerable position and resultantly creates harmful effects, oftentimes compromising the original mission and legitimacy of the bureaucracies in the eyes of the citizens. In light of this reality, it is instrumental that scholars and researchers empirically understand the causes of bureaucratic failures and bureaupathologies and attempt to obtain mechanisms and methods to mitigate excessively increasing distrust issues towards them.

These pathologies have also created democratic deficit in modern bureaucracies due to different factors. "Democracy and representative government are regarded as undermined if not sabotaged by bureaucracy" (Goodsell 2004: 14). However, it should be realized that the central problem is the organizing form of public policy making. The principle of hierarchy institutes an intolerable pattern of inequality, subordination, and dependence on the members of the organization. These patterns are contradictory to the concept of democracy. This is further complicated by the fact that the "specialization of work in bureaucracy creates narrow, humdrum routines that are nearly impossible to bear day after day" (Goodsell 2004:15). Ultimately, organizational designs evolve and consistently move towards instigating changes in organizational forms from the bureaucratic to the alternative paradigms of stakeholder engagement. Lack of realizing this circumstance compromises the effectiveness and perception of effectiveness of policy delivery, thus creating dis-

trust or cynicism towards the education system and/or education policies developed and implemented by the Armenian government.

In this regard, the concept of "democratic innovations" and participatory decision-making come forward as an alternative approach to a set of percepts that departs from the "traditional institutional architecture" of stakeholder's participation and include competitive practices such as merit-based selection of rectors, surveys and focus groups with stakeholders. This approach valuable because of two aspects of its design: on one hand, inclusive engagement of stakeholders of both "lay" or "non-partisan citizens" and experts and partisan campaigners; on the other hand, institutionalized forms of participation in political decision-making at strategic levels, such as "democratic devices that provide citizens with a formal role in policy, legislative or constitutional decision-making" (Smith 2009: 2). Goodsell (2004: 161) articulately suggests different models of stakeholder engagement as it will not only emerge "just in the abstract categories of volunteering, co-production, power sharing, advice, collaboration, or education, but [also] in concrete manifestations of all of these, in different mixtures and degrees." Thus, the archetype of a politically headed bureau should be transformed into a range of different corporate governance forms, such as multi-organizational collaboratives (Sullivan and Skelcher 2002), public-private partnerships (Skelcher 2005), quasi-governmental hybrids (Koppell 2003), and public interest companies (Prabhakar 2004). This transformation into new governance forms epitomizes the importance of fostering active citizenry in emerging democracies, as Armenia epitomizes and is geared towards increasing trust.

In this regard, trust is "achieved when institutions, over time, demonstrate accountability through the results and outcomes produced. The reputation a given university achieves will then become a proxy for trust" (Stensaker B. and Harvey L. 2011: 12). The mentioned process of building trust is narrowly interlinked with the concepts of stakeholders and stakeholder management come forward. Freeman (1984) suggests that a stakeholder may be any individual and group of individuals either impacted upon by the company or able to impact on the achievement of its objectives. Further on, Mitchell et al. (1997) set out a theory of stakeholder salience, in accordance with which stakeholders vary in terms of power, legitimacy, and urgency.

This system of stakeholder management is also noticeable in the system of higher education in Armenia, which includes both internal and external stake-

holders. More specifically, the institutions of higher education operate not only by integrating the directives and regulations stipulated by many external constituents, including state legislatures, boards of trustees, accrediting agencies, but also by functioning through a system of shared governance with input from internal stake-holders at the institutional level, such as teaching staff, staff and students, among the main groups of internal stakeholders.

Public Trust among Citizenry in Armenia

A limited corpus of empirical data might illustrate the discussion of public trust among citizenry in the context of Armenia. A private nonprofit research organiza-tion, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) describes the evolution of distrust based on the evidence using the World Values Survey and the Life in Tran-sition Survey (LITS database) that is devoted to former socialist economies. Accord-ing to that survey, distrust has increased in all transition countries." In the case of Armenia, there was an increase by 1.25 between distrust in 2006 and distrust before 1989. This situation has further exacerbated since 2006.

Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index 2013 indicates that 43% of the Armenian population think that corruption has increased in Armenia in the last two years and 82% of surveyed identified it a serious or very serious prob-lem for the country. According to Transparency's Corruption Perception Index 2013, Armenia's has the index of 36 in terms of the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 - 100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means it is perceived as very clean. In a sample of 177 countries and territories, Armenia ranks at 94, sharing this rank in the Index with such countries as Algeria, Benin, Columbia, Djibouti, India, Philippines, and Suriname. Transpar-ency's Corruption Perception Index shows the following picture in terms of most corrupt institutions in Armenia: the judiciary, public officials/civil servants, medical and health services are perceived as the most corrupt institutions, closely followed by the police, whereas NGOs and religious organizations are perceived to be the least corrupt. As justly stated by Transparency International Armenia, the "most alarming point here is that among the institutions perceived as the most corrupt are those, which themselves are by law entitled to fight against corruption." Probably conditioned by this, only 37% of respondents believe that ordinary people make

difference in the fight against corruption and 68% of respondents would not even report an incident of corruption, believing that it would not make a difference. This is also confirmed in the article *Civic Trust and Governance in Armenia* by Artak Shakaryan, who summarizes empirical data of the survey conducted in Armenia and asserts that the "lack of trust and honesty in Armenia is one of the main reasons for citizens' political apathy, as well as a perfect harbor for perpetuating corruption. The low level of trust in Armenia generates crises, which in turn can bring to a recession and overall decline of democratization" (Shakaryan 2007: 266).

First and foremost for the overarching objective of this article, it is important to present limited data on the attitude towards the system of education in Armenia. The importance of discussing briefly the attitude towards credible higher education institutions is pertinent because the autonomy and trust towards them is an important axis, which rules back to the instrumental notion of educated electors and civic oversight in a democratic polity. Effective and efficient higher education system will be valued "both for its 'intrinsic' qualities in creating, conserving and disseminating knowledge and for its 'extrinsic' qualities in serving broader economic, social and cultural goals. Responsibility for determining the system's 'academic agenda' is shared between institutions and external stakeholders" (Brown 2011: 4). Thus, efficiency and effectiveness of the services provided by higher education institutions derives their legitimacy from the support of all parties and stakeholders involved. However, as such, if a number of parties are unable or unwilling to participate in the process of decision making due to a lack of trust towards bureaucracies, this situation poses a significant and particular challenge to the functioning of the system of education as a whole.

In the Armenian context, bureaucracy is understood as a system of government in which most of the important decisions are made by state officials (including civil servants) rather than by elected representatives. The above discussion emphasizes the notion that one of the failures of the system of state government in Armenia is exclusion of the public (citizens and stakeholders) from decision-making process. Much wider stakeholder engagement and civic participation in the bureaucratic practices in the Armenian system of education might be an antidote to increasing public distrust.

Nonetheless, enhancing stakeholder engagement can also place a significant burden on public authorities in Armenia. Smith (2009:19) posits, "engaging citizens has resource implications, both in terms of organizing engagement and the potential restructuring of administrative procedures and working practices to accommodate participation." But in general, the advantages of engaging diverse groups of stakeholders overweigh resource implications because novice modes in stakeholder engagement for the Armenian context may lead to optimal and/or maximum satisfaction of clients by the delivery scheme of bureaucracies, liberate bureaucrats from growingly ineffective measurement tools of public scrutiny that at times subvert the true mission of bureaucracy.

In attempting to map the available literature, research and empirical data on the subject matter, various factors and constructs have been overlapped and have emerged to schematize the field through the terrain. The subject of trust in Armenia is an underinvestigated area of research. This is exacerbated by the fact that the available literature on trust in post-Soviet countries (Mishler and Rose 2001) or mature democracies is rarely confined to one particular subject in an attempt to illustrate the overall picture. This contention has led to a task of formulating the construct of public trust that may stimulate stakeholder engagement in Armenia. A synthesis of various factors might be useful in determining the impact of trust on any bureaucracy and on the level of participation of the public in the decision-making and the governance process of education bureaucracies. Analyzing trust, including its dimensions, is expected to provide a productive means of assessing the relationship between these two groups and of measuring the impact these constructs may have on bureaucratic practices. It is still a contested space that has a multitude of questions and challenges that have yet to be embraced.

Conclusion

Taking into consideration the fact that the needs of society members and stakeholders continue to escalate and become more complex and without a countervailing measure of stakeholder engagement, it is likely that public distrust will further contribute to a democratic rollback and citizen cynicism and diminish complex bureaucratic practices. As modern society develops and citizens become more educated and sophisticated, bureaucracies are tasked to truly serve the ever-growing

needs and demands of citizens and remain faithful to their intended missions. Thus, it should be realized that trust is an asset, which should not be diminished. The overarching charge for relevant public policy makers or authorities in Armenia must be to generate discussion of new paradigms or modes of stakeholder engagement in order to ensure that bureaucracy promotes and supports democracy, as well as to devise advanced mechanisms to further institutionalize stakeholder engagement in the public decision making in the field of education in Armenia. The importance of stakeholder engagement will provide more space to elaborate on what actually happens when citizens do participate and engage actively and how these forms of participation blend with more traditional understanding of representative democracy and service delivery of public goods/services, including these operations at all levels of governance.

Bureaucracies are confronted with internal and external dynamics that complicates the efforts of those within and outside to maintain trust towards them. Lending credence to the inherent nature of bureaucracies to accumulate power, compromises among bureaucrats and elected officials are necessary to negotiate the interests and needs of the public. This is unequivocally embedded in the model of representative government, where "elected officials are supposed to hold views compatible with citizen predilections, thus ensuring that policy follows citizen desires. These elected executives appoint and supervise agency heads that adhere to popularly supported policy prescriptions" (Schachter 2012: 7). Thus, these sorts of compromises are critical for any democratic bureaucracy to function. Compromises embody both regime values and a certain measure of consistency and stability in order for actors to recognize and comprehend their legal obligations and rights as they accomplish the routine business of a society. The virtue of a democratic system that allows practices to evolve to keep pace with changing attitudes and a collective sense of equity is deeply rooted in the Western models of democracy and bureaucracy.

It has been argued throughout this article the experience of democratic decision-making and stakeholder engagement in Armenia does not percolate down to a shared understanding of bureaucracy and bureaucratic practices, and what these percepts actually imply in practice. A conflict which may potentially damage public trust is inherently embedded in the concept of serving a public with dissimilar values and objectives and with a lack of visions of how bureaucracies should function

and serve their controversial needs and interests. This conflict with its conse-quences is fueled by a mere fact that level of trust is a means of identifying success and failure of a democracy and bureaucracy from empirical data. Therefore, trust is an adequate indicator of the relationship between lower levels of public trust or dis-trust towards the government and perceived corruption or failure to deliver a wide range of public policies in the Armenian context.

December, 2016

References

1. Albrow, M. 1970. *Bureaucracy.* New York, NW: Praeger Publishers.
2. Barber, B. 1983. *The Logic and Limits of Trust.* NJ: Rutgers University Press.
3. Baier, A. 1986. Trust and Antritrust. *Ethics. 96*(January): 231-260.
4. Berman, E. M. 1997. Dealing with Cynical Citizens. *Public Administration Review. 57*(2): 105-112.
5. Bingham, L. Bl., Nabatchi, T., and O'Leary, R. 2005. The New Governance: Practices and Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government. *Public Administration Review. 65*(5): 547-558
6. Bok, D. 1997. Measuring the Performance of Government. In *Why People Don't Trust Government.* (Eds.) Joseph S. Nye, Philip D. Zelikow, and David C. King. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
7. Bovens, M. 2006. Analyzing and Assessing Public Accountability: A Conceptual Frame-work. *European Governance Papers (EUROGOV).* No C-06-01.
8. Braithwaite, V., and Levi, M. (Eds.) 1998. *Trust and Governance*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
9. Brown, P. G. 1994. *Restoring the Public Trust: A Fresh Vision for Progressive Government in America.* Boston: Beacon Press.
10. Brown, R. 2011. Higher Education and the Market. NY: Routledge.
11. Burke, J. (Ed.) 2005. Achieving Accountability in Higher Education: Balancing Public, Aca-demic and Marker Demands. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
12. Caiden, G. E. 1991. What Really is Public Maladministration? *Public Administration Re-view. 51*(6): 486-493.
13. Cappella, J. N., and Jamieson, K. H. 1997. *Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good.* New York: Oxford University Press.
14. Carnevale, D. G. 1995. *Trustworthy Government: Leadership and Management Strategies for Building Trust and High Performance.* San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass Publishers.
15. Citrin, J., and Green, D. Ph. 1986. Presidential Leadership and the Resurgence of Trust in Government. *British Journal of Political Science. 16*(4): 431-453.
16. Coleman, J. S. 1990. *Foundations of Social Theory.* Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
17. Coleman, J. S., Brudney, J. L., and Kellough, J. E. 1998. Bureaucracy as a Representative In-stitution: Toward a Reconciliation of Bureaucratic Government and Democratic Theory. *American Journal of Political Science. 42*(3): 717-744.
18. Cook, K. S. (Ed.) 2001. *Trust in Society*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

19. Cummings, L. L. and Bromiley, P. 1996. The Organizational Trust Inventory (OTI): Development and Validation. In R. Kramer and T. Tyler (Eds.) *Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research*. CA: SAGE.

20. Diamond, L. 2008a. The Democratic Rollback. *Foreign Affairs. 87*(2): 36-48.

21. Diamond, L. 2008b. *The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World.* NY: Times Books.

22. Dogan, M., and Higley, J. (Eds.) 1998. *Elites, Crises and the Origins of Regimes*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

23. Eisinger, R. M. 2000. Questioning Cynicism. *Society* 37(5): 55-60.

24. Freeman, R. 1984. The Politics of Stakeholders Theory: Some Future Directions. *Business Ethics Quarterly*. 4(44): 409-422.

25. Fukuyama, Fr. 1995. *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. NY: Free Press.

26. Gambetta, D. 1990. (Ed.) *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*. MA: Basil Blackwell.

27. Golembiewski, R. T., and McConkie, M. L. 1975. The Centrality of Interpersonal Trust in Group Processes. In *Theories of Group Processes*. Ed. Cooper, C.L. Wiley, New York.

28. Golembiewski, R. T. 1985. *Humanizing Public Organizations: Perspectives on Doing Better-than-Average when Average Ain't at All Bad.* Mountain Airy, MD: Lomond Publications.

29. Goodsell, Ch. T. 2004. *The Case for Bureaucracy: A Public Administration Polemic*. 4th Ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

30. Greed, W.E. D., and Miles, R. E. 1996. Trust in Organizations: A Conceptual Framework Linking Organizational Forms, Managerial Philosophies, and Opportunity Costs of Controls. In *Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research*. (Eds.) Kramer, R.M., Tyler, T.R. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 16-39.

31. Hardin, R. 1998. Trust in Government. In Braithwaite, V. and Levi, M. (Eds.) *Trust and Governance*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 9-27.

32. Hetherington, M. 2005. *Why Trust Matters*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

33. Huxham, Ch., and Vangen, S. 2005. *Managing to Collaborate: The Theory and Practice of Collaborative Advantage.* London: Routledge.

34. Inglehart, R. 1999. Trust, Well-being and Democracy. In Warren, M.E. (Ed.) *Democracy and Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 88-120.

35. Johnson, P. 1993. *Frames of Deficit: A Study of the Loss and Recovery of Public and Private Trust.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

36. Kaplan, S. D. 2008. *Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.

37. Kale, S. H., and McIntyre, R. P. 1991. Distribution Channel Relationships in Diverse Cultures. *International Marketing Review. 8*(3): 31-45.

38. King, D. C. 1997. The Polarization of American Parties and Mistrust of Government. In *Why Americans Don't Trust Government.* Ed. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Philip D. Zelikow, and David King. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

39. King, Ch. S. 2007. Citizens, Citizenship, and Democratic Governance. In *Democracy and Public Administration*. Ed. R.C. Box. NY: M.E. Sharpe.

40. Koppell, J. 2003. *The Politics of Quasi-governments: Hybrid Organizations and the Dynamics of Bureaucratic Control.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

41. Likert, R. 1967. *The Human Organization: Its Management and Value.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

42. Lipsky, M. 1980. *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

43. Mansbridge, J. 1997. Social and Cultural Causes of Dissatisfaction with US Government. In *Why People Don't Trust Government.* Joseph S. Nye, Philip D. Zelikow, and David C. King. (Eds.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

44. McFarland, L. J., Senn, L. E., and Childress, J. R. 1993. *Twenty-first-century Leadership.* NY: Leadership Press.

45. Meier, K. J., and Bohte, J. 2001. Structure and Discretion: Missing Links in Representative Bureaucracy. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 11*(4)*:* 455-470.

46. Meier, K. J., and O'Toole, L. Jr. 2006. Political Control versus Bureaucratic Values: Reframing the Debate. *Public Administration Review. 66*(2): 177-192.

47. Menzel, D. C. Ethics versus Evil: Is It Before or After Midnight in the Garden of Ethics and Evil? *American Review of Public Administration. 31*(3): 340-350.

48. Meyers, M. K. and Nielsen, V.L. 2012. Street-Level Bureaucrats and the Implementation of Public Policy. In *The Sage Handbook of Public Administration.* Peters, B.G. and Pierre, J. (Eds.) London: Sage.

49. Miller, A. H. 1974. Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970. *American Political Science Review. 68*(3): 951-972.

50. Mishler, W., and Rose, R. 2001. What are the Origins of Political Trust?: Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-communist Societies. *Comparative Political Studies. 34* (30): 30-62.

51. Mishra, K. 1996. Organizational Responses to Crisis: The Centrality of Trust. In R. Kramer and T. Tyler (Eds.) *Trust in Organizations.* CA: SAGE.

52. Mitchell, R., Agle, B. and Wood, D. 1997. Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts. *Academy of Management Review.* 22(4): 853-886.

53. *NBER Working Paper Series.* Philippe Aghion, Ph., Algan Y., Cahuc, P. and Shleifer, A. 2009. Regulation and Distrust.

54. Norris, P. 2011. *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited.* Cambridge University Press.

55. Nye, J. S., Zelikow, Ph. D., and Kind, D. C. (Eds.) 1997. *Why People Don't Trust Government.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

56. Orren, G. 1997. Fall From Grace: The Public's Loss of Faith in Government. In *Why People Don't Trust Government.* Ed. Joseph S. Nye, Philip D. Zelikow, and David C. King. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

57. Peters, G. B. 2010. Bureaucracy and Democracy in the Modern State. *Public Administration Review. 70*(4): 642-643.

58. Peters, G. B. 2010. *The Politics of Bureaucracy: An introduction to Comparative Public Administration.* 6th Ed. London and New York: Routledge.

59. Pharr, S., and Putnam, R. (Eds.) 2000. *Disaffected Democracies.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

60. Pierce, W. S. 1981. *Bureaucratic Failure and Public Expenditure.* New York: Academic Press.

61. Prabhakar, R. 2004. Do Public Interest Companies Form a Third Way Within Public Services? *British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 6*(3): 353-369.

62. Riccucci, N. M., and Meyers, M. K. 2004. Linking Passive and Active Representation: The Case of Frontline Workers in Welfare Agencies. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 14*(4): 585-597.

63. Rousseau, D., Sitkin, S.B., Burt, R., and Camerer, C. 1998. Not so Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust. *Academy of Management Review. 23*(3): 393-404.

64. Schachter, H. L. 2012. Introduction: American Civic Participation in the 21st Century. In *The State of Citizen Participation in America*. (Eds.) Schachter, H.L. and Yang, K.. NC: Information Age Publishing.

65. Scholz, J. T., Berardo, R., and Kile, B. 2008. Do Networks Solve Collective Action Problems? Credibility, Search, and Collaboration. *The Journal of Politics. 70*(2): 393-406.

66. Scott, W. R. 1998. Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems. 4th Ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

67. Seligman, A. B. 1997. *The Problem of Trust*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

68. Shakaryan, A. 2007. Civic Trust and Governance in Armenia. *Demokratizatsiya. 15*(2): 261-264, 266-267.

69. Shaw, R. B. 1997. *Trust in the Balance: Building Successful Organizations on Results, Integrity, and Concerns.* CA: Jossey-Bass.

70. Skelcher, Ch. 2005. Public-Private Partnerships and Hybridity. In Ferlie, E., Lynn, L.E., and Pollitt, C. (Eds.) *Oxford Handbook of Public Management*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 347-370.

71. Stensaker, B. and Harvey, L. 2011. Accountability: Understandings and Challenges. In *Accountability in Higher Education: Global Perspectives on Trust and Power.* Stensaker B. and Harvey, L. (Eds). NY: Routledge.

72. Sullivan, H., and Skelcher, Ch. 2002. *Working across Boundaries: Collaboration in Public Services.* Basingstoke: Palgrave.

73. Sztompka, P. 1998. Trust, Distrust and Two Paradoxes of Democracy. *European Journal of Social Theory. 1*(1): 19-32.

74. Thomson, A. M., Perry, J. L., and Miller, T. K. 2007. Conceptualizing and Measuring Collaboration. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 19*(1)*:* 23-56.

75. Trow, M. (1996). On the Accountability of Higher Education in the United States. In P. Maasen and F. van Vught (Eds), *Inside Academia: New Challenges to the Academia Profession* (pp. 227-268), Utrecht, the Netherlands: Cheps/De Tijdstroom.

76. Tschannen-Moran, M., and Hoy, W. 1998. Trust in Schools: A Conceptual and Empirical Analysis. *Journal of Educational Administration. 36*(4): 334-352.

77. Uslaner, E. M. 2002. *The Moral Foundations of Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

78. Vidovich, L. and Slee, R. 2001. Bringing Universities to Account? Exploring Some Global and Local Policy Tensions. *Journal of Educational Policy*. 16(5): 431-453.

79. Vigoda, E. 2002. From Responsiveness to Collaboration: Governance, Citizens, and the Next Generation of Public Administration. *Public Administration Review. 62*(5): 527-540.

80. Vigoda-Gadot, E. 2009. *Building Strong Nations: Improving Governability and Public Management.* Ashgate Publishing Limited.

81. Warren, M. E. 1999. *Democracy and Trust*. (Ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

82. Weber, M. 1954. *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society*. Rhenstein, M. Ed. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.

83. Wilkins, V. M. 2007. Exploring the Causal Story: Gender, Active Representation, and Bureaucratic Priorities. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 17*(1): 77-94.

84. Zand, D. E. 1972. Trust and Managerial Problem Solving. *Administrative Science Quarterly. 17*(2): 229-239.

THE DPRK'S NUCLEAR ISSUE:
VIEWS FROM BEIJING, PYONGYANG AND SEOUL

*Mher Sahakyan**

China-DPRK Economic Relations

China's government, as headed by President Xi Jinping, has deepened China-DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea or North Korea) economic relations. The main aim of China's leadership in domestic Chinese affairs is to improve the economic situation in China's entire regions. One of the new ideologies of China is the Chinese Dream, (中国梦, Zhongguo meng), which aims to create better living conditions for all Chinese citizens. From the perspective of Beijing, it is necessary to develop economic ties between China's northeastern regions and the DPRK for the development of those regions.

The website of Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) lists 172 Chinese firms with direct investments in North Korea in 2013. Among them, 59 are registered in Liaoning, including 4 in Dalian city, and 60 in Jilin. In a March 2012 report, the Open Source Center (OSC) of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) listed 351 foreign firms with direct investments in North Korea; the largest number, 205, came from China, distantly followed by Japan, with 15 firms [1, p. 31].

In 2005 China accounted for more than five hundred thousand tons of cross-border food aid to Pyongyang, and some US $1.5 billion in bilateral trade with North Korea. Despite Chinese opposition to the nuclear tests, those numbers increased after the first nuclear test in 2006; by 2008 China's trade with North Korea was some US $2.8 billion (73% of Pyongyang's total trade for that year). While numbers dipped a bit in 2009 because of UN sanctions following North Korea's second nuclear test in 2009, Sino-North Korean trade increased to US $3.5 billion in 2010 and has only risen since [2].

*PhD Candidate, School of International Relations, Nanjing University, China.

The trade between DPRK and China grew at an annual average rate of 18.2 percent from US $488 million dollars to US $5.93 billion-between 2000 and 2012. Even in 2013 when relations cooled due to DPRK's third nuclear test, bilateral trade increased by 10 percent compared to the previous year to reach US $6.5 billion [9, p. 31].

In terms of types of goods traded, major items exported to China from North Korea include primary products (natural resources and agricultural/marine products), such as coal, iron ore, cement, and fish. Major items that North Korea imports from China include petroleum, capital goods such as machinery and electrical devices, grains, and meat [3].

By developing China-DPRK economic cooperation, Beijing develops its regions neighboring to the DPRK; simultaneously it plays an important role on maintaining economic stability in the DPRK. Consequently, China is North Korea's number-one source of both aid and trade.

What do Chinese People Think about the DPRK?

Contributions of the Chinese researchers show that the opinions of China's researchers are divided on this issue. One segment of Chinese researchers believes that the DPRK is not China's friend and that its behavior and nuclear arsenal is a threat to Chinese security.

As Ex-deputy editor of Study Times, the journal of the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China Deng Yuwen wrote, "North Korea's third nuclear test is a good moment for China to re-evaluate its longstanding alliance with the Kim dynasty. For several reasons, Beijing should give up on Pyongyang and press for the re-unification of the Korean peninsula… Bringing about the peninsula's unification would help undermine the strategic alliance between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul; ease the geopolitical pressure on China from northeast Asia; and be helpful to the resolution of the Taiwan question."[1] In turn, Chinese scholar Dong Xiangrong mentioned, "For a time, the Sino-North Korean alliance lacked a centripetal force. From China's perspective, although the government shows restraint in voicing such thoughts, there are still some voices in China calling for the end of the military alliance relationship with North Korea. The main arguments are as follows: first, China

[1] Deng Yuwen, "China should Abandon North Korea," *Financial Times*, 27 February 2013.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9e2f68b2-7c5c-11e2-99f0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3GGyjwV7j

might be dragged into a new war because of North Korea's provocations through its nuclear and war brinkmanship, which may disturb the peaceful development; 7 second, a 'war backyard' means less in today's military conflicts; third, foreign aid to North Korea has become an economic burden and China gets no appreciation from the latter; last, China's image is hurt by its 'axis of evil' ally" [4, p. 245].

The second segment of Chinese researchers believes that the DPRK is a buffer between China and Japan and between Chinese and US troops that are based in Japan and the ROK (Republic of Korea or South Korea) and that China must help the DPRK for this reason.

The Chinese scholar Shi Yinhong believes, "China would like to maintain the DPRK as a 'strategic buffer zone,' or at least it would prefer not to have a hostile and troublesome DPRK on its border China must not allow the denuclearization process and its own role in this process to seriously damage China-DPRK relations, which would make China a loser in a major geopolitical game-even if the DPRK were by some 'miracle' really denuclearized. To Beijing, the best solution to the North Korean nuclear problem is peaceful denuclearization, in such a way as to avoid losing its relationship with the DPRK or creating a highly unstable or even chaotic situation in its neighbor across the Yalu River" [5].

In turn, the second segment of Chinese researchers can be further divided into two groups. The first group believes that China should help the people of the DPRK because of the longstanding Sino-Korean relationship, but representatives of this group like to add that the Chinese do not like the Kim dynasty. The second group of this segment of Chinese researchers believes that the DPRK is China's strategic partner, as evidenced by the Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of 1961, and that China must continue to help the DPRK maintain its political system.

The Chinese scholars Fang Xiu-yu and Xin Hua believe, "The relations between China and the Korean Peninsula can be summarized into a single Chinese proverb: interdependence as close as the relationship between mouth and teeth. For China, the Korean Peninsula is a highly valuable geopolitical asset that directly influences or even shapes China's national security… The metropolitan area of Beijing and Tianjin, the Chinese core of politics and economy, is only separated from the Korean Peninsula by the narrow water stretch of the Yellow Sea and the Bohai Sea.

Therefore, China is very susceptible to any minor change or adjustment of the situation on the Korean Peninsula" [6].

<div align="right">Table 1</div>

China's Voting Record on United Nations Security Council
Resolutions Relating to DPRK

Affirmative	Abstain	Against
1695 (2006)		
1718 (2006)		
1874 (2009)		
1928 (2010)		
1985 (2011)		
2087 (2013)		
2094 (2013)		
Total 7	0	0

The View from Pyongyang

What does the DPRK really want? Is there any need to further complicate the situation? What does the DPRK want to prove? It appears that Pyongyang finally decided to build its nuclear weapons after the Gulf War to deter the US from possible military action against it. Would the US have struck Iraq if Saddam had deployed his nuclear arsenal, or would Russia have organized a referendum in the Crimea if Ukraine had kept its nuclear warheads after the collapse of the Soviet Union?

It appears, Pyongyang has the same view as General Sundarji of the Indian Army. He similarly argued that "One principal lesson of the Gulf War is that, if a state intends to fight the United States, it should avoid doing so until and unless it possesses nuclear weapons" [7].

Soon after the NATO launched the air attack on Libya, North Korea announced that the Libyan crisis is teaching the international community a grave lesson. The Western coaxed Libya into demilitarization by the plausibility of "guaranteeing security" and "improving relationship", and then used the weapon to eliminate the regime. North Korea's "Songun" ideology of a powerful military was "proper in a thousand ways" and the only guarantor of peace on the Korean Peninsula [8].

The second reason for the DPRK's decision to build a nuclear arsenal may be the following argument of Dong Xiangrong: "From North Korea's perspective, is that North Korea views China's assurance of security protection grows increasingly uncertain. To North Korea, China is no longer trustworthy. North Korea worries that China may subjectively be unwilling, or objectively incapable, to maintain its treaty obligations to defend North Korea" [4, p. 247].

The DPRK's calculations are clear. It wants to maintain its political regime by the help of nuclear deterrence. The other question is whether nuclear weapons are the best choice for deterrence? The results of its nuclear tests are sanctions, which may destroy the DPRK's economy; in this case, a nuclear arsenal cannot help, just as it failed to help the Soviet Union. Some analysts believe that Kim Jong Un excluded and then executed the second-highest ranking political figure in the DPRK, Jang Song Theak, because he had opposed the launch of the long-range rocket and the third nuclear test.

Perhaps Jang Song Theak thought that because of the nuclear test, the UNSC would adopt new sanctions, and China would stop helping the DPRK with its economic hardship. As a result, the DPRK's economy would crash, which would be a real threat to the regime.

Korean scholar Dong Wook Won mentioned, "After the Jang's execution there were two main viewpoints in Chinese media. The pessimistic view was that Jang was a Pro China figure in the DPRK, and his purge was a result of a decision by the DPRK's leadership to eliminate 'the China factor' in DPRK, so Jang's execution would adversely affect the future of the bilateral relationship. Optimistic view was that the DPRK-China relationship is an intimate one that can be described as that between 'the lips and the teeth', and if the DPRK cannot be protected by China-its only benefactor – then the regime would collapse upon American intervention. On the day after Jang was arrested, the agreement on the construction of the highway and railroad linking Sinuiju, Pyongyang and Kaesong was concluded, and the DPRK have sent signals to their Chinese counterparts that their bilateral economic cooperation will continue" [9, p. 35].

The Chinese scholar Dong Xiangrong has an interesting opinion regarding China's relations with the DPRK and ROK, and their attitude on China's behavior. He mentioned, "The dilemma of China's peninsular diplomacy was mainly caused

by the ambiguity of its foreign strategy. Ally or not, partner or not, any move by China angers one of the two parties on the Peninsula" [4, p. 244-245].

Generally, I believe that the DPRK's byungjin line, which aims at the simultaneous development of nuclear weapons and its economy, is impossible because the UNSC sanctions de facto blocked the DPRK's opportunity to develop economic and trade ties with other countries. The best choice for the DPRK is to implement China's style of economic reforms and destroy its nuclear arsenal. This roadmap would provide an opportunity for the DPRK to improve its economy and return to the international community.

What Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev told Kennedy at the height of the Cuban missile crisis could also prove relevant to the DPRK-US confrontation: "Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the end of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter the knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it. And then it will be necessary to cut that knot." [10].

The View from Seoul

It appears that China and the ROK have the same goals in the Korean Peninsula: to maintain stability and to control the DPRK's aggressive and unpredictable behavior, which can quickly escalate tensions in the Peninsula.

According to American scholar Graham Allison, "South Korea preferred a non-nuclear North Korea, but not at the price of threatening war on the peninsula. South Korea was also fearful that rapid collapse of the North Korean regime would create unacceptable financial burdens for South Korean." [14].

The Obama administration has maintained the "strategic patience" approach to deal with the issue of North Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMD) [17]. As ROK scholar Edward Kwon mentioned, "The strategic patience approach is a 'passive aggressive' mixture consisting of both engagement and pressure [17, p. 492]."

In describing US policy regarding the DPRK nuclear issue, ROK scholar Tae-Ho Kang mentioned, "Washington's policies toward DPRK had failed, because this failing grade applies equally to the 'strategic patience' approach adopted by Obama during his first term. North Korea beefed up its nuclear capabilities more in those years than

during any other period. Even so, the administration has yet to change policy approaches in its second term. On the eve of that second term, North Korea announced the prospect of 'all-out Armageddon', conducting a nuclear test and announcing a state of war on the Korean Peninsula. Washington evaporated, leaving only UN sanctions and the prospect of military reprisals. The North Korean nuclear issue became more serious ever, and at the same time was completely forgotten" [18, pp. 58-59].

It is worth mentioning that South Korea and the US signed a new joint military strategy, "Tailored Deterrence Strategy against North Korean Nuclear and other WMD Threats," on October 2, 2013. The strategy proposes a strategic framework for how the US and South Korea are to manage the North Korean nuclear threat and WMD during an armistice and in wartime. US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel reaffirmed the United States' firm commitment to use the nuclear umbrella, conventional strikes, and missile defense to fend off North Korean nuclear threats to South Korea [17, p. 497]. In this regard American scholar Donald Fuller mentioned, "The US will defend Japan and South Korea. While DPRK could cause a war by accident, no one wants refugees to come streaming into South Korea or China. Certainly China would not welcome such an egress in its direction. Unless the Great Leader is crazy, DPRK would be a hole in the ground, were it to start something. It would be desirable, however that the trajectory of their missiles was more accurate. The direction of their missiles can detour into Japanese waters or, conceivably, even onto the Japanese mainland" [15].

A segment of ROK society believes that nuclear weapons would repair the status quo with the DPRK.

As Edvard Kwon stated, "Although the United States has confirmed its strong commitment to defend South Korea with its extended deterrence and nuclear umbrella commitment, Seoul should do more to withstand any threat of nuclear attack from the North. Many South Koreans are skeptical of the effectiveness of US extended deterrence. Their most serious concern is whether the United States would defend South Korea unless the US mainland was targeted by North Korean nuclear ICBMs. In response, some conservative South Korean politicians argue that Seoul should develop its own nuclear weapons. However, the United States and other regional powers would not accept such a drastic option" [17, p. 488].

Because of the nuclear arms race, which was begun by Pyongyang in the Far East, the main vulnerable country is the ROK. The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) remains the main economic bridge for the divided Korean Peninsula. Regarding inter-Korean relations, it is important to mention citizen contact, as well the framework of the family reunion policy. After the UNSC sanctions, it was difficult to develop inter-Korean economic relations, but the main problem underlying this issue is that the ROK has established a clear prerequisite that further development of inter-Korean relations can occur only if there are solutions regarding the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Following a temporary suspension of operations in the KIC in 2013 inter-Korean trade fell by 42 percent compared to the previous year to US $1.15 billion, about one-sixth the amount of North Korea-China trade [9, pp. 31-32].

ROK position on the DPRK's nuclear issue well summarized by ROK scholars John Kun Choi and Jong-Yun Bae, "Broad consensus exists in South Korea on three indisputable matters of the nation's interests regarding its policies toward Pyongyang: intolerance of an operational North Korean nuclear capability, the desirability of resolving the nuclear issue in a peaceful and diplomatic manner, and maintaining a proactive stance in dealing with crisis [19, p. 61].

Conclusion

The following question arises: Why did China vote affirmatively for the UNSC sanctions against a so-called ally, the DPRK, while continuing to strengthen economic ties with the country, as the DPRK instigated a nuclear arms race in the Far East?

In the UNSC, China voted affirmatively for the economic and military sanctions that were imposed against the DPRK. It proved once again that the main role of a responsible power is to maintain stability and peace, halting the proliferation of WMDs, even if doing so is against the interests of its ally. China is disappointed because Seoul and Tokyo can follow Pyongyang's suit and create their own nuclear arsenals. These possible developments would change the balance of power in the Far East. It appears that China is quite disappointed by the fact that nuclear weapon technologies are being disseminated into neighboring states, because this fact can stand as a reason for a possible nuclear arms race in Far East.

During the Korean War (1950-1953), China was also keen about keeping the US troops far from its eastern borders. It seemed that China must be interested in changing the DPRK's regime, but Beijing could not allow an unstable situation in the DPRK, which would cause thousands of refugees to flee from the DPRK to China. Thus, China has invested interest in the DPRK's stability. For this reason, China continues to help the DPRK to develop its economy, and China-DPRK economic cooperation continues to grow [21].

China invests in the DPRK's economy to maintain stability. From Beijing's perspective, if China does not continue to help the DPRK, the US may attempt to fill the vacuum, and the DPRK would move to the US camp or unite with the ROK. I believe that China voted affirmatively for heavy UNSC sanctions against the DPRK, before China could calculate future developments and find new ways to improve China-DPRK economic relations. The result of these calculations gave an opportunity to China, with the help of the UNSC-imposed sanctions, to eliminate other players in the DPRK's economy, to take control of the DPRK market (24 million people), to obtain permission from DPRK officials to operate the DPRK's rich mines, and to use the DPRK's cheap labor force. In return, the DPRK can receive Chinese investments and maintain stability. It is important to note that in China-DPRK relations; communism is no longer the main unifying factor.

It is worth mentioning, that China maintains good relations with the DPRK and the ROK; thus, China has served as a mediator between the two sides, strengthening its role as a responsible and important player in modern international relations.

The ROK, on the one hand wants to maintain stable situation in the Korean Peninsula by cooperating with China and for this goal it uses economic tools, but on the other hand it gives the green light to the US to maintain troops in ROK territory, as its leaders see the US as its protector in the event of a DPRK attack.

ROK society appears to have begun discussions about the possibility of its own nuclear arsenal. These discussions must stand as a signal to the UNSC that it must attempt to find new ways to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

August 2016

References

1. *Mathieu Duchâtel and Phillip Shell*, China's Policy on North Korea, Economic Engagement and Nuclear Disarmament, SIPRI, Policy Paper 40, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2013.

2. *Gregory J. Moore*, "Beijing's Problem with an Operationally Nuclear North Korea," in North Korean Nuclear Operationality: Regional Security and Nonproliferation, Edited by Gregory J. Moore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013, pp. 77-103.

3. *Kim Jin Moo*, "North Korea's Reliance on China and China's Influence on North Korea," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 23, #2, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, June 2011, pp. 257–271.

4. *Dong Xiangrong*, "China's Dilemma on the Korean Peninsula," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 25, # 2, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, June 2013, pp. 243-255.

5. *Shi Yinhong*, "China and the North Korean Nuclear Issue: Competing Interests and Persistent Policy Dilemmas," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 21, #1, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, March 2009, pp. 33-47.

6. *Fang Xiu-yu and Xin Hua*, "China-U.S. Relations and the Security of the Korean Peninsula," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 25, #3, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2013, pp. 351–367.

7. *John Baylis,* "From Arms Control to Counterproliferation," in Strategy in the Contemporary World, Edited by John Baylis et al, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 220-229.

8. *Teng Jianqun*, "A Brief Assessment of Global Nuclear Posture in 2011," in Global Nuclear Posture Review: 2011/2012, Beijing, China Institute of International Studies, Current Affairs Press, 2012, pp. 27-48.

9. *Dong Wook Won*, "Will the Jang Execution Affect Beijing's Economic Ties with Pyongyang?" in Dark and Mysterious: How Kim Jong Un is Reforming North Korea, Global Asia, Volume 9, #1, Spring 2014, pp. 30-37.

10. *Robert Jervis,* "Getting to Yes with Iran," in Iran and Bomb 2: A New Hope, Edited by Gideon Rose, Foreign Affairs, The Council on Foreign Relations, 14 January 2014, pp. 42-54.

11. *Bonnie Glaser and David Szerlip*, "US Allies Respond Japanese, Australian, and South Korean Reactions to China's Military Modernisation," in The Modernisation of the People's Liberation Army and its Repercussions, China Perspective, #2011/4, pp. 17-29.

12. *Chung Eun-sook*, "Long-Stalled Six-Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program: Positions of Countries Involved," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 25, #1, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, March 2013, pp. 1-15.

13. *Liu Junbo*, "DPRK Nuclear Issue: Retrospect and Prospect," in Global Nuclear Posture Review: 2012/2013, Beijing, China Institute of International Studies, Current Affairs Press, 2013, pp. 175-202.

14. *Graham Allison*, "North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Bush Administration Failure; China's Opportunity," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 18, #3, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, Fall 2006, pp. 7-34.

15. Interview with Donald Fuller, Provost of the American University of Armenia, 29 June 2015.

16. *Shi Yinhong*, "New Games in Tightly Fixed Structures: North Korea's Volatile Desperation and China's Cornered Strategy," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 23, #3, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2011, pp. 353–368.

17. *Edward Kwon,* "The U.S.-ROK Alliance in Coping with North Korea's Nuclear Threat," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 26, #4, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, December 2014, pp. 487–503.

18. *Tae-Ho Kang*, "North Korea Inches toward Negotiations on Its Nuclear Ambitions," in Dark and Mysterious: How Kim Jong Un is Reforming North Korea, Global Asia, Volume 9, # 1, Spring 2014, pp. 58-67.

19. *John Kun Choi and Jong-Yun Bae*, "The Implications for Seoul of an Operationally Nuclear North Korea," Edited by Gregory J. Moore, North Korean Nuclear Operationality, Jothn Hopkins University Press, 2013, pp. 53-76.

20. *Zheng Jiyong*, "The 'Conflict-Reconciliation' Cycle on the Korean Peninsula: A Chinese Perspective," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume 24, #1, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, March 2012, pp. 123–139.

21. *Մհեր Սահակյան*, «Ատոմային ռումբը վերադառնում է, կամ կորեական թնջուկ», Գլոբուս #4 (49), 2014, էջ 16-20:
http://www.noravank.am/arm/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=12707

22. *Մհեր Սահակյան*, «Չինաստան-ԿԺԴՀ տնտեսական հարաբերությունները ՄԱԿ ԱԽ պատժամիջոցների համատեքստում», Գլոբուս #11-12, 2014, էջ 38-44:
http://noravank.am/arm/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=13069&sphrase_id=51119

MODERN MIGRATIONS:
NEW TERRITORIES, NEW BORDERS

*Aram Vartikyan**

Movement from one settlement to another has followed the humankind throughout the whole history. Among the conceptions that address formation, development and fall of civilizations there are specific ones that choose migration as a descriptive element. Probably, there is no single historical period, civilization, state that has not dealt with migration. In this respect, the 20th century is notable, with migration flows taking place since its very beginning period.

Violent displacements, trade, economic, labor, environmental and other migration flows have uniquely formed the vivid process of state and regional developments, as well as the social, economic, political, and most importantly, cultural reproduction characteristics of the former. Migration cycles with their intensity, qualitative and quantitative characteristics have reached their culmination by the last quarter of 20th century and at the beginning of 21st century [29]. Quantitative raise of migration flows, tremendous increase of qualitative diversity, deepening of undeniable and irrevocable influences were caused by fundamental social-historical, geopolitical forces, global, regional developments, changes and processes. Consequently, the raise of global and local uncertainty, asymmetric economic and political activities and processes of separate regions, polarized developments undesirable for the countries, fall of political systems and their remarkable change, extensive forms of financial and economic capital reproduction and accumulation, new division of labor and other resources contributed to the formation of the above described pattern [7]. Changes and developments were no more limited and localized. These being present in a new, strongly interconnected global world have their escalating, often negative, unintended effects on the societies and states that are located

---

* Assistant Professor, Department of Applied Sociology, Faculty of Sociology, Yerevan State University, Director of Migration Competence Center, Faculty of Sociology, Yerevan State University (mcc@ysu.am).

in the far corners of the world. In this complex situation modern migration gains its primary importance and significance. As result of global and local social, geopolitical, economic changes and complex processes often being alienated from forming prerequisites, fundamental and secondary factors it becomes a basis for enormous number of socio-economic, cultural and political processes, metamorphoses that cause dangerous and intense uncertainty and tension within social life. It is hard to imagine any state and society, a social group that has not felt the positive or negative impact of migration on itself. Political life of the states and everyday life of individual citizens, ordinary people is deeply flavored with global processes, in particular with the migration seemingly having no direct connection with them. This interdependence, along with migration has led to the formation of global social crater, a member of which is even the population in remote corners of the world. Already formed complex global system is continually expanding, bringing to the growing manifestations of its own and separate features and indicators. In this case, certainly, we may argue that the global migration will increasingly expand both in size and quality encompassing new regions, new social forms and new challenges into its circle. The newly independent Republic of Armenia did not remain apart from diverse processes that engulfed the end of 20th century, unfortunately having mostly negative effects on Armenia. The fall of the Soviet Union, the transition from one quality of economic relations to another, change in the political system that has been formed through decades, the 1988 devastating earthquake, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, economic and energy crisis created unbearable conditions for a newly established state to have a healthy social life [32; էջեր 62-74]. This most difficult situation in Armenia's modern history was manifested in unprecedented migration flows and circulations. Since the last years of Soviet Union and till today the Armenian society has witnessed almost all forms of migration types described in current scientific literature [13].

Indeed, in the last quarter of the 20th century and especially today many social scientists pay attention to the fact that the world is interconnected more than ever [30, 31] . First of all intertwining of information flows is evident. The unprecedented development of information and communication technologies led to a situation that one can hardly imagine a corner where the Western information industry outputs are not present, and what is the most important, something contrasting occurs either [20].

Mass media, social networks etc. each moment deliver political, economic, social, cultural information not only about the West, but also about the states, societies whose existence and geographical location were previously in best cases disclosed only to the professionals [12]. New regimes of global capital growth, new delocalized forms of business bring to the fact that it is almost unreal to have and continue reproducing self-sustained, localized economy without feeling the processes and often tragic effects of changes occurring in distant countries, regions, and integrated economic zones [14]. Political decisions, regional and at a first glance local political processes have sometimes direct impacts on the remote corners of global society. Modern sovereign states and their individual citizens have happened to be in complexly interconnected enormous melting crater of political, social and economic processes in the focus of the crash between global and local reciprocal instability.

Political, economic and social interdependence between regions and states has gained the name of transnationalism [24]. Since in 1960s, mostly in 70s the term was used to describe the features of formation, functioning, development of new economic subjects that represent more than one sovereign state. The discussion is about the so-called transnational corporations that embody the progress that is more flexible and presupposes mostly horizontal ties. Later on the term "transnational" has indicated the weakening of national borders, political institutions and ideas that are linked to them and are present in various spaces [30]. Currently based on the whole diversity of the terms transnationalism it can be concluded that the discussion is probably about the weakening of the meaning of the national borders, which stemmed from the reformation of the global capital accumulation system [25, pp. 49].

In such conditions, the most unique result of transnationalism that has emerged is transnational migration. According to the many supporters of the mentioned idea modern migration with its whole diversity cannot be imagined without taking into account its impact and role in both host and home societies, for the two sides of the separating geographical border [27, pp. 196-204]. Social, economic, political, cultural ties that link the migrant with the host society and the non-migrant in home society have so deepened, spread, intervened the separate social actors' activities that they have drastically changed the daily life of the individuals, family and community reproduction, traditions, expectations and different attitudes and dispositions. [25, pp 49]: Comparably important and powerful actors, i.e. social, political, economic institu-

tions, and states are not completely isolated from these changes. Meanwhile, the critics of the idea question the novelty of transnational migration and some of its features insisting that they have been related to the previous migration flow types and social developments. They contend that migration and the changes resulted from the transnationalism are not widely spread and refer to a small number of population and will be stopped after one or two generations because the migrants will either assimilate becoming integral elements of the host society or will return to homeland. Finally, a serious criticism is related to the "transnational", "transnationalism", "transnational migration" and other similar terms that are often being put in line with the already existent ones, seem to be related to everything, and hence, gaining lower interpretative and analytical meaning [23].

Certainly, the criticism may not be causeless. There are many studies that disclose a variety of aspects of transnational migration, uncover solid samples of relationships and relations of migrants in host and home countries [10, pp. 5328-5335], [22, pp. 547-565], but the question of the dissemination of transnational migration remains unanswered.

Transnational migration practices have a very short history. There is a lack of periodic structured research that would disclose particularly its continuation beyond the generation. And also, are the features of transnationalism and especially transnational migration homogenous in quality or there is a principle heterogeneity of its content depending on the country [27, pp. 196-204]?

At the same time, modern social scientists undoubtedly witness unprecedented changes and processes in the social life, where the increasing transparency of previous and surely more closed borders and the formation of, in a sense, new, inconceivable borders is becoming more evident. Definitely, one needs to be naively brave or incredibly cynical to claim that previous social relationships are rapidly and unequivocally replaced by new ones, a contemporary human being lives in an entirely transnational era [21] and that the traditional mechanisms of the formation and functioning of nation states are rarely encountered and the borders are open for any relationships. On the contrary, we witness an amazing paradox when developments at different levels indicate new borders, absence of any borders, or transformation of borders, while separate states make their border policy stricter for neighbors and immigrants [5]. Under these conditions much more sophisticated re-

search tools and serious attention are necessary to reveal the reality. Thus A. Appadurai states in globalization era social groups are no more territorially predetermined, but are rather unrestricted and highly heterogeneous [1]. Clear-cut territorial borders – traditionally a crucial component of the group and community identity formation – are not of primary importance any more. The modern human being seems to prefer more flexible and mobile components of his/her identity, which could easily be transferred geographically. Over time, these trans-border social networks become so independent and well-formed that they transform into self-reproducing transnational social fields or areas, combining both sending and receiving societies into a single unit. Hence, the economic activity of the included social actors, their political, social, cultural life is mainly formed proceeding from the principles of the transnational territoriality, which interprets the concept of the state in an entirely new way [27, pp. 196-204]

The transnational migrant is one of the actors mentioned, whose daily routine, and short- and long-term future is predetermined by numerous trans-border connections and whose identity is formed under the social and cultural umbrella of more than one territory [18]. Therefore, the members of the social transnational field include and reproduce the social expectations, cultural values and norms, human relations types which are formed as a result of the combination of more than one social, political and economic systems [27, pp 196-204].

But it is not only the trans-migrant who is involved in the transnational social territory and reproduces the appropriate social practice. Obviously the family members of the migrant who stayed in their country and whose life activities are connected and conditioned by the migratory activities of their relative also become part of the transnational social territory. The same is true for the people living abroad who have not visited their homeland for a long time, but somehow are in close periodic touch and continue the interaction. In fact, mobility is not a necessary condition for the transnational migration.

The variety of the transnational migration activities and its diverse manifestations led some researchers to provide the classification of the phenomenon along a number of criteria. So, L. E. Guarnizo differentiates the Core Transnationalism, which is an indispensable part of an individual's common life, proceeds at certain periodicity. At the same time he puts forward the idea of Expanded Transnationalism,

wherein the migrant is not periodically and consistently involved, but rather acts arbitrarily, coincidentally [17]. The other dimension of the transnational migration activities is the scale. Case in point, some people can be involved in the transnational religious activities without any participation in the economic or political activities, while others are involved in all types of trans-border activities. The first is the case of Selective and the second of Comprehensive transnational activity [27, pp. 196-204].

Generally, the definitions of transnationalism and some of its manifestations, main indicators and differences from other trans-border activities are a subject of interest for many social scientists. So, Peter Evans aims at clarifying the differences between International, multinational and transnational by examining their manifestations in the political, economic and social-cultural areas [6, pp. 187].

	Political	Economic	Sociocultural
International	Embassies and organization of diplomatic missions abroad by national governments	Export drives by farming, ranch, and fishing organizations from a particular country.	Travel and exchange programs organized by universities based on a specific country.
Multinational	United Nations and other international agencies charged with monitoring and improving specialized areas of global life.	Production and marketing activities of global corporations with profits dependent on multiple national markets	Schools and missions sponsored by the Catholic Church and other global religions in multiple countries.
Transnational	a) Non-governmental associations established to monitor human rights globally	a) Boycotts organized by grassroots activists in First World countries to compel multinationals to improve their Third World labor practices	a) Grassroots charities promoting the protection and care of children in poorer nations.
	b) Hometown civic associations established by immigrants to improve their sending communities.	b) Enterprises established by immigrants to export/import goods to and from their home countries.	b) Election of beauty queens and selection of performing groups in immigrant communities to take part in annual hometown festivals.

At the same time disputable is the difference between the transnationalism and globalization and transnational migration. The transnational practice proper and the activities which are the result of modern migration are to be differentiated with a high degree of probability from those which are the result of other global processes [27, pp 196-204]. The problem is that some scholars consider transnationalism – a mutual relationship of people and institutions in cultural, economic, political or many other contexts (entrepreneurship, industry, financial investment, cultural exchange, etc.) [26] – not as a result of modern migration network, but as a direct and indirect result of late capitalism. The transnational migration itself is viewed as a result of the new accumulation ways of goods and flexible modernization typical of late or developed capitalism. It is the result of one of the most deep-rooted phenomena of modern times, namely deterritorialization. The latter, without even presupposing factual mobility of people, changes and transforms the identity of people and groups [4]. Thus, transnationalism reduces and pushes back the role of geography and bordered territories in the formation of collective identity and creates trans-border membership and opportunities for simultaneous social involvement [2]. In its turn, globalization refers to inter-regional and even inter-continental transnational economic, political, social activities and continually strengthens the interaction and interconnection between countries and societies [9]. On a large scale, global processes are not connected with national, state territories, while transnational activities occur in case of more than one, clearly separate countries where the state is not necessarily a transnational actor, but it certainly dominates the activity of others [27, pp 196-204]. A question emerges what lies behind the transnational activities, particularly the progress and continual existence of migration and what is its influence on the receiving and sending societies and countries. According to a number of scholars it was the unprecedented technological advance that contributed to the formation and subsequent gradually deepening functioning of transnational migration network. Available means of communication, quick and cheap transport and particularly the internet were very important for such developments, enabling the current trans-migrant to reproduce its membership and belonging to two state systems. Here there is a danger of vulgar technological determinism, according to which only the emergence and spread of technological means, transport and communication technologies itself leads to a qualitatively

new social phenomenon which in its turn comes to transform the whole familiar world and all the social systems. Numerous authors put such simplifications into question, stating that this technological boom is a regular result of deeper economic social, political processes [12]. The newest modes of global capital accumulation, and the changes of processes preconditioned by the latter, makes migrants to live in the centers of global capitalism reproduction, but in line with the transnational life rules. And this leads to the deterritorialization of the economic and social conditions of the receiving and sending societies. However, strange is the still-existent and even more deepening discriminative attitude and profound, inner borders towards the migrants [25, pp. 50].

Today the cultural and social diversity of a number of central and important cities for the modern capitalistic reproduction is especially conspicuous. In the streets of Western megalopolis one can encounter cultural forms, social practices, relations, material and spiritual products, completely non-typical of the West several decades ago, although the migration itself is not a new phenomenon and there have been quite numerous migration inflows before. It seems that newcomers should be free from any integrative controversies, discrimination and social segregation in these conditions of diversity when the picture formed calls forth the freedom and transparency of both internal and external borders. Unfortunately, the opposite paradox is present today. The intensive increase of migratory flows and the diversity of migrants in the traditional and newly formed receiving societies and, at the first sight, the global interdependence of countries are accompanied by the gradual fortification of external borders and inner predicaments. The impossibility of painless assimilation and integration, marginalization of numerous migrant groups, social exclusion and the further stagnation of mobility result in various, and often ferocious conflicts. The vulnerability of immigrants is currently defined by a special term known as the Ulysses syndrome [3]. Without mastering the formal mechanisms for the improvement of the situation, immigrants form unique vital strategies where the transnational social practices and networks are of primary importance. Seemingly arbitrary and chaotic immigration acts, when reaching a certain "critical mass" establish ground for the further self-reproducing non-formal, trans-border network, through which new compatriots are attracted to the receiving society. At times the social networks construct logical junctions in the receiving

states in the form of new transnational communities [8, pp. 583-599]. The local activity of the communities, links with the homeland, stable relationship of certain migrants with the relatives in the country of origin come to form a system of mutual help, which in many cases reduces the shock of newcomers and the tragic process of the arising problems. On the other hand, the transnational membership and practice formed, new communal activities and links with the country of origin may lead to the decrease of integration potential in the receiving society, casting doubt on the assimilation approaches and formal policies. The traditional approach, according to which to become a full-fledged member of the receiving society, one has to re-socialize, accept and assimilate and later to reproduce the values and norms of the receiving society, its behavioral forms, which in the western societies are based on the class, state-national ideology and loyalty principles [19]. Thousands of immigrants for years live and conduct activities being an integral part of transnational social community and territory, of the far country of origin.

The mechanisms of the transnational territory reproduction and continual proliferation are present in the sending society as well. A number of researchers noted that emigration, having once started, tends to continue even though the initial reasons for it have been reduced or are even absent. The phenomenon referred to as *cumulative causation, migrant syndrome* and so on, indicates that the initial migration act leads to such a change in the social-economic context that the further migration acts become more preferred and reasonable [11, pp. 1492-1533], [15, pp. 56-66]. The transnational territory being formed and trans-border social network evidently assists the process. Due to the remittance from abroad the families of migrants find themselves in more beneficial conditions, other things being equal. The working social network consisting mainly of friends and relatives, which provides the predictability of emigration and reduces the risks, contributes to this process. The transnational migration practice provides the accumulation and consumption diversification of risks, expenses and resources.

The complicated situation formed requires a fresh interpretation and reformulation of the concept of diaspora. Within the framework of social discourse the diaspora is represented as a group of marginalized people who lost their country of origin as a result of violence and those who anticipate homecoming, at least at the initial stage of the diaspora formation [16, pp. 3-36]: The Armenian so-called tradi-

tional diaspora communities, which were formed mainly after the 1915 Genocide, were always singled out by unity and solidarity, having as their ultimate goal the preservation of the Armenian outside Armenia [34]. Having passed through assimilation processes for the whole 20th century, the latter exhibited a high degree of integration potential. The representatives of diaspora occupied a number of significant social-economic and cultural niches and high social positions in many countries. Gradual membership in the receiving societies, with a definite preservation of the Armenian identity, has weakened ties with the motherland, namely the Republic of Armenia, which was the country of origin only for a small fraction of the diaspora Armenians. This resulted in the preservation of mere symbolic emotional ties, the functioning of which manifested itself only from occasion to occasion, especially at tragic times for the Armenian people. The Soviet Iron Curtain also had a role to play in this kind of ties manifestation. Under such conditions the feeling of belonging and membership was ambiguous: a. member of the Armenian diaspora, b. citizen of the receiving country and a full-fledged member of the society [33]. The new transnational communities, formed after post-Soviet era, were already different both geographically and in essence. Firstly, preservation of the Armenian outside Armenia was not the primary point on the agenda. The life responsibility was much narrower, since the community could be an assisting link when conducting certain economic activities. Apart from it, evident are the stable, periodic ties with the country of origin including almost all the spheres of the social life, which leads to the double belonging and membership, where the country of origin is the primary link. In this way the formula of "simultaneously here and there", as well as "neither here, nor there" emerges. Thus, the modern Armenian diaspora is a group of Armenians, residing abroad, comprising both traditional communities and transnational communities, actively or passively reproducing the ties with the country of origin. The problem of ambiguous belonging, present also in current Armenia, becomes evident when examining a number of transnational practices. When the receiving society, upon realizing the realistic or concocted perils to the social progress or stable cultural reproduction, restricts the national and political border policy, numerous sending countries, including the Republic of Armenia, switch to a new regime of power, state and social relations. The transnational and trans-border ties acquire obvious and major importance in the given situation.

The transnational economic activities are not constrained to individual remittances to families. The state and communal investments reach high volumes. Many successful emigrants begin reconstructing communal rural substructures, building schools, kindergartens, churches and so on. This is indicative of an intensive feeling of belonging and loyalty to the community, village, and the former place of residence. The concept mentioned is also confirmed by the obvious visualization of investments necessary for increasing or reproducing the social status in the country of origin. Definitely it could be claimed that the transnational economic activity and the continual monetary inflows free the administrative bodies from responsibility, nonetheless the new model state and nation formation is evident. The transnational political activities come to corroborate this. Many sending countries see the need for goal-oriented participation of a vast number of emigrants in their internal and external political processes. In the case of Armenia the problem is particularly important in that the number of Armenians residing abroad outnumbers those living in Armenia, and this resource needs utilization. Providing to the Armenians residing abroad the right for vote and political will expression, the political elite consolidates the democratic essence of the country [27, pp 196-204]. Besides, the electorate in this case may provide a significant help for this or that political power or party. The question of political belonging and legitimate rights arises here. To what extent the compatriot living abroad can be responsible for the processes occurring in the country of origin, be well-aware of them and make an unbiased decision and express his will freely? Certainly the contemporary means of communication and the Internet provide a partial solution to the problem. A more comprehensive solution is the dual citizenship practiced in Armenia [28]. And it is here that the problem of national belonging and its application moves to the forefront in the contemporary global society.

In summary, it can be stated that although the traditional nation-states have not only not weakened the traditional modes of reproduction, but rather in the conditions of current local and global tension, security threats and uncertainty have consolidated and deepened them, posing additional limitations and barriers. However, the formation of new borders, the new ways of national borders perception and application cannot be ignored any more. The transnational social territo-

ries and the transnational migration within them, as well as the social, political, economic activities with numerous empirical manifestations, are a vivid confirmations of this fact.

<div align="right">

November, 2016

</div>

<div align="center">

References

</div>

1. *A. Appadurai*, Global Ethnospaces: Notes and queries for a Transnational Anthropology, Recapturing Anthropology, ed. R. Fox, Santa Fe, School of American Reserche Press, 1991.
2. *A. Appadurai,* Modernity at large: dimensions of globalization, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.
3. *A. L. Diaz-Cuellar, H. A. Ringe, D. A. Schoeller-Diaz*, The Ulysses Syndrome: Migrants with Chronic and Multiple Stress Symptoms And the Role of Indigenous Linguistically and Culturally Competent Community Health Workers, [online] 2013. (http://www.panelserver .net/laredatenea/documentos/alba.pdf, accessed 9 August 2016).
4. A. *Ong, D. Nonini (eds.),* Ungrounded empires: the cultural politics of modern Chinese transnationalism, New York: Routledge Press 1997, pp. 3–33.
5. *A. Pecoud, P. Guchteneire*, Migration Withot Borders, Essays on The Free Movements of Peoples, Unesco, 2007.
6. *A. Portes*, Introduction: the debates and significance of immigrant Transnationalism, Global Networks, 2001, Volume 1, Issue 3, pp. 187.
7. *A. Solimano*, International Migration in the Age of Globalization, Cambridge University Press, 2010.
8. *B. Riccio*, From «ethnic group» to «transnational community». Senegalese migrants' ambivalent experiences and multiple trajectories, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 2001, Vol. 27, No. 4: 583-599.
9. *D. A. Held, D. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, J. Perraton*, Global Transformations, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.
10. *D. S. Massey, R. M. Centeno,* The Dynamics of Mass Migration, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 1999, Vol. 96, pp. 5328-5335.
11. *D. S. Massey, L. Goldring, J. Durand,* Continuities in Transnational Migration: An Analysis of Nineteen mexican Communities, American Journal of Sociology, 1994, Volume 99, Issue 6, May, 1492-1533.
12. *F. Webster*, Theories of the Information Society, Rootledge, 2006.
13. *G. Pogossyan*, Migration In Armenia, Yerevan, 2003.
14. *G. Ritzer*, Globalization, The Essentials, Wiley, 2011.
15. *J. S. Reichert*, 1981, The Migrant Syndrome: Seasonal US. Wage Labor and Rural Development in Central Mexico, Human Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 56-66.
16. *K. Tololyan*, 1996 'Rethinking diaspora(s): stateless power in the transnational moment', Diaspora, No 5, pp. 3–36.
17. *L. E. Guarnizo*, Notes on Transnationalism, Paper for Conference: Transnational migration: Comparative theor and Research Perspective, Oxford, UK, 2000.
18. *L.G. Basch, N. Glick Shciller* from, C. Blanc-Szanton, Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterriorialized Nation States, New-York, 1994.

19. *M. Boatca,* Class Vs. Other As Analityc Cathegries: The Selective Incorporation of Migrants Into Theory, T. Jones, E. Mielants, Mass migration in the World System: Past, Present And Future, Paradigm Publisher, 2010.
20. *M. Castells*, The Rise of the Network Society, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture Vol. I. Cambridge, MA; Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1996.
21. *M. I. Angulo*, National Identity or Transnational Citizenship? In T. Jones, E. Mielants, Mass migration in the World System: Past, Presnt And Future, Paradigm Publisher, 2010.
22. *M. Kerney*, The local and the global: the anthropology of globalization and transnationalism, Annual Review of Anthropology, 1995, No 24, pp. 547-565.
23. *M. Suarez-Orosco*, Commentary, Papers of Transnationalism and Second Generation Conference, Harvard University, 1998.
24. *N. Al-Ali, K. Koser*, New approaches to Migration, Routledge, 2002.
25. *N. Glick. Schiller*, From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration, Anthropological Quarterly, 1995, Volume 68, Issue 1, pp. 49.
26. *N. Nyber Sorensen,* Notes on transnationalism to the panel of devil's advocates: transnational migration – useful approach or trendy rubbish?' Paper presented at the Conference on Transnational Migration: Comparative Theory and Research Perspectives, ESRC Transnational Communities Program, Oxford, UK, June, 2000.
27. *P. Levitt,* Transnational Migtaion: Taking Stock and Future Directions, Global Networks, 2001, Volume 1, Issue 3, pp. 196-204:
28. Republic of Armenia Low on Dual Citizenship, http://www.mindiaspora.am/en/erkqaghaqaciutyun
29. *S. Castles, M. J. Miller,* The Age of Migration, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
30. *S. Vertovec,* Transnationalism, Routledge, 2009.
31. *T. Faist, M. Fauser, E. Reisenauer,* Transnational migration, Wiley, 2013.
32. *Ա. Վարտիկյան,* Միգրացիոն հոսքերի ուղղությունները և դրանց հետևանքները, Միջազգային գիտաժողովի նյութեր, ՀՀ ԳԱԱ, Երևան, Գիտություն 2006, էջեր. 62-74:
33. *Ա. Վարտիկյան*, Հայկական հետցեղասպանական սփյուռքի առանձնահատկությունները, Ցեղասպանությունը հասարակական գիտությունների կիզակետում, Հոդվածների ժողովածու, ԵՊՀ, Երևան 2015, էջեր
34. Հայ սփյուռք հանրագիտարան, Հայկական հանրագիտարան հրատարակչություն, Երևան, 2003թ.

CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS OR CLASH OF INTERESTS? REDEFINING THE CLASH AND REDEFINING THE CIVILIZATION

Anahit Parzyan[*]

In the current world order, where nation states are no longer the only major players of the International Relations, but the emerged, developed super and supra-powers, there is a need to evaluate and define the scope of interests and possible clashes as results of those interests.

Samuel Huntington in his article "The Clash of Civilizations?" describes the World a place where in future states will clash based on differences in Civilizations. According to him, differences of the civilizations will stand as the main reason for the clash [4, p. 22].

The main goal of this article is to prove that people, nations and states clash because of interests and not because of the differences of civilizations. In the contemporary World Politics ideas and definitions of concepts are subjects to a fast change, thus this article aims to newly define the ideas of "Clash" and "Civilization." This article is reasoning that the clash may occur not because of the differences in civilizations, but because of differences in state interests. If a clash occurs and the reason of it is the difference of civilizations, then it is possible on the physiological level, which presupposes a change and not violence.

Throughout centuries as states struggled for their interests, they were in cooperation in case they have common interests. Religion, history, geography were just additional links to the cooperation. In case of different interests, the two parties might have found themselves quite dissimilar even in the areas where they once found similarities. Maybe this was the reason of the interpretation of different types of Christianity like Catholics, Orthodox, Protestants, Apostolic, or among Muslims Sunni and Shia...they could find common ground anytime they found mutual interests or they might find differences anytime their interests contradicted. Interests of

[*] Doctoral Student, Institute of International Studies, Nanjing University.

states always stand higher than any other element. In case of common interests, states may find necessary similarities to cooperate and in case of different interests, they will find dissimilarities to oppose each other. It is illustrated better in the Era of the Balance of Power in Europe.

Evan Luard brings a vivid example of this, "During the fifteenth century it was known that Florence had habitually allied herself with the power or powers opposed to the one which she saw as the greatest threat to herself and to the peace of the peninsula as a whole. At the time when Milan, under the Sforza, was the main threat, for example, Florence allied herself with Venice to resist her; from 1551, when Venice became the dominant power, she joined instead with Milan in opposition [1, p. 2]."

In order to understand the Clash of civilization in a broad way, there is a need to describe what is meant by the clash. Two types of clashes are specified herein: **physical** and **psychological**.

Psychological clash occurs when one part with its own ideas/conceptions of understanding the world and own response to the surrounding world encounters another party which has different, unpredictable (totally or partially) conceptions. This clash may be called psychological and does not presuppose any other action; this is a clash of yours and a different one. This kind of clash can be a clash of civilizations.

Physical clash, in turn, implies a physical action from one party to the other in order to conquer, win, jeopardize or the like. This clash may be called an act of violence and may occur because of the different needs and interests. Physical clash is possible between those who have different civilizations, or it may occur between those who belong to similar civilizations, who share the same civilization, because the reason is not to which grouping you belong, but what you want. For instance, when the first time the white men with their military clothes, ships, weapons, haircut and long boots met the red men with t,heir own way of living, the black men with their way of greeting, eating and living, when Mongols reached Europe or when Japanese met other nations, that was the clash of civilizations but that was no more than the Psychological Clash. It may refer to people, or to their ideas, to anything new and different that will always bring to the clash and this clash is psychological. But when a man belonging to some grouping; no matter national, international, kills or conquers others to take the gold or the lands, the economy, security,

the power to rule them, physical clash occurred and it is not the clash because of civilization, but it is the clash of nothing more than interest.

To justify this hypothesis, it will be interesting to examine the following example: if we consider the clash of civilizations the main reason for the clash in future, then we should firstly divide those who are the bearers of a certain civilization and those who are potentially under attack, because of having other civilization. The attackers can be called "Family" while those who are under attack will be called "Strangers". If the reason of the attack falls only on the fact that there is a difference of civilization than there should never be any contradictions within the "Family" because they share the same civilization. The clash may occur only between the "Family" and the "Stranger" while the cooperation of any "Family" member with any "Stranger" member is an issue of non-possibility, as they are of different civilizations and cannot be in cooperation but in a clash. From my point of view, though, if there is an interest that will influence any other member of the "Family" or "Stranger" or will be beneficial for the whole group, cooperation is possible.

In the Era of the Balance of Power in Christian Europe the differences were inside of the types of Christianity, but the allies were gathered only when they had state interests higher than their faith, and any other aspects. It was not one time that parties were united in one group to struggle against the third one and shortly after that former enemies could be united against former alley. Could civilization, stand as a reason? World history offers cogent examples to justify, that those were nothing but state interests that brought two parties to the clash.

The example of the war in Eastern Ukraine between Ukrainians and the Russian national minority in Ukraine illustrates how national interests overwhelm civilization. In this case the clash occurred in the "Family". It is interesting to note, that American scholar Huntington mentioned, that Russia and Ukraine would never have a real clash because they are "Family" and they would always find ways for solving their problems as they are representatives of the same civilization. He argued that they[1] are two Slavic, primarily Orthodox peoples who have had close relationships with each other for centuries." Talking about the issue over Crimea Huntington mentioned, "As of early 1993, despite all the reasons for conflict, the leaders of the two countries were effectively negotiating and defusing the issues between

---

[1] The author means Ukrainians and Russian national minority in Eastern Ukraine.

the two countries. While there has been serious fighting between Muslims and Christians elsewhere in the former Soviet Union and much tension and some fighting between Western and Orthodox Christians in the Baltic states, there has been virtually no violence between Russians and Ukrainians [4, p. 38]."

However, history shows that, unfortunately, they will, if there are the interests of states. They not only had a clash, they had a war. The war would be called "брат против брата" meaning a war of brother against brother. When interest brings to the physical clash, it does not differentiate between civilization, geography, strategy, it differentiates between interests.

The Armenian-Azerbaijani war over Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) is another example of a clash of interests and not the clash of civilizations as Huntington noted. The point of the author was that Russia was involved into the war on the side of Armenia because both of them were Christians and supported each other. Huntington mentioned, "With the end of the Soviet Union, however, political considerations gave way to religious ones. Russian troops fought on the side of the Armenians, and Azerbaijan accused the 'Russian government of turning 180 degrees' toward support for Christian Armenia [4, p. 37].[1]" This is one way to describe a situation that occurred, but if we examine deeply this conflict, we would see that Russia was involved after Turkey began to deploy its troops near Armenian borders. Of course, Russian troops had never been involved from the Armenian side. Russia was reaffirming its political supremacy over Caucasian region by balancing its forces against possible intervention of Turkey, thus preventing further possible developments and undermining the desire of Turkey to find its new identity in Pan-Turkism.

The military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan was not a religious war but an ethnic war that occurred because of territorial disputes. The justification of the religion issue was announced by Azerbaijan but remained on words because Armenia declared that had no other conflicts with other Muslim countries. The Islamic Republic of Iran, a neighboring country of Armenia, opened its borders with Armenia despite the desire of Azerbaijan and Turkey to impose blockade on Armenia, and subsequently this proves that it was an ethnic/territorial war, but not a religious one.

If we consider this a religious war, then we will have the following questions to answer: why Russia and other Western countries did not help Christian Arme-

---

[1] *S. P. Huntington*, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, p. 37.

nia?Armenia is an Apostolic Oriental Orthodox country, and has as much in common with eastern Orthodox Russia, as it has with Protestant and Catholic West. So why wouldn't they get involved too? The question is why would they? By that time no other country was more interested in spreading its supremacy over that region than Russia, thus Russia was the main active player. For the centuries preceding the military conflict, South Caucasus was the part of Russian Empire, as thereafter it emerged in the Soviet Union. Thus it is evident, that Russia had more interests than "Family" story to be involved into this crisis. The Armenian-Azerbaijani war was not a religious war, as Huntington mentions, it was an ethnic one, and it was based on state interests. There is another important factor to mention: the war occurred just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, another big "Family" where Armenia and Azerbaijan, together with other members, shared the same way of living and ideology (communism).They had the same education, the same perception of life, the same perception of "right" and "wrong", the same New Year celebrations…When the war started, it was difficult to believe that after 70 years of no religion those countries found themselves so deeply in faith to support or oppose because of religion. The examples prove the hypothesis that the interest and not the civilization brings to the clash.

What is the civilization? Classical approach and New Era of Civilization

In International Relations where the subjects of investigations are no more nations but states, and these states are not necessarily supposed to be national, the idea and the description of the civilization goes beyond the classical one, which is described by a combination of various factors including culture, religion, history, etc.

Speaking about civilization Samuel Huntington defines it in the following way, "A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people [4, p.25]." He then adds, "Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion [4]."

In classical definition civilization can be described as the highest grouping of people that include religion, history, language, culture, traditions, etc. These values

are common for nation-states while in current world order civilizations are beyond national peculiarities. They may include one common element, but may miss other or others. The combination of all together in a specific geography in a specific nation is no more of high importance.

James M. Roberts's ideas about Western civilization as a whole are illuminating. He specifies ideas and thoughts, attitudes and behavior, rather than subjects that are linked to history. Referring to civilization and the role of religions Roberts speaks about the decrease of the value of Christianity in Europe in 1920-30s…"Striving to grapping with Freud's alarming suggestions….the conscious intellectual life of Europe seemed to indicate that little excitement could still be aroused by tolerance, democracy, or the old liberal absolutes set up to protect the individual…For a long time, only a minority of Europeans, even in Roman Catholic countries, had been regularly attending religious worship. The masses of the industrial cities lived in post-Christian world of growing paganism. Whether or not the decline of church-going made much difference to their daily lives, a mess-entertainment industry was at work destroying or transforming much of the structure of festivals and commemoration embodies in the traditional calendar, and public law was cutting or by-passing the experience of the great traditional rites of marriage and baptism [3, p. 325]."

Generally speaking, the role of Christianity and the morality it has on social behavior of 1920-1930, inter-personal relations and attitudes based on these morals gave their turn to new ones, being displaced by new liberal certainties of the autonomy of the individual, new moral criteria, new concepts and order of life.

The classical approach of the description of what is civilization can be viewed from different perspectives and for different elements. There is a need to newly define what civilization is, that will have more inclusive approach. We will go beyond the classical description and will bring a new description of Civilization: New Era civilization.

The description of the civilization of New Era can be assumed as a response, the reaction of a person towards the world on the basis of Law (legal/illegal), Morality (good/bad, moral/immoral) and Human Rights (right or wrong).

Law coordinates actions of people based on local or international law and constitution. The attitude of a person towards these laws predicts his/her behavior that will

reflect as his/her civilization. The attitude towards laws predicts not only the civilization of people towards the power, but it is also formed by the attitude of a state towards citizens and laws. The attitude towards laws (respect or disrespect, follow or not follow, justify or not justify) formulates a civilization of a nation, country or state.

Morality is the second element of a civilization. What is good or bad, what is moral and immoral can be determined by a religion or by an ideology, which formulates the rules for a citizen to behave in a certain way, in the view of the public opinion formed and dictated by the state or the society. It can be based on religion, freedom, or on indifference…no matter what type of morality the society has, it still has it and that articulates the attitude and the behavior.

The third one is the Declaration of Human Right by the United Nations (UN) which navigates the laws and moralities of a human being. In the current world order UN is the highest level for all states to cooperate and to function according to its regulations. Declaration of Human Rights is the base for every human being to act in the world. Countries that adopted the declaration are guided to formulate laws and regulations for citizens in or out of their country. This is their attitude. Countries that refused to accept it, also demonstrated their attitude by rejecting and not respecting it. It is their standards of living. It is the highest regulations for a person to cooperate with other members of society and with the entire world. Countries which has similar attitude based on the above mentioned criteria can be grouped in one civilization. Western countries share these ideas, they accept and spread these standards of living. Their grouping is called Western Civilization.

Speaking and generalizing about Western culture J.M. Roberts mentioned about Sigmund Freud and his influence on the conception of an idea of Westerner. According to Roberts, Freud's ideas called in question the ideas of the rational, responsible, consciously motivated individual – a key notion of Western civilization and a presupposition of right of society to impose morality [3, p. 321].

According to Samuel Huntington, elements of the Western civilization are: Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state which, he thinks, has "little resonance" in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures, Western efforts to propagate such ideas produce instead a reaction against 'human rights imperialism' [4, p. 41].

In the modern world movement of people from one geographic place to another is a matter of their will, also confirmed by their right. In a new world order people can change the place they live and move to another place. When they appear in another place they have to follow the rules and regulations of that specific area, if they feel better and safe with that rules they will accept them freely and follow them easily and that will make their civilization different. If an Algerian comes to France and stays for decades and feels comfortable with those regulations, he/she faces a new position. Will he/she become the bearer of a civilization? The answer is no, if we consider that he/she is not Christian, has nothing in common with the history and is not the bearer of the culture he/she happened to be in. But if he/she has a French passport, he/she becomes the bearer of anything that is connected with that country, then he/she becomes a Westerner. Being physically in the West, he/she is a westerner by passport, so is he/she a bearer of Wwestern civilization? The answer is yes, if it is a conception of life, his/her response and actions are predictable, acceptable and understandable for the society he/she lives in. Even if he/she has different religion and listens to different music, even if his/her ancestors are buried not in the Western soil, he/she is still a westerner, according to the law, at least.

The USA, Australia, Canada are multinational countries and the selection of the nation is not based on their culture, rather than on their attitude and conception of the norms and ways of living and cooperation within a society by a new culture, in turn based on the above mentioned three criteria: Law, Morality and Human Rights. Only these three factors may formulate the civilization of the New Era.

In modern world though, it is the Western civilization that has the dominant impact on other civilizations. The question arises why specifically Western civilization has its influence on other parts of the world? Throughout history the greater is the power of the state, the more it will influence others. It will spread its language, music, religion, arts etc., currently new political system and the place of citizens in a state is also an important part of Western civilization. Moreover, if nowadays other elements are replaceable, changeable or missing completely, like religion is no more an obligation but a personal will, culture and the behavior, ethics and morality are no more the same (it can be hardly claimed that they could ever been: Frenchman and American are completely different in their behavior and taste), the only thing that will unite them and make one "Family", is the attitude towards free-

dom of rights, democracy as a political system of a country, attitude of a citizen towards the laws and justice, and the attitude of a state towards its citizens. These are the aspects that will always differentiate a Westerner in the terms of Western civilization, from bearers of civilizations of other parts of the world.

After defining the civilization of the New Era, it will be interesting to focus on the reason of the clash. Why would the Western world have any interest to spread its way of living, its civilization to other countries of the world? Why would they bring to the physical clash through civilization?

The interest may vary: starting from the defense issues, economic interests, spreading the influence and their power over other states. To control other parts or to have super power over them is an important issue in International Relations, as it gives capability to stand in better position and have more benefits.

Why there is the difference between the West civilization and other civilizations. Why there is the differentiation between two types? As Huntington mentioned, "The West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values [4, p. 40]. According to Huntington, in contemporary International Relations international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its centerpiece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations, and among non-Western civilizations", where the peoples and governments of non-Western civilizations are no longer the object for colonialism implemented by the West, but subjects on the political stage.

Huntington believes that, the conflict of the West and rest of the world may have responses which generally take one or a combination of three forms. At one extreme, non-Western states can, like Burma and North Korea, attempt to pursue a course of isolation, to insulate their societies from penetration or 'corruption' by the West, and, in effect, to opt out of participation in the Western-dominated global community. A second alternative, the equivalent of "band-wagoning" in international relations is to attempt to join the West and accept its values and institutions. The third alternative is to attempt to 'balance' the West by developing economic and military power and cooperation with other non-Western societies against the West, while preserving indigenous values and institutions, or in short, to modernize but not to Westernize [4, p. 41].

Influence of the Western civilization over other civilizations can be defined differently. For the last decades the insertion of the Western civilization to the other parts of the World is implemented by different methods: political system, constitution, education, military aspects, cooperation in a political word arena, etc. The question is, will the state be open to accept or not accept the rules of the 'game' the West offers?

If a state accepts the rules of the game, then it should follow the rules of the game, it becomes predictable for the West; easy to predict the policy and steps the state will take. If the West is the author of the game and the introducer to other countries, then it is evident that it has its advantages, obviously, because it is stronger in any field then the state that will accept the rules of the game. The super-powers are spreading their way of living to others first of all to be able to make a good and effective defensive structure for themselves and to strengthen their economy and have benefits in other aspects.

Currently the input of Western civilization on other states can be observed in two levels:

1. Those who are closed and struggle against it.
2. Those who are open to accept the game rules.

Those who are open usually get some financial aid to support the reforms. Some countries use this support and make transformations and become family members easily (e.g. Croatia, Bulgaria) while others 'enjoy' the constant stable condition and spend money without an evident result. By all means despite of the decision makers' efforts, the transformations occur within the society. EU neighborhood Policy, Association Agreements, various education funding programs influence society and change their perception of democracy and freedoms, their rights as a member of a society.

Some programs are very effective, while ineffective in other countries, but the influence will bring to massive changes anyway. Among those changes the following have to be differentiated:

Constructive effective, these are the changes that bring reasonable changes to better condition, do not destabilize the society, but have an informative-educational approach.

Non-effective – financial aid to such spheres that are not efficient for a better change like financial aid to anti-corruption policy, which make the scales of the corruption even bigger, because in those countries where decision makers want to see the change, they will do that without additional financial aid, while where the decision-making elite is already under corruption, financial aid will just make them more powerful and richer, without any change inside of the society.

Destructive – when the information about the 'game' (new way of living) and its rules are introduced to the society where the system, especially judicial, is not in line with the desired introduced one, and will not help to overcome the situation. To tell to the lady from highest mountains, that she has the right not to overwork and her husband must share household duties and also compare her life within the frameworks of rights and freedoms with a lady living and working in Paris will not help her, because she would face misunderstanding in society as well as the judicial system would not help her legally. So it will bring to the distractions rather than to a good will.

Figure 1

Maslow's hierarchy of needs represented as a pyramid

The influence of other civilizations, especially the western civilization, is imported not only at the state level based on cooperation between states, but also at the state-personal or non-state to non-state level. In 21st century supra-powers like International Organizations (UN) internet networks (Facebook, Twitter, Google) Hollywood films, Alibaba can shape public opinion, change ideas and perceptions, connect people from all around the world, make connections between geographically unrelated parts and unite them in a new sphere. Some countries like Iran,

North Korea, Saudi Arabia would close specific channels and windows of the incoming information waves, but it is impossible to close them completely. The era of globalization, telecommunication technologies build new bridges and connect the entire world. Songs and film stars do not belong to their country of origin anymore, they are open to the world, and the same is true about ideas, thoughts and decisions.

The question is why would the change occur in a society?

Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs illustrates five levels of needs for people [7, pp. 370-396] and depending on which level people are, they will be easy and open to change or they will be conservative and constant to waves and changes. In this article it is suggested to look at Maslow's hierarchy of needs not as the needs of people, but as the needs and opportunities the citizens are provided by a state. If the state gives opportunities only for the first level of the hierarchy, then the society will be easy to deform and reconstruct, because socially unstable society is doubtful and open to changes especially dictated by a more prosperous and safer society. Accordingly, if they are on the second or up to the second level, then it will be possible to change, especially if the dictating or influencing civilization stands on the top of the pyramid. Those states which are on the top of the pyramid can also be influenced by the low levels but the effect is completely different. When civilization of the state on the lower level of the pyramid influences the state standing on the upper level, than the last one is enriching its culture, but when the upper level is influencing the lower level then the deformation of the latter takes place. This kind of clash of civilization can be fatal. It may result in lower levels to lose their cultural face, lose their language, and by that "lose" everything, as they will be undergoing the process of assimilation which will finally bring to their complete "loss" of identity. As it was mentioned before, this kind of clash of civilization is nothing, but the interests of the influencing party. The process for the party that is under influence may occur consciously or unconsciously. Unconsciously it may occur when influenced by ideas, myths, behavior and morality by the other part. When something occurs in one part of the world, news agencies of the West interpret the events the way it is beneficial to them by formulating specific ideas, attitudes, decisions and morality for the world.

Consciously it may occur by the comparison of the inserted/ imported values and ideas with those that you have. It can be defined as inter-personal clash of civilization, which may occur in the following forms:

97

1. Protection of your own – denial, or even struggle against the influencing civilization
2. Change to the new one – open acceptance
3. Ignoring – neither struggle nor under influence

It will be interesting to observe the reason why a person will be open to accept the new civilization without struggle. It can be reasoned it in the following way: if a person acknowledges that the new one will give him/her more good than the one he/she is in now. If we look again into the Hierarchy of needs that Maslow suggests and come to the reasoning that if a citizen is in upper levels of the pyramid his/her needs are more satisfied as human being rather than when he/she is in lower level. Thus, if a person realizes these factors, he/she would make a decision to undergo a change. The change may be:

- Inter-personal-passive change: when the change remains inside of a person without any evident change: these people can live in parallel worlds: the one they have in reality and the one they admire.
- Inter-personal active change:
  a) directed to change personal space and surrounding civilization by moving and changing the place of living (migration to the countries from where the implemented civilization is coming)
  b) directed to change the society

Figure 2

Possibility and reality circles

Inter-personal active change directed to changing the society may be realized within small groups, bigger groups (masses) and may become an ideology to struggle for a change in the entire population of a specific state.

The understanding what is good or what is bad is a question of life. Even if something is definitely better, it is difficult to understand how to take that good and how to make that change. Possibilities and reality can be expressed in the way shown on Figure 2.

When you are in the smallest space your circle is small and the angle you have is smaller as compared with other levels of the circle. If you realize this and that you have the right and possibilities to move from one circle into another from smaller into a bigger one, then you will move from the smallest to the middle, and the to the biggest if you still feel the second wave of the need. If there will be no need to change from the second one, then you will remain in the second one.

Referring to the influence of the Western civilization in the term and description of the civilization of New Era, the move from one circle to the other is possible. Current open telecommunication world provides opportunities to get acquainted with other cultures and Western culture offers the best opportunities and make others just admire the way people are treated in their countries within the framework of Human rights and Freedoms, or persuade that it offers and provides the best opportunities. Considering the military, economical, telecommunication supremacy over other states it sounds more persuasive. Since the "Universal Truth" of Aristotle is still undiscovered by Humanity, it seems that the concept of Sophists[1] will work better, who believed that the relative nature of truth is a matter of arguments and effective and persuasive linguistics. Greek philosopher Poulakos described Sophists as those who believed and taught that "the world could always be recreated linguistically" and the reality itself is a linguistic construction rather than an objective fact." Thus if the society itself believed that truth, or even reality itself, were merely matters of who could speak most persuasively, what was to become justice, tradition, virtue, social order, or, eventually, society itself is a question to consider [2, p. 40-41].

As it becomes clear that in case a person undergoes changes and feels close and accepts these aspects of New Era civilization, then he/she becomes the follower in the first phase and may be bearer on the second one.

---

[1] Sophists were teachers of rhetoric in the fifth and fourth centuries BC.

Conclusion

In summary, it can be stated that the clash never occurs between states and civilizations without interests. Civilizations within influenced states are also changed because of interests. Civilizations will never have any clash unless there is an interest. The physical or psychological clashes are about control, supremacy of one party over other. This never occurred without any interest and it will never be possible to imagine, in contrary to Huntington's ideas, because the clash itself implies forceful psychological and/or physical actions, so it will always occur even between those who share the same civilization when their interests clash.

The New Era civilization presupposes new concepts and aspects that formulate and define a type of civilization, which unites Western countries into one "Family", i.e. Western civilization. It implies elements which are not necessarily linked to such things as national characteristics. It is open to larger audiences and can fit all in it. It is the acceptance of ideas and world and personal behavior based on that acceptance. The New Era civilization description is based on three main aspects:

1. Legal and illegal (Laws and constitution)
2. Moral and immoral (ideology/religion/society)
3. Right and wrong (Human rights)

According to the attitude towards these three aspects, states function differently. In the modern world the clash may result in changes and transformations within certain society. The changes may be compulsory, while they can also be necessary, and finally they can be according to the will by some or all. The change may lead to not only ideological changes, but also to geographical changes which will on one hand make the world closer to a more identical type, on the other hand it will make a chaos of interactions, the results of which will bring to forming new civilization, removing or adding new elements, describing and formulating the new concept of civilization.

August, 2016

References

1. *E. Luard*, The Balance of Power: The System of International Relations, 1648-1815, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1993.
2. *J. A. Herrick*, The history and Theory of Rhetoric: an introduction, Allyn and Bacon.
3. *J. M. Roberts*, Twentieth Century: The History of the World, 1901 to 2000, New York, Penguin, 1999
4. *S. P. Huntington*, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49
5. *J. Baylis,, J. Wirtz, J., Gray, Colin S.,* Strategy in the contemporary world: an introduction to strategic studies, Oxford University Press 2010
6. *Ch. Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Eds.)*, The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford University Press, 2008
7. *A. H. Maslow*, A Theory of Human Motivation, Psychological Review, 50, 1943, pp. 370-396.

ANTI-ARMENIAN ACTIVITIES OF THE UNIVERSITY "ARMENOLOGICAL" DEPARTMENTS AND ANALYTICAL CENTRES IN TURKEY[1]

Arestakes Simavoryan[*]

In foreign countries Armenian Studies in general have a number of important functions for Armeniancy, but in some cases they are distorted and made to serve anti-Armenian and anti-Armenological purposes. Today there are such "Armenological" centers abroad activities of which are different from others and have an adverse context. They can be described as anti-Armenological or pseudo-Armenological centers since they are engaged in anti-Armenian, anti-scientific and anti-propaganda activities. Such institutions have been founded and operate in Turkey, Azerbaijan, and with their initiation and sponsorship, also in some other countries. The main purpose of these centers is to serve their political anti-Armenian interest in the information area. Thus, anti-Armenian centers disguised under the name of "Armenological" have a strategic meaning for Turkey.

Establishing "Armenological" university departments in the Republic of Turkey was brought forward in 1984 at the conference on the Armenian Question in Ataturk University of Erzurum (old Armenian city Karin that was subjected to the Genocide in Western Armenia)[2].

During the last decade "Armenological" institutions were established in the faculties of humanities of several universities by the decision of the Government of Turkey at the suggestion of the superior body of institutions of higher education[3]. As a result of the decision several specialized institutional departments were created. The establishment of such centers was prompted by Turkey's denial policy against the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by different countries in 1990-

---

[1] This article was first published in issue II 2015, "Fundamental Armenology".

[*] Head of the Centre for Armenian Studies, Noravank Foundation.

[2] Ermeni Dili Bölümü ilk mezunlarını veriyor, Sabah, 31.05.2014.

[3] Հայերենը որպես օտար լեզու, http://www.aravot.am/2011/05/18/341858/

2000. As mentioned by the vice-rector of Erciyes University, prof. Metin Hulagu "*… the purpose of opening an Armenian department is to prepare specialists able to work in the Armenian archives and to fight against the Armenian theses*"[1].

Presently, such departments operate in the following universities:

- Department of "Armenian language and culture" of Ankara University *(Ankara Üniversitesi Ermeni Dili ve Kültürü Anabilim Dalı)*[2],
- Department of "Armenian language and literature" of Nevshehir University *(Nevşehir Üniversitesi Ermeni Dili ve Edebiyatı Bölümü),*
- Department of "Armenian language and literature" of Trakia University *(Trakya Üniversitesi Ermeni Dili ve Edebiyatı bölümü),*
- Department of "Armenian language and literature" of Erciyes University *(Erciyes Üniversitesi Ermeni Dili ve Edebiyatı Bölümü):*

The above-mentioned departments operate within the framework of educational programs and courses developed for the purposes of anti-Armenological strategy (research and translations are also carried out).

In 2001 the first "Armenological" department was established in Ankara University. Within the same year several other "Armenological" centers were founded that perform research, rather than educational functions. These were affiliate institutions to universities and research centers (e.g. "Research center of Turkish-Armenian relations" of Sakarya University, "Institute of Armenian Studies", etc.). The department of "Armenian language and culture" of Ankara University prepared researchers who were involved in the propaganda work within the framework of the "studies" carried out by the above-mentioned centers targeted at the denial of the Armenian Genocide. At the same time, in some universities research centers were established whose real purpose was the denial of the Armenian Genocide. Such centers are:

- Research center of "Turkish-Armenian relations" at Sakarya University *(Sakarya Üniversitesi Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri Araştırma Merkezi),*
- Research center of "Turkish-Armenian relations" at Ataturk University *(Atatürk Üniversitesi Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri Araştırma Merkezi).*

---

[1] Թուրքիայում կտրուկ աճել է հայերեն սովորել ցանկացող դիմորդների քանակը, http://akunq.net/am/?p=13194:

[2] http://www.dtcf.ankara.edu.tr/akademik_birim.php?ermeni-dili-ve-kulturu-anabilim-dali&bid=74&icerik=bolum_hakkinda&lang=tr#breadcrumb

One of the strategic goals of these two centers, involved in falsification, was to develop and spread abroad the thesis of "genocide" as if carried out against the Turks by the Armenians. It is no coincidence that the above-mentioned center of Ataturk University, which is in the city of Karin-Erzurum, occupied as a result of the Genocide and now considered the hotbed of Turkish nationalism, has established "museums of genocide" for that purpose in several villages[1]. These two centers have once cooperated with the "Armenian Institute" of Ankara and now they have closer ties with the department of "Armenology" of "*Eurasian research center*" (*Avrasya İncelemeleri Merkezi, AVİM*).

It should be mentioned that the anti-Armenological activities in Turkey and Azerbaijan are not only used for the purpose of anti-Armenian propaganda, but also prepare personnel for different fields, including special services. Not only the "Armenological" centers of Turkey serve this purpose, but also certain specialists are sent to Armenological centers abroad for training. For example in 1999 a number of Turkish specialists were sent to Saint Petersburg University to study the Armenian language in order to open the chair of "Armenian language and literature" in Ankara University to prepare Armenologists [1, էջ 170]. Behind these steps "one can clearly see Turkey's certain political and long-term intelligence goals and tasks directed at training of present and future employees and agents of Turkish special services in linguistic and area studies for the purpose of carrying out effective intelligence activities against Armenia" [1, էջ 170].

As a probable place of employment also the Turkish Historical Society and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey are mentioned, which have a demand of personnel with command of Armenian language[2]. To provide the departments Turkish universities with lecturers, specialists of Armenian language and literature are invited from abroad, particularly from Georgia and Azerbaijan[3].

When in 2011 at the initiative of MFA of Turkey, Kadir Has University (financed also by the USA German Marshall Fund in the US - $32,500) faced the problem of preparing diplomats knowing Armenian[4], the efforts of staffing it with

---

[1] There is such a museum in the village Yeshilyayla (old Armenian name - Artsati).

[2] Ermeni Dili Bölümü ilk mezunlarını veriyor, Sabah, 31.05.2014.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Kadir Has'ta ücretsiz Ermenice kursları başlıyor sırada Kürtçe var» (18.05.2011), http://www.haberturk.com/yazarlar/pervin-kaplan/631678-kadir-hasta-ucretsiz-ermenice-kurslari-basliyor-sirada-kurtce-var.

lecturers had been in vain as a result of which the opening of the department of "Armenology" was temporarily suspended[1]. Now it does not work as an "Armenological" department, but instead offers courses of Armenian language[2]. Compared to state institutions of higher education the analytical institutions carry out another kind of work. In the past, the research work of the most of numerous analytical centers, including the "close analytic" groups, was mainly focused on gathering information about the developments in the Armenian Diaspora and mostly the activity of ASALA[3]. This information was processed for anti-Armenian purposes. Presently political and strategic problems concerning the Armenian-Turkish relations, the Armenian Genocide, the Diaspora and in general Armenia and Armeniancy have become the subject matter of anti-Armenian research of Turkish analytical institutions as well.

The "intellectual products" (articles, books, reports) full of falsification, published by around 10 research centers[4] in the course of the last five years can be divided in two parts "historical" and modern. In the so-called "historical" studies and investigations of modern problems, the problems of the history of Armenia are being distorted from the positions of Pan-Turkism and neo-Osmanism[5] in order to deny the Armenian Genocide and information warfare is carried out against the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Artsakh.

---

[1] Հայերենը որպես օտար լեզու, http://www.aravot.am/2011/05/18/341858/

[2] http://www.khas.edu.tr/egitim/yasam-boyu-egitim-merkezi/komsu-diller-akademisi/ermenice-dil-kursu.html

[3] Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia.

[4] Fund of social and strategic research" («KÖK Sosyal ve Stratejik Araştırmalar Vakfı-KÖKSAV»-founded in 1991), "New Turkey strategic research center" (Yeni Türkiye Stratejik Araştırma Merkezi»-founded in 1994), "Turkish center of international relations and strategic analyses" («Türkiye Uluslararası Ilişkiler Ve Stratejik Analizler Merkezi-TURKSAM»-founded in 2004), "Eurasian research center" (Avrasya İncelemeleri Merkezi, AVİM»-founded in 2009), "Turkish-Asian strategic research center" (Türk Asya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi-TASAM»-founded in 2004), "Political social strategic research fund of the Turkish Academy" («Türk Akademisi Siyasi Sosyal Stratejik Araştırmalar Vakfı-TASAV»-founded in 2012), "21st century Turkish Institute" («21 Yüzyıl Türkiye Enstitüsü»-founded in 2005), "Strategic research center of Erciyes University" (Erciyes üniversitesi Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi-ERUSAM»-founded in 2011), "Research center of Turkish-Armenian relations" of the University of Ataturk (Atatürk Üniversitesi«Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri Araştırma Merkezi»-founded in 2001), "Eurasian economic relations association" («Avrasya Ekonomik Ilişkiler Derneği»-founded in 2006).

[5] Taking into consideration the denial of the Armenian Genocide in Turkish historiography it has been mentioned that "presently the question of the Armenian Genocide is problem number 1 of Turkish historiography towards which it implements a systematic policy".(Թուրքերը թուրքերի մասին, հատոր երրորդ: Կազմող և խմբագիր Ռ. Մելքոնյան, Երևան, 2011, էջ 3):

"Historical" "research" is carried out either in the affiliate research-analytical centers at universities (e.g. in the research centers of "Turkish-Armenian relations" in Sakarya and Ataturk universities), or in the *think tanks* specialized in anti-Armenological questions.

Among Turkish *think tanks* the largest "Armenological" center engaged in the problems of "historical" and modern periods was the Institute for Armenian Studies, founded in Ankara and operated in 1999-2009 in cooperation with Turkey's "Eurasian Center for Strategic Studies" (*ASAM*). As noted by Haykaram Nahapet-yan: "Although the structure is called Institute for Armenian Studies, however, its functions do not completely fit its name. One can not even speak about objective research on the subjects of Armenian civilization, culture and history. The structure is mainly engaged in carrying out works to deny the Armenian Genocide and con-ducting research to reveal propagandistic, social-political activities and economic capabilities of the Armenian Diaspora"[1].

The activities of "Institute for Armenian Studies" were terminated in 2009 and it was incorporated into the Centre for Eurasian Studies (AVIM) (established the same year by the Turkmeneli Cooperation and Cultural Foundation in An-kara). AVIM is also involved in the publication of two journals, which were estab-lished by "Institute for Armenian Studies" ["Journal of Armenian studies" (in Turk-ish, first publication in 2001) and "Review of Armenian Studies*"* (in English, first publication in 2002)][2]. Publications in these journals are prevailingly about the de-nial of the Armenian Genocide, evidencing the fact that they still continue to work by the principles adopted by the "Institute of Armenian Studies" of Ankara. Besides the Turkish authors, Azerbaijani and several western authors also publish their arti-cles, some of whom are also included in the advisory boards to lend "international" character to the periodicals. The anti-Armenian propagandistic publications are not limited to these periodicals. The center also prepares similar works as a daily bulle-tin. It can be seen that together with the Turkish falsifiers several foreign "specialists" are consolidated around these journals (e.g. Jean-Luis Mattei [2, pp. 65-92], Derk Jan van der Linde [3, pp. 123-151], Jeremy Salt [4, pp. 65-75], Maxime

---

[1] See the details in: *Haykaram Nahapetyan,* Institute for Armenian Studies in Ankara,
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/security/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=3486
[2] http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=322&debate_ID=4&slide_ID=15

Gauin [5, pp. 127-145], et al.), who in their effort to propagate the Turkish misinformation, invented falsified theses serving the Turkish denial of the Armenian Genocide, neglecting the fact that Western Armenia is the largest part of the Armenian Homeland and the genocide was committed against Armenians in their Homeland.

The founder of the former "Institute of Armenian Studies" affiliate to "21st century Turkish Institute" and *ASAM*, member of the party "National Movement", Umit Ozdagh who was engaged in anti-Armenian topics for years, considering that the work carried out for the effective distribution of the Turkish "theses" abroad was so far unsatisfactory, suggests training foreign young "scientists" for protecting the interests of Turkey and involving famous "historians" choosing them from target countries (particularly from the USA, Great Britain, France, Spain, Latin America, Lithuania, Germany, China and Japan). Ozdagh is convinced that with Turkey's sponsorship and support they will have an opportunity to publish pro-Turkish works in dozens of languages and contribute to the establishment of Turkish research institutes in the above-mentioned countries[1].

Together with the activity of the anti-Armenological centers the following private analytical centers with other research fields, also appear in the range of the anti-Armenian propaganda:

- Foundation for social and strategic research (KÖK Sosyal ve Stratejik Araştırmalar Vakfı KÖKSAV-established in 1991)
- New Turkey strategic research center (Yeni Türkiye Stratejik Araştırma Merkezi-founded in 1994)
- Turkish-Asian strategic research center (Türk Asya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi-TASAM-founded in 2003)
- Turkish center of international relations and strategic analyses (Türkiye Uluslararası İlişkiler Ve Stratejik Analizler Merkezi-TURKSAM- founded in 2004)
- Political social strategic research fund of the Turkish Academy (Türk Akademisi Siyasi Sosyal Stratejik Araştırmalar Vakfı-TASAV-founded in 2012)
- Strategic research center (Birlik Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi BİRSAM-founded in 2014)

---

[1] Ümit Özdağ, Dış İşleri Bakanına Açık Mektup veya 2015'e Doğru Yeni Bir Büyük Strateji Önerisi, http://www.21yye.org/arastirma/milli-guvenlik-ve-dis-politika-arastirmalari-merkezi/2013/04/29/6972/dis-isleri-bakanina-acik-mektup-veya-2015e-dogru-yeni-bir-buyuk-strateji-

What is general for such analytical centers is that the research concerning the Republic of Armenia and Armenians are mainly periodic, in other cases – casual or situational. Most of it is carried out by the subdivisions called "Caucasian", "regional", etc. Thus, in the area of anti-Armenian research, think tanks have a great role, offering a supplementary potential.

From the perspective of institutional ties the level of cooperation between the Turkish institutions engaged in Armenian studies or educational activity (whether they are university departments or analytical centers) is high. They work with the principle of complementarity which gives an opportunity to perform several key functions in the field of anti-Armenian policy: training of personnel, planning and accomplishment of strategic goals, implementation of joint programs, conferences, etc.

The above-mentioned anti-Armenological Turkish centers carry out a large-scale propaganda activity both in Turkey and abroad, serving the anti-Armenian policy of the Turkish government in information warfare.

Taking into account this fact, it should be mentioned that the real Armenological centers have great significance in conditions of current information warfare for unmasking and confronting the Turkish-Azerbaijani encroachments against Armenian history, culture and other fields of Armenology, which is one of the important problems of modern Armenology [6, էջ 29; 7, էջ 102]. It concerns not only the protection of interests of Armenia and the Diaspora in the international arena, but also the informational safety of Armenians. Thus, the "achievements of Armenian Studies should become a reliable stronghold for the further strengthening of Armenian statehood and against anti-Armenian pseudoscience and propaganda" [8, էջ 91].

It has to be also mentioned that in the Republic of Armenia scholars of Armenian Studies and the specialists and experts of information safety [9; 10, pp. 78-101; 11, pp.105-131; 12, էջ 84-86; 13, էջ 24-35, 14; 15, pp.121-124; 16, etc] discover and unmask the Turkish falsifications, the methods and mechanisms of their implementation.

February, 2016

References

1. *Հարությունյան Ա.,* Թուրքական հատուկ ծառայությունների ստեղծման պատմու-
   թյունը և դրանց գործունեությունը արդի փուլում, «Թուրքիա. անվտանգության ու
   պաշտպանության հիմնախնդիրները», Երևան, 2007:

2. *Jean-Louis Mattei,* Mkrtich Portukalian and the "Armenia" Journal (From Terrorism to
   Skeptical Modesty). - Review of Armenian Studies, 2011, No 24.

3. *Derk Jan van der Linde,* The Armenian Genocide question and Legal Responsibility. -
   Review of Armenian Studies, 2011, No 24.

4. *Jeremy Salt,* The Armenian "Relocation": The Case for "Military Necessity". - Review of
   Armenian Studies, 2014, No 29.

5. *Maxime Gauin,* Facing Liberty: The Victory of Rational Argumentation and Its Conse-
   quences, - Review of Armenian Studies, 2014, No 29.

6. *Սուվարյան Յ.,* Հայագիտության արդի վիճակը Հայաստանում և զարգացման
   հիմնախնդիրները.Հայագիտական միջազգային երկրորդ համաժողով. «Հայագիտու-
   թյունը և արդի ժամանակաշրջանի մարտահրավերները», Լիագումարնիստի զեկու-
   ցումներ, Երևան, 2013:

7. *Մելքոնյան Ա.,* Հայ պատմագիտության խնդիրները արդի ժամանակաշրջանում, Հա-
   յագիտական միջազգային երկրորդ համաժողով, «Հայագիտությունը և արդի ժամա-
   նակաշրջանի մարտահրավերները», Լիագումար նիստի զեկուցումներ, Երևան, 2013:

8. *Հակոբյան Հ.,* Հայրենիք-Սփյուռք հարաբերությունները և հայագիտության հիմնա-
   խնդիրները, Հայագիտական միջազգային երկրորդ համաժողով, «Հայագիտությունը
   և արդի ժամանակաշրջանի մարտահրավերները», Լիագումար նիստի զեկուցումներ,
   Երևան, 2013:

9. *Զուլալյան Մ.,* Հայոց պատմության խեղաթյուրումը արդի թուրք պատմագրության
   մեջ (հին և միջին դարեր), Երևան, 1995:

10. *Danielyan E. L.,* Importance of the Armenian toponyms' ontological integrity in the system
    of National Security. - "21st CENTURY", No. 2, 2013.

11. *Danielyan E. L.,* Historical truth against Turkish-Azerbaijani falsifications ininformation
    warfare. - "21st CENTURY", No. 1, 2014.

12. *Դանիելյան Է.Լ.,* Հայաստանի և այլ երկրների պատմության թուրք-ադրբեջանական
    կեղծարարությունների քննադատությունը, Հայաստանի միջազգային Երկրորդ հա-
    մաժողով «Հայագիտությունը և արդի ժամանակաշրջանի մարտահրավերները»,
    Երևան, 2014:

13. *Սիմավորյան Ա., Հովյան Վ., Ղանալանյան Տ.,* Արտերկրի հայագիտական կենտրոն-
    ները. ներուժի գնահատում, Երևան, 2014:

14. *Hovhannisyan Mari,* Collision of past and present. The Collective memory of the Armenian
    Genocide and the Turkish denial, Saarbrucken, LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, 2012.

15. *Հովհաննիսյան Մհեր,* Համացանցային քարոզչության հակահայկական դրսևորում-
    ները, Հայաստանի միջազգային Երկրորդ համաժողով «Հայագիտությունը և արդի
    ժամանակաշրջանի մարտահրավերները», Երևան, 2014:

16. *Sahakyan L. S.,* Turkification of the Toponyms in the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of
    Turkey, Montreal, 2010.

CONTROVERSY OVER
THE "TOCQUEVILLIAN DEMOCRACY": CONSIDERATIONS ON
THE "THIRD" VOLUME OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

*Sargis Shirkhanyan**

Introduction

Alexis de Tocqueville is one of those thinkers whose theoretical legacy has been considered as certainly relevant to and truly pivotal for the development of a number of scientific disciplines. A prominent 19th century publicist Sainte-Beuve in one of his famous essays prophesied that Tocqueville would be an inexhaustible subject of reflection for the generations to come [1] and today we may affirm that the time has proved him right.

The Tocquevillian tradition undoubtedly represents first of all a pure scientific approach. A. Cobben argues that Tocqueville broke the "conspiracy theory based" approach and offered to analyze the social history facts [2]. From that perspective, Tocqueville is often considered as one of the founders of modern Sociology. On the other hand, the French author emphasized that "a new science of politics is needed for a new world" [3, p.7] and, in fact, he created the very foundation of that science, so he is certainly one of the founders of modern Political Science, as well. In this regard, the viewpoint of a British author A. Hess is noteworthy, who merged the above-mentioned two traditions and interpreted de Tocqueville in context of "Political Sociology" [4]. In our opinion, however, Tocquevillian ideas are not limited only by the frame of sociological and political research; they have much wider scope and may encompass the issues of anthropology, philosophy, psychology, history etc. Moreover, as it is underlined by "Tocqueville Studies" well-known representative S. Drescher, the theory of the French thinker is permeated also by the idea of "national character", which manifestly dominates in most of the researches re-

* PhD student, Department of Political Science of Russian-Armenian University; Attaché, Policy Planning Department of MFA of RA.

lated to the issues of modern society's development and evolution [5]. Hence, it would be reasonable to agree with the point of view of Indiana University professor Aurelian Craiutu, who states that Tocqueville's new science of politics "is fundamentally cross-disciplinary" [6].

Nevertheless, the prior "substance" that integrates all those disciplines is the concept of democracy and from that point of view de Tocqueville's calls upon creating a new science necessarily means creating "Democracy Science". Interestingly, the aspiration to underline the crucial role of democracy in modern world is not determined by author's "sympathy" towards the phenomenon of democracy; instead, it overtly reveals the Tocquevillian realism and the goals postulated by his research, which is clear in the following reference: "I have not even pretended to judge whether the social (*democratic – S.S.)* revolution... is advantageous or prejudicial to mankind. I have acknowledged this revolution as a fact…" [3, p.16]. In other words, Tocqueville tries to understand what the democracy is, not to provide a rationale for its dominance, but to mark its irresistible and irreversible essence with all its benefits and flaws. This is the reason why author's most famous book *Democracy in America* today still matters.

At the same time, despite the fact that the Tocquevillian scientific works have been studied during more than a century, there is still a controversy both over the meaning of the term "democracy" (in Tocqueville's perspective) and over the sequential logic of the volumes of *Democracy in America*, in particular, in context of some attempts of "uncovering" the "third volume" of the prominent book. Therefore, this paper attempts to highlight the mentioned spectrum of issues and to come up with some considerations in this regard.

The "Tocquevillian Democracy": one or many?

It has been noted by a number of authors that in different volumes of *Democracy in America* the term "democracy" has different and sometimes contradictory meanings. Harold J. Laski in his foreword to the *Democracy in America* mentions that Tocqueville understands democracy both as an aspiration to equalize all the sides of the social life and as a representative government; with the same word Tocqueville also expresses the concepts of suffrage and republic [7]. J. Schleifer notes that the democ-

racy for Tocqueville means the very "social revolution and the created social state (*état social*), as a result» [8]. Moreover, as S. Drescher points out, the two volumes of Tocqueville's treatise, published, correspondingly, in 1835 and 1840, represent drastically different attitude towards democracy [9]: the first volume describes mostly positive characteristics of democracy, while the second one has much more critical content. Probably, that is the reason why the second volume "was received with as much enthusiasm as the first, though with possibly even less understanding" [10].

In this context, there are two interconnected questions to be raised: 1. what is the reason of different meanings of democracy in Tocquevillian theory; 2. whether the author of *Democracy in America* in two parts of the book talks about different democracies or it is about different points of understanding the same democracy? In our opinion, the answer for both of those questions should be derived from understanding the research objectives of Tocquevillian concept. The point is that the French author adopts an approach of complex analysis; he tries to go as far and as deep as it is possible, and, looking from that point of view (in regard to the first question), it is necessary to state that there is no contrariety in Tocquevillian "polysemous" perception of democracy: different meanings are attached to "democracy" not for the purpose to put that conceptual variety into a context of contradiction, but to ensure the idea of complementarity of democracy's different layers. In other words, Tocqueville tries to study the democracy through avoiding its narrow vision and, accordingly, via revealing different aspects of the concept. Thus, different meaning of "democracy" in Tocqueville's legacy should be interpreted in the light of author's intention to present its broad vision, because democracy stands for being a "multifaceted phenomenon" [11].

Turning to the second question from that perspective, it would be reasonable to assume that the difference in the nature of two volumes of the prominent book is quite comprehensible, as well. De Tocqueville's research goals required corresponding methodology aimed to ensure an "objective" picture of democracy, revealing both the advantages and shortcomings of the phenomenon, the two sides of the same coin, the "initial code" of democracy. It is believed that this is the way necessary to look at the difference of the first and the second parts of the book: Tocqueville visited America and decided to write a book about democracy not for the sake of composing a panegyric on it, not for its "one-way" praising, but for unfold-

ing and conceptualizing all its constructive and destructive sides[1]. Therefore, the thing that the first volume of *Democracy in America* shows predominantly the constructive "shade" of democratic system and the second one considers the possible drawbacks of democracy is expected to be understood in the light of revealing and ascertaining some logical sequence in the French author's thoughts and not in context of seeking for contradictions.

Democracy in America: is there a third volume?

Even after the 1840, when the second part of *Democracy in America* was published, Tocqueville continued to show interest towards the issues of American political life and the political system, in particular. The idea was to stay tuned to democracy and, in that way, to verify the arguments and conclusions made earlier during the visit to America.

As evidenced by his letters, addressed to his American colleagues, Tocqueville, however, repeatedly expresses his "disappointment with the development of American political system" (especially, on issues of slavery, on the risks of civil war etc.). Remarkably, today this serves for some researchers as grounds to assume that there is an "invisible" continuation of Tocquevillian *Democracy…*, which can be observed in French author's correspondence. For instance, A. Craiutu argues that Tocqueville's letters written after 1840 implicitly reveal the specific "third volume" of the book, which has even more critical content than the second volume, and these letters provide the very taste of what the message of that volume might have been. In that context, Craiutu, anticipating the possible pessimistic nature of the "third volume", in a bit ironical way marks that the Americans "should be grateful to the vagaries of French political life (which absorbed his energies and occupied his attention in the last two decades of his life) that the author never came to write Volume Three of *Democracy in America*" [12].

However, did the political career (from 1840s) of de Tocqueville really present an obstacle for him to write on [American] democracy what he wanted to write? In other words, if we even assume that Tocqueville had the intention to create the "third volume", is it the time and the energy spent on career or practical political issues (in France) that made him to refrain from writing an additional part of his

---

[1] And American democratic political system presented a good opportunity for that kind of research.

prominent book? In our opinion, the answer requires to point out some essential details of Tocqueville's political career.

The revolution of 1848 created a political conjuncture where the socialists had a crucial influence. De Tocqueville criticized them many times and, in fact, he was in a political opposition. At the same time, being an experienced functionary and a famous political thinker, he had some influence, as well, so the government wanted to take control over him. For that purpose, in June, 1849 Tocqueville was offered the position of the minister of foreign affairs. Obviously, the idea was to neutralize his critique and distract his attention from internal issues to foreign policy. On the other hand, for Tocqueville this was a possibility to use the power for tackling the challenges facing France, "including the internal issues" [13]. Therefore, Tocqueville accepted the offer, though in his letter (dated June 15, 1848) addressed to an American historian and a diplomat George Bancroft he underlines that he accepted the position against his predisposition and exclusively with the hope to contribute to the "restoration of the order" [14, p.13]. However, neither the government, nor the Tocqueville were able to use that "deal" for their purposes (Tocqueville could not use his post to intervene into the internal issues and the government was not able to "recruit" him), so in half a year Tocqueville resigned.

Nonetheless, the important thing is that some years later Tocqueville has already been out of "big politics": in his letter (from 4 August, 1852), addressed to a German-American philosopher and lawyer Francis Lieber, Tocqueville confesses that he leaves the active political life and dedicates himself to the research work [14, pp. 132-133]. This is exactly the point which becomes essential in context of the question raised earlier herein: Tocqueville died in 1859, so at the time of leaving the politics he still had 7 years to write the third volume of *Democracy in America*…indeed, if there was any intention. However, the reality is that in 1856 he published his second book *The Old Regime and the Revolution*, which complements the *Democracy in America*, but obviously does not appear to be a continuation of the book. Hence, it would be reasonable to presume that Tocqueville had enough time and energy to write the third volume of *Democracy…*, but, in fact, he did not intend to do it. It is believed that the reason of "absence" of the third volume is explained not by the assumptions that the author was exhausted by the political life, but by the fact that the book is considered to be a finished, conceptual work: it was written during over 10 years and

did not need to be "amended" in any manner. From this perspective, Tocqueville's disappointment with the American democracy's further development seems to be not something "unexpected" or something which provides a material for Tocquevillian observations' falsification (and, respectively, actualizes the need for Tocqueville's re-vision (i.e. writing the "third volume"), but proves the validity of author's notions on democracy's risks and defects, described by him primarily in the second ("critical") volume of *Democracy in America*.

Conclusion

More than 150 years passed since de Tocqueville's death, but his theory and, in particular, his masterpiece *Democracy in America* is still considered to be a subject matter for many sciences. It is obvious that the dispute over different aspects of Tocquevillian analysis will remain topical for modern socio-political realities. In this regard, it is also clear that the attempts to rethink Tocqueville's legacy will inevitably accommodate Tocqueville Studies' further development. However, it seems that the very trajectory of those researches should be changed: there is a need to shift from the "enhancement" model to a "deepening" one. In the context of issues touched upon in this paper, this means it is more reasonable to ensure an insightful understanding of Tocqueville's ideas rather than try to reinvent the wheel and ascribe something which has no reason to be "attached" to Tocqueville. As Russian author S. Isaev pointed out, the "critical judgments" over the Tocquevillian legacy today in most of cases appear to be a distortion of author's real ideas rather than a correct scientific reinterpretation [15].

Thus, as we tried to argue in this article, the "Tocquevillian democracy" has the same meaning in all the parts of *Democracy in America*, and even if there was a "third volume", the concept would have the same understanding: apparently, the French author had a conceptual vision over the basics of democracy, which explicitly acted as a cornerstone of his theory and permeated the very logic of the volumes of *Democracy in America*, as well as of the rest of his works.

October, 2016

References

1. *Sainte-Beuve,* Nouveaux Lundis (Paris, 1886) t. X, nouvelle Èdition, p. 330.
2. *Cobban A.,* Aspects of the French revolution. – London: Cape. 1968, p.40.
3. *Tocqueville A. de,* Democracy in America, Volume 1, translated by Henry Reeve and edited by Francis Bowen. Cambridge, MA: Sever and Francis, 1863.
4. *Hess A.,* Concepts of Social Stratification. Palgrave Macmillan, UK. 2001, pp. 50-57.
5. *Drescher S.,* Dilemmas of democracy: Tocqueville and modernisation. – Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh press, 1968. – XI, p.5.
6. *Craiutu A.,* «Tocqueville's New Science of Politics Revisited» [May, 2014]. / «Liberty Matters» Online // http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/tocqueville-s-new-science-of-politics
7. *Токвиль А. де.* Демократия в Америке/ Пер. с франц., предисл. Гарольда Дж. Ласки. – М.: Изд-во «Прогресс», 1992. C. 16-17.
8. *Schleifer J.,* The Making of Tocqueville's Democracy in America. Foreword by George W. Pierson (2nd edition).Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000, p. 328.
9. *Drescher S.,* «Tocqueville's Two Démocraties», Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 25 (April –June 1964), University of Pennsylvania Press , Philadelphia, pp. 201–216.
10. Alexis de Tocqueville on democracy, revolution and society. Selected writings. Edited and with intro. by *Stone J., Mennell S.* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London. 1980, p.10.
11. *Craiutu A.,* Tocqueville's Paradoxical Moderation. The Review of Politics, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Autumn, 2005). Cambridge University press, p. 602.
12. *Craiutu A., Jennings J.,* The Third Democracy: Tocqueville's Views of America after 1840. American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 3. Cambridge University Press. August, 2004, p. 404.
13. Воспоминания Алексиса Токвиля, изданные графом Токвилем / *Пер. с франц. В. Неведомского.* –М.: Издание К.Т. Солдатенкова: Типо-литография В.Ф. Рихтер. 1893. C. 215-227.
14. Tocqueville on America after 1840. Letters and other writings / Edited and translated by *Craiutu A., Jennings J.* Cambridge University Press. New York. 2009.
15. *Исаев С.А.* Трактат А. де Токвиля «О демократии в Америке» как источник по истории политической мысли XIX века : автореф. дис. … канд. ист. наук. – Л., 1990.

SYMPTOMATOLOGY OF THE GENTILE SPECIES

Tigran Babasyan[*]

"As churches sprang up within the Roman world, Eusebius, bishop of Caesarea (who lived from about 260 to 340) boasted: 'Persians who have become [Christ's] disciples no longer marry their mothers, nor Scythians feed on human flesh, because of Christ's word which has come even unto them, nor other races of Barbarians have incestuous union with daughters and sisters, nor do men madly lust after men and pursue unnatural pleasures, nor do those, whose practice it formerly was, now expose their dead kindred to dogs and birds, nor strangle the aged, as they did formerly, nor do they feast according to their ancient custom on the flesh of their dearest friends when dead, nor like the ancients offer human sacrifices to the demons as to gods, nor slaughter their dearest friends and think it piety."(Shafer Parker, It's 50 B.C. All Over Again, The Report. December 20, 1999, p. 39).

The psycho-physiological image of the *gentile/stray* culture is inextricably tied with the *incest* as a telling aberration of any societal organization that has espoused the theomachist strain. A closed society is always open to a sin. Balked against the individualism of the Christian worldview, the isolated pagan polities resting upon clan/tribe bonds are prone to yield *incest* as the only "sound" interpersonal psycho-physiological connection against the backdrop of overwhelming sodomy which constitutes the imminent social and moral product of a gentile society. This unsound behavioral ardor embosses the insanity in the minds of the pagan citizenry which after a while needed for this routine to catch on becomes a conclusive pattern in shaping up social ideology of the given polity. With this kind of ideology the gentile society transmutes into a sodomite democracy, where challenging God becomes a public entertainment, the truth – a vice, and the lie – the linchpin of social behavior. In this connection, however, a question suggests

[*]Honorary Doctor of the International Academy of Sciences on Nature and Society.

itself: "Where does the sodomite democracy stem from?" Undoubtedly, it hails from the depths of a circuitous heathen culture staking on kinship/tribal relationships which are specified by the innermost fleshly desires poked up by self-imposed pagan rites and basically preclude or considerably impede the members of one clan/tribe from intercourse with people from a different one or from civilians at large. The inevitable incestuous rotation thus growing into yet another implicit gentile tradition, forges also the incestuous legal, administrative, and economic circulation inside such a miscarried society. *The consolidated sodomite drive against laws of nature and the divine commandments redounds on the abortive society the gentiles have established with most exquisite arsenal of self-extermination: members of such a sodo-gentile society cannot live in peace because inside their culture they are used to living as enemies to each other, or to put it in other words, they are engaged in a dramatic subliminal quest for self-identity in each other. This futile penchant, however, imminently leads to an individual debacle, because if you are not filled with God who is the prerequisite of peace and who is the only way of self-identification, then you are doomed to a ubiquitous animus, since you are filled with the Adversary. To protect themselves against themselves they even concoct a ramified legal system solemnly crowned by the Fundamental Law the foundation of which seems to be the frenzied chase of an enemy.* This stage of the statist metaphysics, as applied to American reality, is portrayed with a few strokes by an American lawyer J. F. Dilton: *"The absolutely unique feature of the political and legal institutions of the American Republic is its written Constitutions which are organic limitations whereby people by an act of unprecedented wisdom have protected themselves against themselves". (W. Seagle, History of Law, 1946, p.299).*

And so the vicious circle is actuated over and over again. In the long run it transpires that the only enemy of this type of society based upon the self-restricted and inevitably incestuous traditions of stray culture is God, especially in his earthly embodiment, to wit Christ Jesus. To put it in other words, unless the kinship/clan-based society is overcome, it is impossible to talk of a truly democratic, i.e. Christian society. ***Hence it is safe to say that the democracy in the political sense of the word starts with the disintegration of the gentile community***. Only in this way can each

individual be personally responsible for his thoughts and deeds to God; otherwise the gentile legislation will make him sin on, i.e. cultivate the subversive mendacity as a norm of social behaviour. It is an ineluctable spiritual axiom with men that as soon as they turn to God they desist from abiding by the gentile/secular law. And it is not occasional: having experienced the power of the direct accountability to God, no one will ever turn back to the hidebound, parochial, backward, and hopelessly obscure world of the irresponsibility of the legal positivism.

One more seminal observation on the *gentile/stray culture* might be its **mono-ethnic composition.** While structured around the clan-based social totem, that is, the gentile polity, and being woven into the intricate pattern of the sinful pagan fabric, this kind of human organization absolves itself from whatever obligation in societal terms; the only charisma for these people becomes playing up for their posterity so that the ossified rites and hidebound precepts of the millennia-old parasitizing social organism stay intact and be handed down. Some may argue this trend to be exemplary also for Christian civilization. But the spate of incestuous generations with massive psychopathic deviations prove to the contrary. The point is that the ethnic self-isolation and individual complacence of these cultures proceed at the expense of inner degeneration. Hence it is easy to visualize the baneful aftermath of the infiltration of the representatives from such social units into the Western/Christian system which draws upon the collaborative relationships between individuals from different social and ethnic backgrounds who are cemented by all-expiating freedom of the Christian doctrine behind the democratic ideology of the Western nation-states or, as we are inclined to put them, Christian nations. For yet another time we come to the imminent conclusion that the elements of stray/pagan cultures should not be admitted to the activities inside the state institutions of the Western nations without being duly indoctrinated and checked for their ideological aptitude first. More plainly, we are positive that the subversive socio-cultural processes cumulatively specified as corrupt practices are nothing less than the emergence of ideological clichés and practical technique worked out inside a pagan social organization and entrusted to its agents to erode the Christian society, which otherwise is called democracy. This utterly vague and ambiguous political layout described in the foregoing which is so tellingly adverse to the western countries at the present time, raises a straight question: 'Who and in what way is going to ensure the reinstatement of the functionality of bedrock

principles enshrined in the ethical norms of the Western political doctrine that entirely rests upon the concept of the global hegemony of the Christian civilization in the name and on behalf of Christ Jesus?' Just in case we will venture to offer a suggestion to those would-be enablers of this crucially important reform: 'The only way to pull it off is to groom the Constitutions of the Western countries by incorporating respective amendments into the Preamble and other respective sections of this fundamental legal instrument toward the unambiguous formulation of the religious prevalence of the Christian doctrine in the legal and judicial systems. Technically this can be enabled only through the actuation of the concept of Christian faith at the socio-economic and ideological levels.'

The foregoing arguments would be untenable if not supported by the most fundamental and atavistic proclivity in the behavior and life activity of the gentile/ stray culture: its inimitable **endowment of *replication***. Among the myriads of things it duplicates on daily basis are the Constitutions of the Western countries which, though far from being ideal, still provide for the bill-filling maintenance of Western civilization, and moreover, give a new lease of life also to the present-day sociopolitical "miracles" like China, India, Japan, Singapore, and others. Still, sad as it sounds, one has to admit that in religious terms even the Constitutions at issue are replications of the divine precepts laid down in the Letters of St. Paul and, indubitably, aimed at building an ecumenical society called Church of Christ that needs to be governed by the constructive principles of integrity so inherent in God. So the choke point of the present-day western/Christian political system appears to be the ever enlarging gap between the religious precepts supporting this system and the technical modes this system governs itself. If, however, we endeavor to find out who is behind that incessant copying, we imminently will arrive at a logically unique conclusion: the locally organized pagan community that, incidentally, is also perfectly networked globally. Having plagiarized the Bible the *principal, i.e. the aggregate of polytheist deities (their notoriously buoyant triad of Astarte, Molech, and Mammon),* behind that old and nasty game has been staking on the lie as the capital weakness of man and the mortal evidence against him in matters concerning the divine retribution. Yet nowhere in the secular Constitutions can it be found that an unambiguous reference to the Atonement Blood of Christ be made, and this is not accidental. Had this reference been made as the keynote stipulation of the entire

legislative system, the latter would be actuated in the spirit of God, to wit justice. Meanwhile, as we know, the replication of the divine and only justice in the mundane interpretation boils down to the formidable institutionalized punitive system that traverses all spheres of the secular rule hierarchy, something that has little, if anything, to do with the concept of the New Testament espoused by the Western civilization. In addition, as we see it, the secular administrative culture builds exclusively on the written law because the Word, the modality of a sound societal life, belongs to God. Under the lay statist conditions even if you promise, you do it for the state (the copy of the Church of Christ) and not on your behalf because you are accountable to God by your own will, while to the state you are also accountable by your will that has been replicated by a formidable statist machinery that, as the case may be, produces the authorized copy of your will in a variety of legal, i.e. written ways, but always in the light favorable for its secular interests that are not always in line with your benefits. By contrast, God accepts your verbal vow which benefits your individual growth and strengthens your personality: it is in your own interest to keep your vow. Evidently, the secular polity has nothing to say: that is why it resorts to written regulations. It is benumbed by its own ploy: having neglected the Word of Life this statist machine of compulsory survival has bereft itself of the modality of perpetuation.

To summarize the above discourse, we would point out some crucially important postulates undergirded by the following considerations. *First,* the society of the stray political system is largely a pagan/kinship/incestuous community void of any reasonable organizational and sound administrative leverages towards ensuring general welfare. The driving force behind its activity is the perverted chase of enemies, which means that this type of society has a congenital predisposition to mental and behavioral disorders because it is swayed by the hallucinogenic incitations of the antichristian cultures fed off the destructive teachings of the remotest antiquity acting on the subconscious level and aiming at the social predominance of a narrow religious clan that is opposed to the monotheist political culture of the sound state system of the Christian age and represents the wasteful pagan lifestyle that only consumes the societal achievements of the religious-political reality created by the Christian West. Thus the

war declared inside the stray polity against each other devours the civilian resources of such a polity on daily basis. In a way this system is always victorious in that it is made up of enemies only, who gain no end of victories over each other. That is why what stands for a victory in human understanding, is construed as a smashing defeat in the eyes of God. This reality comes to attest to the fact that peace can only belong to its maker, i.e. God, who has won a victory men can never do, and who invites men to share the peace emanating from that victory by giving allegiance to God's only Son, through whom this victory has reached fruition. *Second,* the ongoing trends in the development of the secular Western states graphically demonstrate that, due to the negligence of the tenets underlying the Western states/Christian nations, they are being devoured by the ever more conspicuous percolation of the *stray/neo-pagan elements* into the public infrastructure of the Western civilization which process is fraught with the loss of religious identity of Christian nations. *Third*, the expansion of neo-paganism must and can be stopped by the revitalization of the Word of God, not only through the amelioration of the legislations of the nation states, but also through the discovery of its applied implications, by using the esoteric weaponry bequeathed to us by our Lord Jesus Christ. This will absolve Christian nations of any further need of arms race because the Word of God has always proved to work more victorious miracles than any kind of arms past or present. The name of this weapon is Life against which Death dashes and crumbles away. So there is no need to cause death, if death itself can be stripped of any cause or reason. With God everything is workable.

December, 2016

References

1. *T. Babasyan*, Covert Actuality: Stray Cultures Launch World War III, *International Journal of Education and Social Science*, November 30, 2015, pp. 55-60.
2. *T. Babasyan*, Secular Economy as Viewed from Christian Perspective, *21-st Century,* June 2015.
3. *Grove Harris,* Pagan Involvement in the Interfaith Movement, *Crosscurrents,* Spring 2005, p.66.
4. *R. Saunders*, Pagan Places: Towards a religiogeography of neopaganism, *Progress in Human Geography*, 37(6) 786-810, 2012, p.797.
5. *Danny L. Jorgensen and Scott E. Russell*, American Neopaganism: The Participant`s Social Identities", *Jornal for the Scientific Study of Religion,* 1999, 38(3), pp. 325-338.
6. *Shafer Parker,* It's 50 B.C. All Over Again, *The Report.* December 20, 1999, p. 39.
7. *Gary Jensen and Ashley Thompson*, "Out of the Broom Closet": The Social Ecology of American Wicca, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion.* (2008) 47(4), p.753.
8. *Loren Wilkinson*, The Bewitching Charms of Neopaganism, *Christianity Today,* November 15, 1999.
9. *Jon P. Bloch*, Individualism and Community in Alternative Spiritual "Magic", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion,* 1998, pp.286-302.
10. *Huntington S. P.*, The Clashes of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, *2003*
11. *Seagle W.*, The History of Law, NY, 1946
12. *P. Vicente, D. Kaufmann*, Legal Corruption, 2006